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This brief introduction is intended partly to provide a
background against which a discussion in detail of
Freud's unconscious can be seen in proportion and partly
to explain why such a discussion has not been rendered
a waste of tine by the advances in psychology which have
made obsolete so many of Freud*s notions. This
introduction does not try to justify its statements, but
merely to make them as plain as possible: and this must
be my excuse if some of them are less precise than they
might be,
(1) From the practical point of view, Freud was the man
who worked out a technique for alleviating certain
disorders by talking to his patients and by getting them
to talk to him. dome of these disorders were physical
(hysterical paralyses or tics, for instance) and some
were emotional (such as anxieties about illness or
abnormal affections). There was a striking difference
between this technique and the physical measures v/hich
had hitherto been applied to all disorders and which
continued to be applied by other practitioners to the
disorders which Freud's method alleviated: and this
difference was identified by Freud with the distinction
between the mental and the physical. ilis patients'
talk /
talk v;as an expression of tilings of the mind. - memories,
phantasies or emotions - while the medicines and
neurosurgery of his colleagues were directed at the body.
His patients* disorders were alleviated when their talk
led them to recall experiences which they had forgotten -
to regurgitate, as it were, memories instead of foreign
bodies. The more difficult it was to regurgitate the
memory, the greater the relief when it was out.
(2) Like so many eighteenth-and nineteenth-century
psychologists, Freud thought of memories, phantasies
and so forth as consisting of ideas which were the
contents of the mind in much the same way as food can
be the contents of the stomach. Instead of being
regarded as actions which were sometimes being performed
and sometimes not, ideas were thought of as things which
existed, and which could not be created out of nothing
or vanish into nothing. When this habit of thought
encountered the fact that some disorders were alleviated
when certain memories were with difficulty regurgitated,
it seemed clear, at least to Freud, that these memories
had been there all the time, like "matter in the wrong
place". The wrong place must be a part of the mind,
since memories were things of the mind; but this could
not /
not be a part of the xoind that was known to us (bewusste).
Everyone knew, of course, that there was a part of the
mind where memories went when they were not being recalled
and where certain processes, such as counting or reasoning
could be carried out without our realisin it, although
they were easily recognised as talcing place when attention
was drawn to them. But this was only a sort of ante¬
chamber to the known mind: it could be called the
"vorbewusste", or "preconscious". The interesting and
important thing was that there seemed to be other thoughts
that differed from those in the preconscious in that they
could not be brought into the conscious part of the mind
at will, but only by special methods and with difficulty.
This must be a completely unknown part of the mind, the
nunbewu3ste", the unconscious.
(3) The things in the unconscious were the cause of dis¬
orders because they were trying to escape into conscious¬
ness, but were prevented by a force, called repression
by Freud, exercised upon them by the conscious self, the
ego. The ego behaved in this way because it was under
constant surveillance by the super-ego, a structure which
had been created out of the ego by parental admonition,
and /
and which subjected the ego to feelings of guilt if the
things in the unconscious were entertained by it. The
efforts of these things to escape from the unconscious
took two forms: the first was their apiiearance in
dreams under elaborate disguises: the second was mental
or physical disorder, such as the detachment of an
emotion from its proper but repressed idea and its
mesalliance with a conscious but inappropriate idea, or
again the appearance of the physical concomitants of a
violent emotion without the emotion itself.
(4) In this and other ways the things of the unconscious
did not behave quite like those of consciousness. There
was this protean fluidity which sought escape in all
sorts of disguises. There was the coexistence of quite
contradictory ideas about, or emotions toward, the same
object. There was a sort of "tiinelessness" or absence
of change. There was the absence of negation: all
unconscious things were positive, and negation or
prohibition was a function of the conscious ego. There
was an independence of reality: unconscious desires
took 110 account of whether their objects ere attainable,
or whether, if attainable, they might not harm or
destroy the possessor of these desires: what determined
whether /
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whether thoughts should he repressed or admitted to
consciousness was the pain or pleasure they would give
to the ego if it entertained them, not their practical
consequences if they gave rise to action.
(5) It ould of course take too long to refer here to
all the new notions that Freud introduced at various
points of this psychological frame..orIc. Borne of them,
such as symbolism, will be dealt with in the detailed
discussion which is to come. There are other inno¬
vations, such as the classification of instincts into
the sexual and destructive groups, and the much
criticised inclusion of many apparently "innocent" ones
in the sexual group, which are very largely independent
of the psychological framework, and with hich we shall
therefore be very little concerned.i
(6) But no account can afford to loave out Freud*s
"metapsychology", although almost all expositors try to.
Freud thought that a complete description of a mental
process must deal with three aspects of it. It must
say which system it belonged to (for example, to the
preconscious system): this xvas the "topographical
aspect." /
"LAlthough these other innovations of Freud*s are also
of great interest to the logician.
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aspect". It must also say what the process did (that
is, whether it was a memory, an emotion or some other
kind of process): this was the "dynamic aspect".
These two aspects together were sufficient for a
"psychological" account. But a metapsychological
account must also Include a third aspect. This was
the distribution of energy which was involved in the
process: the "economic aspect". All mental processes
involved the same kind of energy, which Freud visualised
as electrical: but the energy could exist in two states,
"cathected" and "discharging", which corresponded roughly
to "potential" and "kinetic" with the additional difference
that in the cathected form a certain amount of energy was
linked with a particular process, such as an individual
memory. It was this cathected energy, striving for
discharge, which was responsible for the efforts of
unconscious mental processes to escape into consciousness.
One of the important differences, in Freud*s view, between
conscious and unconscious processes was that cathected
energy, which in the former is linked to one particular
process, can transfer itself in the unconscious from one
process to another in its search for a means of discharge:
I have already given a "psychological" description, in




metapsychologically as "motility of cathexis".
(7) freud's metapsyciiology, to which I shall return
when considering his views on the mind-body relation¬
ship, is in one way an attempt at a reconciliation
between his technique and his scientific beliefs. He
must have felt that the success of his technique was
closely connected with the fact that it dealt with
things of the mind, such as ideas and emotions, instead
of things of the body, such as lesions of the brain.
But his scientific materialism, which regarded all these
mental phenomena as the result of the process of evolution,
made it necessary for him to show that the things he
described psychologically were physical phenomena. His
metapsychology provided this demonstration. At the same
time it provided him with a defence against attacks from
two quarters - from academic psychologist-philosophers
who argued that only the conscious was mental, and from
practising psychiatrists who objected to his neglect of
physiology.
(8) I shall have more to say about metapsychology very
soon. But I want to explain why the Freudian unconscious
seems to me to deserve study at this late stage. To
begin /
-9-»»
"begin with, it has been adopted in one form or another
by practically all exponents of a very important group
of psychotherapeutic techniques. I shall be devoting
a chapter to the exact relationship between It and the
technique of psychoanalysis, and a rough statement must
suffice at this stage.
(9) The psychotherapeutic techniques can be divided
first of all into two main divisions, the "physiological"
and the "semantic". The former rely chiefly on the
administration of drugs, electric shocks, and surgery:
the latter on the exchange of signs between technician
and patient. (I say "signs" rather than "words" because
of the use of pictures, models and toys, which is not
entirely confined to the treatment of children). The
semantic techniques can be divided in their turn into
the "environmental", which seek to remedy the patient's
disorder by inducing him to cnange part of his environ¬
ment - for example, his job or his wife: (some of the
"counselling" techni ues that are practised in the United
States of America seem to rely largely on this): and
the "personal" > which seek to produce a change in
the patient himself. Personal . techniques can be
arranged in a scale according to the extent to which they
are /
10,
are "mandatory" or "maieutic": the former seek to
change the patient's constitution "by persuasion,
instruction, threats or hypnosis2, while the latter
seek to guide the patient's own mental processes so
that he rearranges himself, as it ..ere, ho technique,
of course, is wholly mandatory or maieutic: even
psychoanalysis, which is probably the most maieutic,
has comparatively mandatory exponents such as Ferenczi.
(10) It is this group of semant c personal
techniques which are usually labelled "psychotherapy".
There are perhaps a few at the extreme mandatory end
of the scale which do not make use of the concept of the
unconscious: there is, for example, the general
practitioner whose advice in cases of anxiety neurosis
is to "pull yourself together" or to "think of something
else" (this technique is becoming rarer). But I
cannot think of any school, outside the churches, which
does not use the concept. It is true that it assumes
different forms in different hands - an obvious example
is the comparatively shallow- individual unconscious of
Jung, supplemented by the comparatively bottomless
collective unconscious. In these non-Freudian hands
the /
^Hypnosis can of course be used, as Freud himself used
it at first, to assist a maieutic technique.
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tlie concept is to be found without the rest of the
Freudian apparatus - without the superego, the libido,
the metapsychology. It is true that some of his other
concepts, notably the superego, have proved of such
value that, under one name or another, they appear in
many other psychologies. But they have achieved this
on their own merits. They are not logically involved
in the employment of the concept of the unconscious.
Indeed, as we shall see, there is probably only one other
Freudian concept which is logically implicated with that
of the unconscious in such a way that it is impossible
to employ one without the other, and that is "repression".
(11) So much for the importance of the notion. But is
there any need for yet another discussion of its nature?
hy excuse must be that there is still a good deal of
misunderstanding on two points. The first of these is
its nature as it is described by Freud. I hope to show,
for example, that the so-called dynamism of the Freudian
unconscious lias been exaggerated. It has been thought
of as something that was in a continual state of change -
a place where action went on unobserved, or even as a
crude hind of alter ego which could scheme against a
man*s conscious well-being. But when we come to examine
the /
12.
the sort of behaviour that Freud actually attributed to
it, we shall find it to be something much less exciting -
much more like a simple machine than a manimin. I do
not mean that the view which I intend to put forward
would have been accepted by Freud: but it is the view
that emerges when all his considered statements are put
together, when his thoughtless obiter dicta are discarded
and hen a consistent scheme is thus drawn up.
(12) The other misunderstanding concerns its logical
status. A lot of controversy has raged round the
question "Is there really such a thing as the unconscious?"
home people (including Freud) have produced arguments from
observed phenomena to show that there is such a thing.
Others have attacked these arguments, or have produced
evidence that there is no such thing. Others again have
treated the matter as a dispute over words. I hox>e to
show that the Freudian notion of unconsciousness belongs
in fact to a fairly small class of things which we
find in the explanatory sciences, and whose true nature
has only recently been appreciated. X shall not
attempt to make an assessment of its value, either to
psychotherapy or to academic psychology, since I am
not /
13.
not qualified to do so. What I shall attempt to do is
to suggest a certain view as to its logical nature,
and show how this affects its logical relationship to
the technique of psychoanalysis; and both of these
subjects have a bearing 011 the question of its practical
value.
(13) In the remainder of this Introduction I shall deal
very briefly with the origins of some of .Freud's notions,
the traps to be avoided in interpreting him and his via s
on the relationship between mind and body -
In Chapter 1 I shall discuss Freud's way of dis¬
tinguishing between conscious, preconscious and uncon-
:sclous entities, and will give a short account of the
things which in his view were never unconscious.
In Chapter 2 I shall discuss "repression" and the
way in which different accounts of repression support
the suggestion that the unconscious is a "scientific
model".
In Chapter 3 I shall discuss the various things
that in Freud's view could be genuinely unconscious, and




In Chapter 4 I shall discuss Freud's four arguments
for the unconscious in the light of these conclusions,
and suggest that only one of them is of any value, and
this only if it is modified.
In Chapter 5 I shall suggest that unconsciousness
belongs to the class of things that xiave been called
"principles of inference".
In Chapter 6 I shall discuss its relationship to
psychoanalysis in the light of the recognition that this
is a technique and not a science, pure or applied.
THE OKIGIEE OF FuEUE'E EUTlUiU.
(14) To identify all the sources from which Freud drew
the concepts and theories which are now regarded as his
system, is a task in itself, and I intend to include in
this brief introduction only a few salient facts to serve
as a background for my logical discussions,which will not
deal with historical questions. At least two writers in
English, Allers (3E. 1941) and Ernest Jones (SFLW• 19l>3)
have reviewed what is known about Freud's intellectual
ancestry., Ernest Jones with industry and Allers with
insight. Ernest Jones' statements, however, (especially
in his chapter on "Freud's Theory of the Liind") suffer
from at least one important defect: they do not make it
clear /
/
clear whether they are dealing with Freud's nature
viev s or whether they are dealing with his views as
they were during the last decade of the nineteenth
century, that is, at the end of the period with which
Ernest Jones' first volune is concerned. Perhaps the
second volume, when it appears, will make this clearer.
(15) Neither Freud nor his followers owed anything to
the experimental psychologists of their generation in
Germany, nor even perhaps of the previous generation.
Freud's only public mention of the great Helmholtz, although
he much admired him, is when he cites him as a case in
which epilepsy did not "interfere ..ith the highest
intellectual achievement". (DP, 1928,CP V,p.226). Until
Freud went to Paris, his subject was cerebral neurology,
and when his interest was aroused there in non-physical
methods of treating disorders of behaviour, it was of
course from the French psychologists that he learnt his
technical approach to them. He always denied, of course,
his debt to Janet, for reasons of prestige, but was less
ungracious to Uuarcot: and there is em obvious resemblance
between his "unconscious" and binet's "double consciousness",
although Freud stresses tne differences (UC8, 1915, CP JLV,
p.103). The hypnotic technique which he at first
employed /
10*
employed was borrowed from the frenchman Bernheim, and
traces of it still remain in present-day psychoanalysis:
the patient's couch is the altar to the forgotten god.
(16) ilis most striking debt is of course to Herbart,
from when he inherited his notion of "ideas" as the
material objects of the mind (see Chapter 3) and his
"censorship", and perhaps other concepts such as the
libido. No-one, however, seems to have offered a very
satisfactory explanation of the way in which Freud came
by his iierbahian notions, until Ernest Jones made a
suggestion in SYLM (1953, p.410). Allers had suggested
that Breuer (who according to Aller's "personal information"
was acquainted with the works of Herbart, and who had
certainly a great influence on Freud) v/as the source.
Ernest Jones has learned, however, from a Dr. and Mrs.
Bernfeld that in Freud's last year at the Gymnasium a
text-book was in use which was in effect a compendium of
the Herbartian psychology: this does not contradict
Aller's suggestion, but it is far more likely to explain
Freud's Herbartianism. I myself suspect, however, that
Herbart*s system v/as well-known to the French psychiatrists.
I find Janet, for example, asking this question in AP
(p.479) which was published in 1889 (three years after
Freud's /
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Freud * s visit to Paris):
"
• . .les theories plus modernes0 sur la
persistence des idees dans la iaeiaoire et
sur lo caractere indestructible de la
pensee, ne se rattacnent-elles pas d'une
maniere bien e'troite a nos experiences
sur la catalepsie, la suggestion
therapeutique et les actes subconscients?".
Quite apart from the question whether Freud owed his
notion of the unconscious to Janet, this passage
suggests that Herbaitian notions were at least being
talked about in the France of the eighteen-eighties.
(17) I shall be dealing later with the complete logical
independence of Freud's psychology from his matapsychology.
The latter was the legacy of his physiological training
under Brucke. Ernest Jones (loc. cit,) and Boring
(HEP, 1950, p. 708) have dealt with the efforts of Bruclce
and others of Helmholtz* school to explain all the
behaviour of the organism in terms of chemistry, electricity
and physics; and Ernest Jones has given us a synopsis of
Freud1s unpublished Project, in which Freud thought he had
achieved this for the hehaviour of the brain. Freud
wrote this in 1895, but seems to nave lost interest in it
very quickly: as the last section has never been seen by
anyone it is not even certain that he finished it.
Ernest Jones is probably near the truth when he says
"We /
3i.e. plus modernes que "les speculations des anciens
auteurs hylozoistes" of whom Janet has just spoken.
18,
"We may regard the feverish writing of the Project as
a last desperate effort to cling to the safety of
cerebral anatomy" (SFLW, 1953, p.421)• Freud's
discoveries v/ere made in the consulting-room, not the
dissecting-room or laboratory, and consequently he
thought of, and gave then their first expression, in
psychological language. But he never ceased to offer,
as a sort of by-product of his work, the metaps3rchological
account which derived from the physiology of Brucke.
(18) At the risk of oversimplifying, I should like to
conclude this very brief section by emphasising that in
Freud we find three quite uistinct tilings combined, and
that they came from three quite distinct sources. First,
there was his psychotherapeutic technique, which was
developed out of the hypnotic methods of the French school.
Second, there was his psychology, which was Herbartian.
Third, there was his metapsychology, which attempted to
reconcile his discoveries in the other two fields with the
cerebral anatomy which had been his first love. # His
notion of the unconscious belongs to his llerbartian
psychology, but he was led to it by his discoveries in
the consulting-room. We shall find in Chapter 4 that
when he produces arguments of the laboratory type in
support of it, they are not orth much, and that the only
one /
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one of importance is the one taken from the consulting-
room. We shall see, too. , that he did not realise
that the notion of the unconscious was foreign to his
metapsychology•
M&dLhdgPIflG FitEUD
(19) To extract from Freud a full ana precise description
of the unconscious is an undertaking in itself. The
trouble is not the sparsity of his statements but their
abundance. Any consistent and comprehensive
interpretation could be refuted many times over by
quotations alone. The inconsistencies are most numerous
in his passages on the nature of the psycnic apparatus.
The same phenomena are described on different occasions
in quite different terms. The most general pronounce-
:ments are delivered without a hint of the important
reservations that are maue elsewhere.
(20) it is true of course that Freud was not trying to
state a metaphysical theory (as he is at pains to point
out) but to secure acceptance for a technique and an
attitude. As a result his arguments are often selected
with an eye to effect rather than consistency. But this
gypTflWflt.jrm nhflR nnt. Liakf- it any easier to decide what _
his /
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his considered answer would have been on many point3,
No doubt he would simply have dismissed many of the
distinctions which philosophers feel bound to draw,"
(21) It is also possible to draw a distinction between
his po ular and his esoteric works. Apart from writings
on applied psychoanalysis (such as "Moses and Monotheism"),
the popular ones are the "Introductory Lectures" ("Old"
and "New") j "The Psychopatnology of Everyday Life", the
"Autobiographical Study" and perhaps 'hoi Outline of
Psychoanalysis", But I doubt whether many difficulties
can be resolved by discarding the popular* expositions.
They may contain a higher proportion of loose statements:
but they also contain the concrete illustrations which
are lacking elsewhere5. (Apart from "Inhibitions,
Symptoms and Anxiety", the theory is seldom illustrated
in the esoteric papers).
(22) One fact, however, which must be allowed for is
the important development which took place in Preud's
views after the first World Var. Unfortunately, it
also took place after he had written his two papers on
the unconscious (1912 end 1915: CP IV), which would
otherwise /
'hie regarded precision in ne\h scient:irTc concepts as a
disadvantage, since it prevented them from being
modified as a result of investigation (ITV1. 1915,CP IV)
5
for example NIL, 1933, P.93 et seq. ^ives a clearer
statement of the distinction between conscious,
preconscious and unconscious than any passage in the
esoteric papers.
21.
otherwise he the loci classici oil the subject. These
and other "metapsychological" essays which were
published before 1919Gcan thus be quoted only with a
certain amount of caution. The same caution must also
be used in accepting expositions by other writers,
unless they give full weight to this development.
(£3) I shall try to outline the naturqof this
development without anticipating too many of the con¬
clusions about Freud*s later view which require to be
substantiated in detail. The 1915 essay treats the
unconscious as a "system" (Freud uses the same word in
the German): it is one of the "regions of the mental
apparatus" and the conscious and preconscious are another.
To Freud at this time it was conceivable that "an idea
may exist simultaneously in two parts of the mental
apparatus", and may "regularly aavance from the one
position to the other, possibly without the first location
or position being abandoned". ,At the same time, he
was aware that he was using the term in two senses - to
refer to a system, which he regarded as the proper sense,
and to refer to a quality ahich some mental acts possess,
which he called the descriptive sense,
(24) /
Q&nnfl FTftud (BMP p.4) speaks of the new phase as
beginning with the books GPAE (1921) and BPP (1920).
It is of course true that the terra ego (or rather, ich)
was used much earlier, for example in the metapsyetiological
essays of 1915 and in the essay on Charcot of 1393
(CP I,p.20): but see paragraph 165 for the difference
between the early Freudian "ego" and the later conception.
22.
(24) By 1923, however, lie had conceived, or borrowed
from Groddeck7, the distinction between the ego and the
id. Henceforward the id takes the place of the
unconscious as a system. This was not entirely a
verbal matter, since the id did not include all that the
unconscious had included, such as the unconscious parts
of the ego. In much the same way the ego replaced the
"system CS", although here again the correspondence was
not exact. , (EI, 1923, part II). Thus it is no
longer the consciousness or unconsciousness of a mental
process that is held responsible for a pathological
condition, but the relationship of the process to the ego.
Consciousness is a by-product of the acceptance of the
process by the ego.
(25) Another source of confusion is Freud*s use of what
are really two separate languages - the psychological and
the metapsychological. A good example of this confusion
is Dr. Brierleyfs statement, while she is sketching the
development of Freud*s thought, that
"With the formation of the libido theory and the
conception of conflict as conflict between ego
and sexual instincts, the ideo-motor terminology
lapsed into disuse. Today the language of
instinct holds the field in theory. Thus, we
speak of cathexes of objects rather than of the
emotional /
23,
emotional charges of ideas, and tend, in
practice, to regard these two expressions as
synonymous • • •"
Her remark may well be true of the linguistic History
of psychoanalytic literature: certainly she knows more
about this than 1 do. But I am afraid that she means
that this change took place in Freud's own thinking, and
that it was more than a linguistic change. I shall try
to make her mistake clear in the course of my brief
section on Freud's views on the mind-body relationship.
But 1 ought in fairness to say that Freud himself provides
every excuse for those v/ho confuse his two languages,
since he makes no effort to keep them separate. I shall
shortly, for example, quote a passage here he talks about
"eathecting an idea". One reason for this sort of
trouble is that there were a number of notions - for
example, the ego - that had to be used both in his meta-
:psychology and in his psychology: so that Freud sometime
slipped from one language into the other without realising
it, like a Frenchman talking in English who has to use a
French phrase - such as "esprit de corps" - which is
common usage in both languages, and as a result inadvert¬
ently goes on talking French.
FREUD'S /
FREUD *3 VIEWS OH THE EELATIOHSHIP BETWEEN
ivIIHD AED BODY.
(86) A good example of the difficulty of interpreting
Freud is the task involved in extracting from his works
a clear account of the relationship between the mental
and the physical. The need to attempt this is obvious.
Interpretations of Freud's statements about the unconscious
will vary reatly if one Interpreter imputes to him a
Cartesian dualism while another believes him a follower
of Leibniz.
(27) These are of course views which Freud was not at all
likely to share, as his background makes plain. His own
autobiography tells us how much he was influenced in
his student days by Darwin8. In his revised edition of
ID (1911, p.2) he shows that he was acquainted with the
works of Herbert apencer. In the early part of his
medical career his subject was cerebral anatomy and the
of
location/organic lesions in the brain which were re¬
sponsible for disorders of speech or of other kinds of
behaviour. It is also true that he had read Kant: but
all that he seems to have got from this is a conviction
that scientific descriptions, however conscientious, can
be /
%rnest Jones points out (3FLU, 19b3, p.381)—that Freud
was strictly speaking a Lamarckian, since he believed
that experiences of one generation could be inherited
by later generations as racial memories.
25.
be no more than approximations to a reality which is
unknowable•
(28) Against this background, we should expect ireud
to derive his notions of the nature of the mental not
from the dualism of the Cartesians or the idealism of
Leibniz, but from the scientific materialism which was
fashionable in Britain at the end of the nineteenth
century, and which Karl Pearson had popularised in Germany
(and also, no doubt, in .oistria), And this is, I think,
what we find in most of the relatively scarce passages
in which Freud hints at his views. Both in comparatively
early essays (such as FTP, 1911) and in his last work
(OP, 1940, p.15) he explains that the ego is q&art of the
id which has undergone modification as a result of its
proximity to the outer world: it "serves the purpose
of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from
them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of
living substance surrounds itself" (NIL, 1933, p.100).
He believed that the conscious system developed out of
"unconscious mental processes ... the older primary
processes, the residue of a phase of development in which
they were the only kind of mental processes".
Consciousness, he thought, appeared only with the
ability to think in words: for thinking in pictures is
a /
26.
a "very incomplete i'orm of becoming conscious, which
approximates more closely to unconscious processes
than does thinking in words, and is unquestionably
older than the latter, both ontoggnetically and
phylogenetically"• In OP, however, he says that the
"higher animals" must be assumed to have an ego, and
even a superego. Possibly, therefore, he thought that
the evolutionary order was - ego, preconscious thought
of the "picture" kind, followed perhaps by the formation
of a superego, and lastly fully conscious thinking in
words,
(29) This sequence does not of course account for all
the kinds of mental processes in which Freud believed.
There are still the primary processes, the processes of
the id, to be accounted for. Their evolution is not
described by Freud. But from his account of the
emergence of the other processes we can without any
reasonable doubt infer that in Freuu*s view animals began
to have an id as soon as they began to have a brain -
perhaps even as soon as t .ey began to have a central
nervous system.
(30) For Freud, this ascending scale of processes
overcame the difficulties of dualism. One of his
arguments /
arguments against "the conventional identification of
the mental with the conscious" is that this "plunges
us into the insoluble difficulties of psychophysical
parallelism". (UC3«1915.p.l00)He goes on to say -
"At any rate it is clear that the question -
whether the latent states of mental life ...
are to be conceived of as unconscious mental
states or physical ones - threatens to resolve
itself into a war of words ... How as far
as their physical characteristics are concerned,
they are totally inaccessible to us: no
physiological conception nor chemical process
can give us any notion of their nature".
(31) His argument seems to be this. "If you hold that
all mental states are conscious, you cannot give a
satisfactory description of any causal connection bet: een
mental and physical states, and are thus driven into the
amis of Malebranche. But the evidence points to
intermediate states, and it is largely a matter of
definition whether they are called physical or mental.
But the latter is better, because they cannot be fully
described in physical terms (although they have some
characteristics which can be): they require psycho¬
logical terms to complete the description".
(32) Compare this with a later passage (BPP,1920,Pt.VI)
.here /
^Ernest Jones uuotes a passage from Freud*s "Aphasia" to
show that in 1891 Freud did in fact believe in psyeno-
physical parallelism. His failure to draw attention to
this later passage is a good example of the difficulty
of icnowing wuen he is describing FreudTs views at the
end of the nineteenth century and when he is dealing
with Freud*s views once and for all.
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where Freud is dissatisfied with the lack of precision in
his speculative concept of the death-instinct, and says -
"This comes only from our being obliged to operate
with scientific terms, i.e. with the metaphorical
expressions peculiar to psychology (or, more
correctly, the psychology of the deeper layers).
Otherwise, we should not be able to describe the
corresponding processes at all, nor in fact even
to have remarked them. The shortcomings of our
description would probably disappear if for the
psychological terms we could substitute
physiological or chemical ones. These too only
constitute a metaphorical language, but one
familiar to us for a much longer time and perhaps
also simpler".
(33) Freud is regretting that his concepts are not such
as can be discussed in physiological or chemical terms -
not that these are completely adequate even for the
phenomena to which they are applied, but having been longer
in use they approximate more closely to the reality. As
I have said, Freud knew enough about kant to believe that
reality contained something quite unknowable.
(34) There is, however, at least one passage which
suggests a "two-sided interaction" theory10 ;_
"For the telepathic process is supposed to consist
in a mental act of one person giving rise to the
same mental act in another, what lies between
the mental acts may very well be a physical
process into which the mental process transforms
itself at one end and which is transformed back
into /
am using Broad*s excellent classification in KEN,
1927, Beetion A.
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into the same physical /"sic translatorJ process
at the other. The analogy with other trans-
:formations, such as speaking and hearing across
the telephone, is an obvious one. And think
what it would mean if we could get hold of this
physical equivalent of the mental act I I
should like to point out that by inserting the
unconscious between the physical and what has
hitherto been regarded as the mental, psycho¬
analysis has paved the way for the acceptance
of such processes as telepathy." (NIL" 1933,p.75)
(35) It is possible to reconcile this passage with en
emergence theory by supposing that a "mental act" is a
process most of whose characteristics (but not of course
all) are best described in psychological terms, and which
gives rise (at least on some occasions) to processes that
can be more or less adequately described in physical
terms, and so on. There is some support for this kind
of interpretation in the following passage from OP (p.34)
"...there is no alternative to assuming that there
are physical or somatic processes which accompany
the mental ones and which must admittedly be more
complete than the mental series, since some of
them have conscious processes parallel to them
but others have not".
But perhaps it is simpler, and more probable after all is
said and done, to explain botn these passages as the
obiter dicta of a man who was no logician and no
philosopher, and did not trouble to reflect whether ho wa
here talking the language of parallelism from which he
had long since meant to save psychology.
(3G) /
30,
(36) From OP (pp.34-56) Freud seems to have thought
that the metapsychology which he evolved from 1910
onward provided the language which came nearest to
describing the essence of mental processes.
"The processes with which (psychology) is concerned
are in themselves just as unknowable as those
dealt with by the other sciences. • .but it is
possible to establish the laws which these
processes obey and to follow over long and
unbroken stretches their mutual relations and
interdependences ... This cannot bo effected
without framing fresh hypotheses and creating
fresh concepts: but. • .we can claim for them
the s, me value as approximations as belong* to
the intellectual scaffolding found in other
natural sciences, and we look forward to their
being modified, corrected and more precisely
determined as more experience is accumulated
and sifted. So too it will be entirely in
accordance with our expectations if the basic
concepts and principles of the new science
(instinct, nervous energy etc.) remain for a
time no less indeterminate than those of the
older sciences (force, mass, attraction etc.)".
(OP. 1940, p.36)
Notice that the "basic concepts and principles of the
new science" are quite different in nature from the
other set of terms with which Freud is accustomed to
work: the latter include such things as ideas, emotions,
and aro in short introspectible,truly mental entities.
The metapsychology is couched in non-mental terms: its
entities are not the sort of things that could conceivably
be introspected. They are such things as libido,




(37) I have already given a short outline of the nature
of this metapsychology; but it ill perhaps be clearer
if we consider as an example the sort of description it
offers of what Freud in his psychological language would
have called an "idea" (vorstellung). For the meta-
jpsychologist, mental phenomena ' ere processes involving
the brain and a kind of energy which Freud seems to have
regarded as electrical (to judge by some of his terms)#
This energy was encountered in two forms, cathexi3 and
• •
discharge (besetzung and abfuhr). Examples of discharge
were emotions (gefuhlen) and "purposive muscular action"
(zweckmassige , .us cela.kt.lon) , all of which, by the way,
involved consciousness or preconsciousness. Ideas, on
the other hand, were cathexes, "ultimately of memory-
traces" (in Grunde von ^rinnerungsspuren) (UC3, 1915,
CP IV p.lll) I have not found anyone bold enough to
attempt a full explanation of the nature of a cathexis
(or, a fortiori , of a hypercathexis or anticathexis)•
It seems, however, to consist of this electrical energy
in an undischarged form, in which it corresponds roughly
to the potential energy of dynamics, as opposed to the
kinetic form, to hich the discharge of this energy
corresponds# The correspondence is not exact, because
a cathexis is sometimes spoken of as a process (vorgang).
I think, however, that it is a process wc ich is, as it
were, /
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were, circular and unending, like some forms of
perpetual check in chess or, to use an electrical
simile, like a current induced in a metal ring. for
practical purposes, therefore, the distinction between
cathexis and discharge is very close to that between
potential and kinetic energy. The point is of
importance for an understanding of the real nature of
the Freudian unconscious (see Chapter 3).
(33) In the section on the interpretation of Freud, I
quoted i)r. Brierley's remark that the ideo-motor
terminology lapsed into disuse, and was replaced by the
language of cathexis. My own view is that this is true
of the history of psychoanalytic literature, but not of
the development of Freud's own terminology, and
particularly misleading if it is intended to convey that
he abandoned his ideo-motor psychology,
(39) First of all, Freud did not confess to any change
of this kind. This is not of course conclusive, but
he did confess, as we have seen, to the adoption of his
ego-i,d theory. Br. Brierley ought however to offer an
explanation of the many references tQideas in Freud's
latest works (for example, ISA, 1926, p.20, NIL, 1933
p.100, 103, OP, 1940, p.23, 42), and particularly OP p.23
where /
where Freud talks of the ego as beginning "to cathect
the ideas of objects with libido".11
(40) It is fairly clear that Dr. Brierley has fallen
into the error of nistaking Freud's metapsychology for a
rival psychology to nis ideo-motor one. I hope that what
I have alreaay said shows how wrong this is. I . m of
course concerned with Freud's ideo-motor psychology
rather than with his metapsychology, for it is to the
former that the Freudian unconscious belongs. But in
view of the sort of confusion of which someone so knov-
iledgeable as Dr. Brierley is capable, I had better say
a little more about metapsychology.
(41) This language seems to me to have been constructed
by Freud for to reasons. one of the reasons was that
ho was forced to recognise that in some ways his
unconscious mental entities (that is, his unconscious
ideas) did not behave in quite the same way as they did
when conscious. But the chief reason was that once he
had conceived the notion that his unconscious bridged
the gap between conscious mental events and physical
processes, he saw a chance of linking his ps, caology with
the /
T°r— —
Btrachey translates "die Vorstellungen von Objekten"
as the "presentation of objects", although he usually
renders "■"Vorstellung" as "Idea" (for example, on p.
42 of OF).I cannot see any advantage in this sort of
translation.
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the physiology and physics of his day. His meta-
:psychological language is much more like that of
electrodynamics than that of psychology.
(42) This has some odd results. First, his meta-
:psychological concepts still behave, as I have hinted,
in a way that is reminiscent of the way in which Freud
thought ideas behave. Instead of the exclusion of one
idea from consciousness by another incompatible idea,
you have a cathexis of a memory-trace kept from dis¬
charging itself by an "anticathexis". Second, he fell
into a kind of epiphenomenalism. Psychoanalysis, he
is forced to say "explains the supposedly somatic
processes as being what is essentially mental and dis¬
regards for the moment the quality of consciousness".
For if the most accurate description of mental processes
is one that contains no mental terms, it cannot be the
introspectible qualities of such processes that determine
their courses. These introspectible qualities, in
other words, must be causally irrelevent, like the
colours of the parts of a grandfather clock: if you
shine a light on them, you see that they are brown or
black or golden, but the clock v/orks whether they are
seen or not.
(43) /
(43) Philosophically speaking, he was thus biting the
hand, that had. fed him# For in his eyes the essence of
the discovery he had made was that you could affect
people's thoughts and behaviour by means of their
introspectible mental entities. Instead of manipulating
their bones or muscles you could manipulate their ideas:
instead of extracting teeth or gall-stones you cured
them by extracting memories# Fortunately, one of the
striking things about Freud is the speed with which he
drops his raetapsychology as soon as he begins to talk
about actual examples# Case histories are rarer in his
later works tnan in his early ones, but even in ItJA,
where he is at his most obscure ana theoretical, he
begins to talk in plain terms (memories, emotions,
desires) as soon as he tries to explain what was the
matter with Little mans. This is not only because his
metapsychoiogical language is hopelessly cumbrous; it
is also because it is lacking in particularity# For
you cannot really explain what was wrong ith Little Hans
in terms of cathexes, anticathexes, ego-syntonic
processes and so forth: they just do not begin to be
an explanation until you give them meanings by saying
"well you see, this cathexis is a memory of an accident
to a morse, and this instinct is an a;ressive one
towards his father; and so on"#
(44) /
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(44) I shall be dealing later with the true logical
relationship between the two languages, the raeta-
ipsychological and the ideo-motor. For the present,
it is enough to emphasise the point I have just made
about the lack of particularity in the metapsyetiological
language. It is impossible to see why one meta-
:psychological process should cause or prevent another
unless you have identified the former as, let us say, a
dislike of your brother and the latter a memory of a
kindness which he did you. And to escape from the
difficulty, as Freud and the neo-Freudians sometimes do,
by talking of the processes as an object-cathexis of
your brother and a cathernia of that memory trace, is
merely to translate netapsychological language back into
ideo-motor language, but to disguise this fact by pe¬
rtaining some of the words of the former. It is true
that some words belong to both languages: "repression"
is probably the best example; and this helps to disguise
the sleight of hand. But they are none the less
separate languages.
(45) We must not of course make the mistake of dismissing
Freud's metapsychology as a useless historical curiosity.
From the point of view of cerebral physiology that is
no doubt what it is. But in psychoanalysis it is not
obsolete: /
obsolete: it is the origin of the "process theory"
which fco many present-day psychoanalysts regard as
the proper language. These neo-Freudians reserve
the icleo-iaotor language of emotions,memories and so
forth for their patients, and converse among themselves
in a technical language elaborated out of Freud's meta-
:psychology. Happily t Is is not universal: as I
shall explain later, the ideo-raotor language survives
not merely as an exoteric language but also as the
technical language of the "object-relations school1'.
(46) I hope tnat I have said enough to mane it clear
why Dr. Brierley is oversimplifying matters when she
says that "the ideo-motor terminology lapsed into
disuse" "with (Freud's) formulation of the libido theory
and the conception of conflict as conflict between ego
and sexual instincts". If her remark is a purely
philological one, and means no more than that Freud
began to use words like "libido" and "cathexis" with
great frequency, I cannot quarrel with her. But I
suspect that she means that Freud abandoned his ideo-
motor way of thinking for a metapsyetiological way of
thinking: certainly this is /hat she thinks that
psychoanalysis has now done (TPA, 1951, p.45: and soe
Ch. IV). If so, I think that she is not clear about
the relationship between the two languages; and if she
is /
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is not clear on this subject it may be that other
psychoanalysts who think (or think they think) in
terms of "process-theory" are not clear either.
However thi3 may be, the language which I am going
to examine is the one in which kreud first described
his discovery and to which he resorted whenever he
wanted to make it plain what was wrong with a
particular person - the ideo-motor language - although
I shall sometimes have occasion to refer to the other.
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CHAPTER I
The distinction between conscious,
preconscious and unconscious*
40
(47) Before plunging into a detailed discussion of the
mental phenomena which could, in Freud1 s view, he un-
:conscious, we must have as clear an idea as possible of
the nature of the distinctions which he drew between this
and the other categories of mental phenomena# For
example, it is important to realise that the\classification
of these phenomena into conscious, preconscious and un-
:conscious was intended to be exhaustive: \f a thing was
mental, it fell into one of these groups, and if it did
not it was not mental (OP, 1940, p.38)• This principle
led him into some questionable conclusions about things,
such as the superego, which must, he thought, be mental
but did not appear to be conscious: he was compelled to
conclude that they were preconscious or unconscious. On
the other hand there were phenomena, such as instincts,
which did not fall readily into any of these categories,
and which were clearly dependent in some way on the
functioning of bodily organs; they were therefore not
mental.
(48) If there could be said to be any one passage in
Freud's writings which summed up his views on the dis¬
tinctions between conscious, preconscious and unconscious,
it would be pages 94-96 of NIL (1933). Fven this
passage has obvious deficiencies. It begins by saying
"What /
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"Wh.at is meant by 'conscious' we need not discuss; it
is beyond all doubt" - an optimistic pronouncement to
which Freud was prone. This forces us to scrape
together references to consciousness in other passages,
of which the most important are:-
"Only something which has once been a Gs
perception can become conscious, and anything
arising from ithin (apart from feelings) that
seeics to become conscious must try to transform
itself into external perceptions: this can be
done by way of memory-traces" (hi, 1923, p.21)
"oensations and feelings only become conscious
through reaching trie system Pcpt1" (ibid. p.25)
"Consciousness is in general a very highly
fugitive condition. what is conscious is
conscious only for a moment. If our perceptions
do not confirm this, the contradiction is merely
an apparent one. It is explained by the fact
that the stimuli of perception can persist for
some time, so that in the course of it the
perception of them can be repeated. The whole
position can be clearly seen from the conscious
perception of our intellective processes: it
is true that these may persist, but they may
just as easily pass in a flash. Everything
unconscious that behaves in this way, that can
easily exchange the unconscious condition for
the conscious one, is therefore better described
as "capable of entering consciousness" or as
"preconsclous" (OP, 1940 p. 37-38)
(49) The passage in NIL is lengthy, but probably
important enough to make it worth quoting almost in
extenso. After beginning as I have described, it goes
on /
%hA "pRT-csptnnl system", w.ilch Freud thought of' aa"
an outer layer of the mind, developed to cope with
external stimuli. It is sometimes called the pcpt-Cs.
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on -
"The oldest and best meaning of tiie ord "uncon¬
scious is tiie descriptive one; we call
"unconscious" any mental process tiie existence
of which we are obliged to assume - because, for
instance, e infer it in some ..ay from its
effects - but of widen we are not directly aware,
l.e have the same relation to that mental process
as we have to a mental process in another person,
except that it belongs to our-selves. If we want
to be more accurate, ve should modify the
statement by saying that we call a process
•unconscious' when v/^iiave to assume that it was
active at a certain time, although at that time
we knew nothing about it. This restriction
reminds us that most conscious processes are
conscious only for a short period; quite soon
they become latent, though they can easily become
conscious again. We could also say that the:
had become unconscious, if we were certain that
they were still something mental when they were
in the latent condition. So far we should have
learnt nothing, and not even have earned the right
to introduce the notion of the unconscious into
psychology. But now we come across a new fact
which we can already observe in the case of
errors. ,.e find that in order to explain a slip
of the tongue, for instance, we are obliged to
assume that an intention to say some particular
thing had formed itself in the mind of the person
who made the slip. We can infer it with
certainty from the occurrence of the speech-
disturbance, but it was not able to obtain
expression; it was, that is to say, unconscious.
If we subsequently bring the intention to the
speaker's notice, he may recognise it as a familiar
one, in which case it was only temporarily
unconscious, or he may repudiate it as foreign
to him, in which case it was permanently unconscious.
Such an observation as tnis justifies us in also
regarding what we nave called *latent" as something
•unconscious'. The consideration of these
dynamic relations puts us in a position to dis¬
tinguish two kinds of unconscious: one which is
transformed into conscious material easily and
under conditions which frequently arise, and
another in the case of which such a transformation
is difficult, can only come about with a consider-
:ablo expenditure of energy or may never occur at
all . . . /
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all • • • We call tiie unconscious which is
only latent, and so can easily 'become conscious,
the 'preconscious*, and keep the name 'unconscious'
for the other. We have now three terms,
'conscious', 'preconscious' and 'unconscious',
to serve our purposes in describing mental
phenomena. Once again, from a purely descriptive
point of view, the 'preconscious' is also
unconscious, but we do not give it that name,
except when we are speaking loosely, or when we
have to defend in general the existence of
unconscious processes in mental life". (NIL,
1933, pp. 94-96).
(50) These passages suggest that for Freud "consciousness"
(bewusstsein) was something very closely connected with
"perception" (Ymhrnehmung)• This "perception" could
take the form of awareness of what was going on in the
outside world, or in a bodily organ, at the present
moment; or it could be a past perception revived, either
in the form of a memory or in the form of a new com-
:bination of past perceptions ("phantasy" or "imagination").
When Freud talks of the "conscious perception of our
intellective processes" (in the OF passage) he seems to
be describing "introspection". Lven the most cam-
:plicated and abstract rocesses of reasoning were made
to come under the heading of "perception" by regarding
the conscious part of them as consisting of words, which
were visual or auditory perceptions revived.
(51) At the same time, Freud's references to the fugitive
nature /
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nature of conscious processes (both in the NIL and. in
the OP passages) suggest that bound up ,ith the
perceptual nature of consciousness there was an element
of introspection, I do not mean that 1'reud thought
of all conscious mentar phenomena as being what we
should call introspected. But as we shall see Ireud
id not think clearly about introspection; nowhere
does he describe, far less discuss it. And in this
case it seems to me very probable that he was trying
to describe the state of affairs which Broad (in MPN,
192b, p,381) puts in this way -
"It is evident that in the vast majority of cases
of conscious perce tion, I am not aware of my
perception in the sense 01 introspectively dis¬
criminating, Nevertheless, I should certainly
refuse to entertain the suggestion that I am
not aware, in any sense, of my conscious
perceptions while theyare taking place, I
shall say then that the person in our
example was aware of his act of seeing the
drawer and most of its contents, in the sense
that he had "simultaneous undisfcriminating
awareness" of this mental event, •
And 1 think that in describing this state of affairs,
I'reud did not distinguish between "introspective dis¬
crimination" (that is, what we should c 11 introspection
proper) and "simultaneous undiscriminating awareness".
If, as seems unlikely, he did reflect upon the difference,
he may well have thought that it was a difference in
dggree /
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degree only, and tiiat introspection was merely the
clearest sort of unaiscrininating awareness; certainly
when we come, as ue are ah ,ut to do, to the difference
between the preconscious and the unconscious we shall
.find that this too is regarded by Freud a3 one of
degree and not of kind.
(58) The ground is thus prepared for an ambiguity in
the definition of the preconscious. This consists of
phenomena which, as OP says, "are capable of entering
consciousness" or as NIL says are "transformed into
conscious material easily and under conditions which
frequently arise" but "the existence of hich we are
obliged to assume ... but of .hich we are not directly
aware". In view of Freudfs ideas on the nature of
consciousness it is clear that "entering consciousness"
or "being transformed into conscious material" could
mean one of two things - either (1) being turned into
conscious perceptions or (S) being the ob.ject of conscious
perceptions, that is, being the object of what Broad
calls "introspective discrimination". These two
possibilities were not clearly distinguished by Freud,
who appears to be thinking sometimes in terms of one and
sometimes in terms of the other.
(55) /
(53) This ambiguity may be responsible for Freud*s
omission to draw a clear distinction between two rather
different things which were both regarded by him as pre-
:conscious. The most obvious example of this is the
way in which both "memory-traces" (erinnerungsspuren) end
the act of remembering are spoken of as preconscious
without any indication that they are of a different
nature. If one does not distinguish between "remembering
with simultaneous undiscriminating awareness" and
"introspectively discriminating" one*s act of remembering,
then it is easy to overlook the difference between two
other things. These are (1) the "actualisation" of a
capacity for remembering something; and (2) the intro-
cspection of thi3 capacity. The first of these consists
simply of the conscious act of remembering something,
whereas the second is not possible.
(54) An example may make it clearer how easy the confusion
was for Freud. If I am asked "Do you re .ember your
telephone number?" I may think of the number 45092,
introspect this act of remembering, and truthfully reply
"Yes". But if I am asked "Do you remember T.S. Eliot*s
poem *The hippopotamus*?" I may reply "Yes" without
saying the poem to myself, and yet without being dishonest.
Frir T mny have recalled that on the occasions when I
have /
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have tried to recite this poem I have succeeded, and
that the last occasion was recent enough to malce it un-
: likely that I am now unable to do so. Now in these
examples Freud would have said that my remembering my
telephone number was conscious and my memory of "The
Hippopotamus" preconscious. But there is a third kind
of phenomenon which v;e would also have called preconscious.
If I had been absentxaindedly repeating to myself the
words of the poem, let us say while I was cleaning my
shoes, he would have said that I was preconsciously
remembering it. If I had been asked "what are you
thinking about?" I might have replied "The ords of
•The Hippopotamus1"; and to do so I would have had to
introspect that I was doing preconsciously. But that
would still be very different from the process by which
I concluded that I had the capacity to remember the
poem.
(55) Thus Freud failed to distinguish introspection
proper not only from simultaneous undisfcriiainating
awareness, but also from something else, which I propose
to call "self-description". As we shall see when we
come to consider concepts such as repression, resistance,
and the super-ego, this failure had important consequences.
tendencies /
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tendencies and dispositions which can be attributed
to a person in one's "description" of them ought, if
all were well, to be introspectible by that person;
and consequently he assumed that any such dispositions
as the person could not introspect were prevented from
being introspected by some abnormal circumstance.
Let us suppose that someone whose judgment I respect
tells me that I am hypocritical, and that instead of
ceasing to respect his judgment I proceed to search
myself for this hypocrisy. If I make the mistake of
looking for something that is introspectible I shall
fail to find it, and mgcy conclude that there is some
onthological reason for this. If on the other hand
I realise that what I ought to be doing is recollecting
my thoughts in certain situations and comparing them
with my expressed opinions - in other words, performing
an act of self-description and not of introspection -
I shall not come to such a disturbing conclusion.
(56) There is another feature of Freud*s attitude
towards introspection -,hich is interesting when the
concept is used to distinguish between the status of
different mental phenomena. The use of introspectibility
in this way is very like the way in which chemists
distinguish /
distinguish between certain pairs of substances. They
are able to tell v/hetner a substance is X or Y by
attempting to dissolve it in water or some other fluid.
If the attempt is successful the substance is X, if not,
it is Y. The underlying assumption in this kind of
test is that the fluid*s capacity for dissolving X does
not alter: the chemist is of course able to make this a
reasonable assumption by making sure that his fluid is
not at on abnormally high or low temperature, end is not
already saturated. The same assumption underlies the
use of introspection as a touchstone for the status of a
mental phenomenon; the capacity for introspection is
assumed to be constant. iay point here, however, is not
that the capacity to introspect varies, not only from
person to person, but also from moment according to the
distractions to which the person is subject; so much must
have been obvious to Treud. What is interesting is that
he chose to treat variations in the introspectibility
of mental phenomena as entirely due to tneir access-
:ibility to a constant capacity for introspection, ..hen
there were two other courses open to him. These were
of course to treat these variations as entirely due to
variations in the capacity'for introspection, or to treat
them as the "resultants" from combine., variations both
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in the capacity ior introspection and in the access¬
ibility of the phenomena,
(57) It may well be that these alternatives did not
occur to him: after all we have seen that he did not
reflect very deeply on the subject of introspection.
But if he had considered them, he might have been able
to offer reasons for his own choice. He might have
argued as follows:- "I agree that if your only observ¬
ation is that a mental phenomenon X, which you would
expect to be introspectible, is not introspectible, you
have no rational grounds for preferring one of these
three courses to another, unless perhaps you argue that
the assumption that the situation is due to variations
in both the capacity to introspect and the accessibility
of X is more complicated and therefore that the other two
are preferable. But- as soon as you couple this observ¬
ation with the observation that the effects of a non-
introspcctible X differ from the effects of an intro-
ispectible X, then it is clearly simpler to assume that
the difference lies in the two Xs, than that it lies in
the capacity for introspection and that the two Xs do
not differ. So that this last assumption must be ruled
out, and you are left with a choice between the other
two, of which one involves two variables instead of one,
and /
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and is therefore only justified if the "assumption of
varying accessibility" fails to account for some of
your observations, I agree that the capacity must be
regarded as something which can vary - for example, in
situations where the external distractions are great -
and there may therefore be small variations at any time.
But I can produce situations in my consulting-room so
free from distractions that these variations are
negligible, and the capacity to introspect can be
regarded for practical purposes as a constant". On the
whole I think that this would have been a valid answer.
It depends of course on the truth of the assertion that
the effects of an unintrospected X are different from
those of an introspected X, with all the assumptions
that underlie this. But granted this for the moment
we can I think approve Freud's reasons for choosing the
"assumption of varying accessibility", if indeed it was
consciously chosen. But we shall find the otner two
raising their heads when we come to the concepts of
repression and resistance, and the attempts of .Russell
and Broad to treat these as "non-recognition".
(58) We are now in a position to consider Freud*s
distinction between preconscious and unconscious mental
phenomena./
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phenomena. In the NIL passage we have seen this
described, as the difference between what is "transformed
into conscious material easily and under conditions
which frequently arise" and things "in the case of which
such a transformation is difficult, can only come about
with a considerable expenditure of energy, or may never
occur at all". We have already seen the ambiguities
which are concealed in the phrase "transformation into
conscious material". But there is something else which
the NIL passage does not make quite clear. At first
sight it gives the impression that there are alternative
sources from which material can come into consciousness -
first, the preconscious and second the unconscious.
Freud makes the conscious mind sound like a room with
shelves, some of which (the unconscious ones) are harder
to reach than the others (the preconscious ones): we
are tempted to conclude that something could be one
moment unconscious and the next moment conscious, as an
alternative to being one moment preconscious and the next
conscious. But he did not mean this. What is un-
:conscious can become conscious only by first becoming
preconscious. The preconscious is the only antechamber
to consciousness® and not merely the more usual of two
means of entrance.
mu. .
g3ee, for" example, the quotation in the next paragraph.
rz
I am, of course, ignoring perception, which was
regarded by Freud as another means of entry.
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(59) Freud * s way of describing the difference, however,
allows him to think of it as one of degree: unconscious
mental phenomena are merely hard...r to reach than pre-
:conscious phenomena. We can see the confusion at work
in this passage from OP (1940, p.38): "The division
between the three classes of material which have these
qualities /"""consciousness, preconsciousness and uncon-
:sciousness/" is neither absolute nor permanent. What
is preconscious becomes conscious, as we have seen,
without any activity on our part: what is unconscious
can, as a result of our efforts, be made conscious,
though in the process we may have an impression that
we are overcoming what are often very strong resistances. . •
The amount of effort needed varies in each individual
case. For instance, what comes about in an analytic
treatment as a result of our efforts can also occur
ontaneously: material which is ordinarily unconscious
can transform itself into preconscious and then into
conscious material - a thing that happens upon a large
scale in psychotic states." X think that Freud is
thinking of the process of making the unconscious
conscious as if it were merely a more laborious form of
the process which we should call "proceeding to intro¬
spect", When he was being precise (as in the last
sentence /
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sentence of the OP passage) lie describes the former
process as one of transformation into preconscious and
then into conscious material# But we have seen how he
can almost in the same breath describe it loosely as
the transformation of unconscious into conscious material.
(60) In fact, of course, the process of introspection
(or more precisely of proceeding to introspect) differs
in kind and not merely in degree of laboriousness from
the process of rendering the unconscious conscious. On
Freud*s own showing, the latter requires either a clearly
abnormal mental state, a psychosis, or else the prolonged
employment of various psychoanalytic devices, such as
free association. as a corollary, the status of the
unconscious differs in kind from that of the preconscious.
The former is not merely harder to reach than the latter;
it cannot be reached until it is transformed into the
latter. The logical error committed by Freud was this*
Having recognised t. at in addition to conscious mental
phenomena there were mental phenomena that could be
rendered conscious by a simple act of introspection, he
found that there was a third class, that could be
inferred but not rendered conscious by this simple act.
He also found, however, that this third class could by
certain means be turned into tilings in the second class,
whereupon /
55
whereupon they were of course capable of being rendered
conscious by the simple act. Therefore instead of
continuing to define the third class as what could be
inferred but not rendered conscious, he tried to define
it as what could be rendered conscious with difficulty.
His mistake may have been more natural because the
process of turning things of the third class into things
of the £?econd was often necessary in order to justify
the inference that was part of the original definition.
(61) As a result of all these ambiguities it is
logically possible that Freud's unconscious mental
phenomena will fall into the following subdivisions:-
A, "Actualisations" (e.g. emotions, acts of
recall) which are not introspectxble.
B. "Potentialities" which are not the subject
of "self-description" (i.e., are not
recognised by their possessor when he
attempts "self-description", either
B.l* because the potentiality is
never actualised
or B,2, because its actualisations are
not introspected.
or B.3. because it is actualised in the
form of introspectiblo actual¬
izations, but these actualisations
are not recognised by the possessor




THINGS TnAT ..ERE HHVEH UHCONSCIOUS
(62) In addition to tiiese distinctions, there is the
subdivision of mental phenomena according to whether,
in Freud's opinion, they were never unconscious, always
unconscious or sometimes unconscious and sometimes
conscious or preconscious, It is not difficult to find
examples of "never-unconscious" phenomena. It seems
clear from HI (1923, p#21 seq) that phenomena involving
"verbal images" or "thinning in pictures" were assigned
by Freud to this category, as were the sense - perceptions
of the external world from which these images are derived,
(As Dalbiez points out (in PILDF, 1941, p, 47) Freud does
not seem to have distinguished perceptions of one's own
bodily organs ("proprioceptive sensations') from other
perceptions or feelings.) Reasoning was another thing
that was probably "never unconscious". There are
passages which cast a little doubt on this; for example, in
ILP (1917 p, 153) we find that mathematical calculations
do not "come into the province of the dream-work;
anything of the sort appearing in the manifest dream is
generally a mere combination of numbers, a pseudo-
calculation, -quite absurd as such, and again only a copy
of some calculation comprised in the latent thoughts".
Here it may be that the "latent tho gilts" are unconscious
phenomena. /
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phenomena. But as we proceed through the middle and
later works it becomes clear that this was not Freud's
considered opinion. There are the repeated assertions
that "the governing laws of logic have no sway in the
unconscious" (OP, 1940, p.53) and that "there is in this
system no negation, no dubiety, no varying degree of
certainty" (UC3, 191a, p«119). And finally there is the
passage in OP (1940, p. 110) which says that the ego's
"constructive function- consists in interposing, between
the demand made by an instinct and the action that
satisfies it, an intellective activity . hich, after
considering the present state/of things and weighing up
earlier experiences, endeavours by means of experimental
actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed
line of conduct".
(63) These passages do not of course exclude the pos¬
sibility that Freud regarded separate judgments or
beliefs, as distinct from a process of reasoning, as
capable of being unconscious. In ILf (1917, p. 33) a
dreamer is described as really knowing the meaning of
his dream, although consciously he cannot interpret it:
and there is a similar implication of unconscious
knowledge /
—I do not think we need seriously consider the
possibility that this xvas a function of the unconscious
part of the ego.
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knowledge In ID (1911, p.561). But I cannot find any
passage that makes it clear whether this was Freud's
considered opinion. On the one hand, the two passages
I have referred to are obiter dicta, not essential to
his argument, and there is an obvious metaphorical way
in which a dreamer may "know the meaning of his dream";
Freud may have meant no more than that the dreamer has
in his unconscious the ideas that the dream represents
in a cryptic way. On the other hand, Freud may have
considered separate judgments or beliefs as consisting
of ideas or groups of ideas, and may therefore have
thought that like all ideas they could be repressed. I
do not think we can reach any firm conclusion unless a
more decisive passage is discovered.
(64) Another phenomenon that is, in normal cases, never
unconscious is volition, or, to be more precise, volition
that issues in action. "The ego is in control of
voluntary movement" (OP, 1940, p.15). Freud arrived
at this conclusion at a fairly early stage, for he
states it In UCS (1915, pp. Ill and ISO). In these early
passages he makes two exceptions to this general rule.
"Left to itself, the system Ucs would not in normal
conditions be able to bring about any purposive muscular
acts, with the exception of those already organised as
reflexes". /
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reflexes". And again "whereas the control of the
system Cs over voluntary motility is firmly rooted,
regularly withstands the onslaught of neurosis and only
breaks down in psychosis. . ."
{65) The first of these exceptions - reflex actions -
fits reasonably well into the theory of mind-body
relationship which I have attributed to Freud• mi
emergence theory can (but does not have to) hold that
the emergence of mental characteristics begins very low -
even at the lowest point - in the scale of biological
processes. Thus, while most of the characteristics
of reflex actions can be described in non-mental
language, it is possible to hold that a complete des¬
cription must employ mental language, to however small
an extent.
(66) The second exception - psychotic behaviour - is
explained by Trend*s belief that in ps Glioses - or at
any rate some of them - the normally organised ego is
overwhelmed by the unconscious id.
(67) The interesting thing is that Freud does not mention
a third class of phenomena as an exception - the
"parapraxes". /
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"parapraxes". At first sight, lie night have been
expected to regard slips of the tongue, lapsus calami
and other errors in "voluntary movement" as unconscious -
in fact, as minor invasions of the ego by the id, :h.ch
differ from psychotic behaviour only in frequency or
importance (as indeed is hinted in the last page of
PPEL, 1904-) •
(68) It is also surprising to find no mention of the
phenomena which captured the attention of the xrench
psychologists about the turn of the century - the
automatic writing and other unconscious actions which,
they could elicit not only from hysterics but also from
normal subjects.
(69) The explanation, I suggest, is this. The para-
:praxes which fraud described in PPEL (1904) '.ere
regarded as faulty parts of an otherwise correct whole -
they were looked on not as actions themselves but only
as defective sections of actions. Secondly, the error
was distinguished from its motive; the latter was
unconscious (or, in the case of easily explained errors,
preconscious) but the e? or itself, since it formed part




(70) Phenomena such as automatic writing had been used
by Binet as evidence i'or "double consciousness" - a
concept which i'reud was at pains to reject. In UCw
(1915, CP IV p. 103) he explains "known cases of * double
conscience*. . . as cases of a splitting of the mental
activities into two groups, whereby a single conscious-
:ness takes up its position alternatively with either
the one or the other of these groups." This does not,
of course, do full justice to Binet (whom Freud must
have had in mind): for Binet had described similar,
though less striking, phenomena in normal as . ell as
hysterical persons (BC. pp. 76 et seq.)
(71) Nor are dreams ever unconscious. So-called un-
:conscious phantasies, which I shall discuss in para¬
graphs 201 to 203, are not unconscious dreams because
they are not the result of dream-worm. I shall discuss
dream-work when I come to deal with so-called unconscious
processes. I suppose, however, that Freud would have
agreed that a dream, though always preconscious when it
occurs, can become unconscious in the sense that the
memory of it can be repressed.
(72) most of my conclusions in this short section on
Dalbiez /
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Dalbiez (EMDF, 1941 VOL II, p. 46 et seq.). His interest,
however, is in deciding whether Freud's views coincide
with his own conclusions as to what can, for theoretical
reasons, bo unconscious, and he does not, in this GS&sapter
at least, draw attention to Freud*3 own distinction
between the descriptive sense of "unconscious" (which
includes "preconscious" - see NIL, loc. cit.) and the
"dynamic" sense (which excludes "preconscious")• As a
result, there is complete confusion in this chapter of
Dalbiez* between "unconscious" and "preconscious", which,
to do him justice, does not weaken his main argument,
although it greatly reduces the value of his interpret¬
ation of Freud«
AFFECTS.
(73) The exclusion from unconsciousness of these concepts
is not very surprising, although the Freudian unconscious
is often credited with them in superficial expositions.
A more interesting exclusion is that of "affects".
(74) "Affekt" in Freud*s terminology is used to denote
all emotions (gefuhlen) ana feelings (empfindungen).
Examples of emotions are love, hate, fear, anxiety: pain
and pleasure are feelings. sometimes all three oems,
emotions, /
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emotions, feelings and affects, are used together as
if they were species of the same genus; sometimes they
are used almost as synonyms (of, UCo, 1915, p.110).
Ernest Jones quotes a passage which suggests that affect
is the metapsychological counterpart of the otuer two9
In the 1915 essay (UCo p. Ill) they are said to "correspond
with processes of discharge", in contrast to ideas, which
consist of energy in catliexis.
(75) UCS (1915, p.Ill) makes it clear that "there are no
unconscious affects in the sense in which there are un-
:conscious ideas". "The unconscious idea continues,
after repression, as an actual formation in the system
Ucs., whilst to the unconscious affect there corresponds
in the same system only a potential disposition which is
prevented from developing further". Earlier in the
same section, the reason for this conclusion is given:
"It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should
feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness".
(76) It is obviously necessary to decide whether Freud
was still of this vie:, in his later phase. In his
later phase, he certainly refers several times to un-
iconscious affects (for example, EI, 1923, p.33). But
in EI (p.26) he says "ae come then to speak, in a
condensed /
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condensed and not entirely correct manner, of "unconscious
feelings", keeping up an analogy with unconscious ideas
\ rich is not entirely justifiable"• It is interesting,
too, to find that this doctrine continues to be a part
of modem psychoanalytic thinking. BrierJej (T.I-.a.,
194-0, p.44) quotes i'reua on the subject with complete
approval.
(77) Bread's own argument in support of this surprising
doctrine is not worth veiq much. -at the most, it would
show that the introspectible qualities of affects are not
unconscious. hut bj his own showing mental processes
have non-introspectible walities, which, according to
his metapsychology, are the essential ones from the
point of view of causality. It is true that if affects
are processes of discharge ana other unconscious
processes are not, this would be a strong argument.
But this distinction, since it is a metapsychological
one, must be reached by reasoning, and not by intro¬
spection, and cannot therefore be the starting-point
for an argument.
J
(70) According to Dalbiez (PiiDI1, 1941, p.49) the doctrine
was criticised b, Breud's own follower de Oaussure. As
I /
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I have been unable to find a copy of La Methode
* 5
Psychanalytique, i imov/ no more of de Baussure's
argument than is summarised by JDalbiez. He seems to
have maintained "that Freud's point of view would end
by recognising only possibilities outside the conscious".
Dalbiez, mho agrees with Freud (p. 34) seeks to refute
him, firstly by appealing to Freud's belief in un-
:conscious cognition (an argument which is greatly
weakened by Dalbiez* failure to distinguish between the
descriptive and the dynamic senses of "unconscious":
and secondly by saying that de Baussure "confuses pos-
:sibility ,.ith potentiality. The former belongs to the
purely logical, the latter to the ontological, order.
The state of potentiality is more than possibility and
less than actuality".
(79) ..itnout access to de Jaussure's thesis, it is
difficult to tell whether Balbiez* retort is more
effective than it sounds. But, however this nay be,
two points are of interest. The first is that, as
Br. ticAlpine points out in her paper PBoF (1942), Freud's
early papers make no such distinction between the
unconscious /
^lt appears to be a thesis published in 1922.
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unconscious affect and the 'unconscious idea (see, for
example, DNP, 1894 in UP I p»63). secondly, when tlie
distinction does come to "be drawn, it is inferred not
from fresh clinical data, but from Freud's notions of the
metapsychological natures of ideas anci affects. There
is no doubt that, at le, st in Freud1s early papers, the
is
cause of disorders/often"iocked-up affect". What then
mas the reason that/Led him to decide that xhat was
"locked-up" was not really affect, but ideas? I shall
sug est reason when I come to discuss "ideas".
IWjTIHCTS.
(80) 8o much for things that are always either conscious
or preconscious. But there is another kind of thing that
is never unconscious, for a different reason; it is not
mental. It is however of great importance to an under¬
standing of the Freudian unconscious - perhaps of more
importance than some of the things (such as phantasies)
that could be unconscious. This is the Freudian "Trieb".
(81) I have not succeeded in finding a satisfactory
discussion of the origins of this notion. Brnest Jones
does not mention it in the first volume of BFLw, although
he /
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he may repair this omission in the next• Boring is
equally reticent in HEP. as happens so often, it is
Allers who, though antagonistic to Freudianism, has the
deepest insight. In tjx, (1941, Ch. 3) he attempts to
derive this notion of Proud*s from Wernicke and Bruclce;
Freud had criticised the former's account of speech
disturbances in his monograph on aphasia, hut has clearly
teen influenced by Wernicke's notion of reflex arc3
(see tiie reference to them at the beginning of I'l'V (1915,
CP IV p. 60). as for Bruclce, Freud had worked in his
laboratory, and as no doubt acquainted with nxner's
experiments with stimuli (ITV also begins with references
to these). I cannot help feeling, however, that filers
has accounted for only part of what is contained in the
Freudian "Trieb". It is of course possible that the
residue is Freud's original contribution, but I should
like to be more certain of this. X cannot, for example,
find anyone who will either name earlier physiologists or
psychologists who used this very word or will state
categorically that Freud was the first to use it.
(8£) For .lave X found any satisfactory account of all
that the word stood for in Freud's writings. fillers'
again is the best, but is unsupported by references that
would prove his -dints. T shall therefore have to begin
with /'
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with a rather tedious aeries of quotations,
(83) It has of course "been said again and again that
"instinct" is not a good translation of "Trieb". It is
true that those who say this are usually thinking of
"instinct" as the equivalent of what is more precisely
called "instinctive behaviour" - that is, the unlearned
purposive behaviour of the organism as a whole; whereas
if "instinct" is defined as the physiological cause of
such behaviour it comes far closer to the meaning of
"Trieb" in £reud. It is also true that Freud himself
used "instinct" to translate "Trieb" -..hen he wrote his
account of psychoanalysis for the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
It is now the accepted English equivalent, although words
like "urge" have also be n used. I myself think that
"motive" is the closest of all, but whether this is
accepted depends on whether my account of the Freudian
"Trieb" is accepted. I shall follow tradition by talking
of "instinct",
(84) It is perhaps orth beginning by pointing out that
Freud believed in waat is sometimes called the "quiescence"
theory of cerebral behaviour:
"The nervous system is an apparatus having the
function of abolishing stimuli hieh reach it,
or of reducing excitation to the lowest possible
level; an apparatus which aould even, if this
were /
G9
were feasible, maintain itself in an altogether
unstimulated condition" (IfV, 1915, CP IV, p.CE) •
In colloquial terms, this can be described as the theory
that all one really wants is to be left alone; that the
organism is organised with one end in view - to get rid
of stimuli as soon as possible and return to the un-
:stimulated .state. Jometines tnis can be achieved
comparatively quickly, but oometim.es it leads to long
and complicated manoeuvres by the organism6. ^11 this
of course is the basic assumption underlying trend's
theory that dreams were really devices to prevent the
dreamer from being wakened up by his own wants, and it
also fits in with his notion of a death-instinct
(Touestrieb - see for example Or, 1940, p. 20).
(35) In ITV, freud distinguishes several kinds of
stimuli. There are those that act on reflex arcs and
do not reach the mind. There are those that do reach
the mind, but from the outer world, that is perceptions,
And there are those that reach it from "within the
organism". These are "stimuli of instinctual origin"
(Trisbreisen) • The examples given by Preud are "when
the mucous membrane of the oesophagus becomes parched
I
kfhe quiescence theory is not by any means dead (see
j'nr rr.ruinple J.h. loung'S DCg. 1951, p. 67). It has
of course been attacked, notably by He'bb, in OiiB,
(1949, p.172 et alibi), but I am not sure that it is
one of those theories that can be disposed of by
scientific argument. It nay turn out to be another
"principle of inference" - see Chapter 5.
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or when a gnawing makes itself felt in the stomach".
These stimuli, however, are not exactly what is meant
hy instincts, lich "never act as a momentary impulse
hut always as a constant force".
(36) A Freudian instinct is not mental. then he is
being precise, Trend carefully distinguishes between an
instinct and its "mental representative" (psychischer
nepr sentat)• This distinction is to be found even in
his latest works (for example, in NIL, 1933, p. 10E and
OP, 1940, 0.19). The mental representative of an
instinct in the conscious or preconscious is an idea plus
an affect (that is, desire or fear); in the unconscious
it is represented by ideas alone, since affects cannot
be unconscious.
(87) ji'reud is not often so precise as this, however.
He will frequently give explanations in terms of un¬
conscious wishes or impulses. In OP (1940, p.19) the
mental representatives of the instincts are described
as "the tensions caused by the needs of the id"
(Bedurfnisspannungen des Ho). ^md on p. 36 of OP
"instinct" is named, along with nervous energy, as one
of the basic concepts of the new science. It is not
quite clfj.nr here whet.-en Freud in talking nfJds npv.r
psychology /
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psychology or his metapsyciiology (probably the latter) but
in any case we must try to decide whether in his later
years he thought of instincts as represented in the mind
not by ideas and affects, but by a third hind of entity,
a need or wish.7
(83) There is a passage in MIL (1933, p.125) which
certainly suggests a new definition -
"An instinct differs from a stimulus in that it
arises from sources of stimulation within the
body, operates as a constant force, and is such
that the subject cannot escape from it as he
can from an external stimulus. /"So far this does
not differ from the account in li'V/ An instinct
my bo described as having a source, sin object
and an aim. /""UYiis catalogue omits "impetus",
..rich heads the list in ITV_/ source is a
state of excitation within the body, and its aim
is to remove that excitation; in the course of
its path from its source to the attainment "of
its aim the instinct becomes operative mentally.
^The emphasis is mine^" We picture it as a
certain sum of energy rorcing its way in a
certain direction ... The aim can be attained
in the subjects own body, but as a rule an
external object is introduced, in which the
instinct attains its external aim; its internal
aim is always a somatic modification ..hioh is
experienced as satisfaction."
(89) Although Dalbioz does not quote his evidence, I
think he must have had this passage in mind when he
attributed /
7I find Anna Freud talking of the "ideational
rftp-ranontntIves of repressed instincts" as "entering
consciousness" (O, 193G, p.32) But this falls
between both stools, and proves very little.
attributed to him. two definitions of "instinct" -
"According to Freud, instinct is a constant internal
Gtimulus, iiicli produces specific satisfaction if
it obtains sufficient response. He often gives
tlie word "instinct" a wider significance, when
it implies the aim total of psychic acts necessary
to the fulfilment of a physiological function."
(PMDF, 1940, UAI p.129).
This view would certainly explain the passages in Freud's
later orks where he speaks of instincts as if they were
mental phenomena, ithout making it clear that he is
talking of their "mental representatives". But we have
already cone across a similar looseness of language in
the case of "affects", and I do not Uhinlt that these
passages alone make it necessary to assume a change of
view.
(90) Even on its own, however, the passage from NIL which
I have just quoted seems to support Dalbiez' theory of
a "wider significance". And if Dalbiez is merely
pointing out that Freud employed "instinct" in a loose
as well as in a precise sense, and does not intend to
imply that he abandoned the sense in which he used it in
HIT, I agree. But I think that a comparison of the
passage from NIL with ITV will yield an even more exact




(91) I have already, ..hile quoting the NIL passage,
drawn attention to the disappearance of "impetus" from
the catalogue terms which Freud says can "bo used in
connection with instinct. And yet in I..V (CP IV p,65)
he had said -
"By the impetus of an instinct (unter dera Drange
eines Triebes) we understand its motor element,
the amount of force or the measure of the demand
upon energy which it represents. The character-
tistic of impulsion is common to all instincts,
is in fact the very essence of them. £~The
emphasis is mineJ Every instinct~~is a form of
activity; if we speak loosely of passive instincts,
we can only mean those whose aim is passive"•
How is it that something which had been regarded as the
"very essence of instincts" in ITV had disappeared from
the catalogue in NIL? For the very reason, I suggest,
that it is of the essence. B„ the time Freud wrote the
later passage, the notion of impetus or impulsion had
become so closely bound up with the concept of instinct
that it was no longer a notion to be used in connection
with instinct, as were "source", "aim" or "object"; it
was instinct. In its most precise usage, the Freudian
instinct is a force. This is strikingly confirmed in a
passage (OP, 1940, p. 19) which may not, because of its
late date, have been accessible to Balbies -
"The forces which we assume to exist behind the
tensions caused by the needs of the id are called
"instincts". Taey re-prosent the
upon mental life. Though they are the ultimate
cause /
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cause of all activity, they are by nature
conservative; the state, whatever it may be,
which a living tiling has reached, gives rise
to a tendency to re-establish that state as
soon as it has been abandoned ..."
(92) I think that this passage is to be taken very
literally. Instincts are the forces that set the
psychic mechanism in motion. Like the forces of
dynamics, they are exorcised by one body (the soraatic
organ) 011 another (the idea): they have direction
(the "aim"). They can be opposed to one another,
giving rise to affects in the conscious mind, to actions
or (through the agency of the super-ego) to repression.
Their energy can pass from one instinct to another.
(OP, loc. eit.).
(93) This last point of similarity is of some importance.
Freud is in the habit of talking of the instincts as
"constant forces". If an insoinct ceases to make itself
felt, his explanation is that it has been "repressed",
"sublimated", "reversed into its opposite" or "turned
round upon the subject". This list of possibilities
(from ITV, 1915, CP IY. p. 69) is interesting, for it
does not include what, for want of a better word, I shall
call "abatement". To make it clear what I mean, I need
only refer to the example of hunger which Freud himself
gives / *
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gives at the start of H'V. (see paragraph 85). If I
cease to feel hunger the first explanation that would
occur to me would be that I must have fed, and that this
has removed what Freud calls "the stimulus to the mind".
It is true that by the tine Freud cones to catalogue
the "vicissitudes" of instinct, he has expressly eon-
:fined himself to the sexual instincts. But even here
the phenomenon of abatement surely occurs? It is true
that the four "vicissitudes" which Freud does mention are
much more interesting. But I suspect that through
confining himself to cases where "abatement" was not the
obvious explanation, Freud came to regard his list as
exhaustive. If so, this list amounts to a statement of
the principle of the conservation of energy, with the
organism regarded as a closed system. For all four
"vicissitudes" have this in common, that they explain
the disappearance of an instinct by saying that its
energy has "gone somewhere else". 'we shall see that
this principle of the conservation of instinctual energy
is accompanied, as its counterpart was in nineteentii-
a
century physics, by/corollary, the indestructibility
of mental matter - namely, Ideas.
(94) It is now easy to sec why instincts are not regarded
by Freud as mental, but have ideas and affects as their
mental /
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mental representatives. Hcpas like a man looking
inside a clock, who sees the springs, the cog-wheels
and the levers. To account ibf "their motions he must
as sume that pressure from the mainspring is being
tr nsmitted through the mecnanism. But he is careful
to exclude this from his definition of a watch: he can
see the wheels, levers and springs, but not the force
that moves them. It is interesting to compare this
attitude of Freud*s with Bertrand Russell's elimination
of "desires" as a mental phenomenon (hM, 1921, p.66 et seq..)
(95) I cannot find any writer who has considered the
extent to which the Freudian concept of instinct succeeds
in dispensing with teleological explanation. For this
is undoubtedly what it was intended to do. Freud was
offering an explanation of the "goal-seeking" behaviour
of animals which sought to do two things. First, it
tried to make "final causes" unnecessary by providing a
sufficient mechanical cause; and second, it left a place
in its mechanical system for the idea of the goal which
so often appears to be a feature of human goal-seeking
behaviour. The sufficient mecnanical cause was the
stimulus provided by the bodily organ, which, us we have
seen, Freud visualised as a force like the forces of
dynamics. He was not the only twentieth—century
psychologist J
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ps chologist to visualise natters in this way: McDougall*
"homic" psychology deals in much the same way with the
problem of goal-see: ing behaviour. The trouble about it
is that it can be too successful. If it provides a
thoroughly satisfactory mechanism to account for animal
behaviour in general, the picturing of the goal, which we
know to occur in some human goal-seeking benaviour, is
rendered superfluous; the causal chain is supposed to
be complete without it. we have already se n that this
sort of epipkenonenalism is an accompaniment f the
metapsychology which Jfreud used as an alternative to his
ideo-motor language. The latter, however, avoids
epiphenomenalism in this way. Instincts are forces that
are exerted upon the mind, and not, .Like mere reflexes,
directly upon other bodily organs. Ideas, being the
particles of which the mind consists, are impelled by
these forces (indeed they have nothing but these to give
them motion); if the impulsion is not blocked or
uiverted, the ideas reach consciousness and there produce
"muscular innervation".
(96) My concern is not ith the fact that there are
other and probably better ways of eliminating final
causes without falling into epiphenomenalism of the kind
I have described. What I want to consider is whether
Freud * s /
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Freud1s method really did eliminate final causes.
There is at least one feature of it that makes me
doubtful. This is what I call tho "selectivity" of
the Freudian instinct: by which X mean the way in which,
for example, the instinct of hunger "impels" ideas of
meals rather than ideas of, let us say, women into
consciousness. Why should it select one wind rather
than the other? It cannot be that the force exerted
by the organs of digestion has some peculiar property
that makes it do this, while the force exerted by the
organs of reproduction selects another set of ideas.
For Freud is at pains to emphasise the homogeneity of
the various instincts. The energy that manifests
itself in them all is the same• It can reinforce now
one inscinct, now another. For must we forget that
an instinct can, in abnormal circumstances, select an
inappropriate idea; the destructive instincts, for
example, can select ideas of harm to the person to whoa
they belong. For can the ideas themselves be responsible
for this phenomenon of "selection"; for they are the
passive subjects of forces: the billiard ball does not
select its cue.
(97) But in fact Freud uoes not trouble to keep his
i n.qf.i nets free of final causes when he wains to the task
of /
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of describing them. iiS we have seen, he talks quite
unashamedly in IT? of their aims and objects; they are
not, as they should be in his mechanistic system, blind
forces that actuate goal-seeking behaviour; they are
themselves goal-seeking. Wow it seems to be possible
to distinguish behaviour that is goal-seeking from
behaviour that is not without bringing in final causes;
Braithwaite, for example, provides such a distinction in
ah (1946, ch. x). had I suppose that anything, from a
paramesium to a presbytery-, that exhibits this sort of
behaviour can be called goal-seeking . ithout any covert
reference to final causes. But if what you are trying
to explain mechanically is the way in which a future
event - such as the eating of a meal - seems to determine
present behaviour, are you really doing so if you say
that the present behaviour is really due to an invisible
force within, which is food-seeking? Is this not rather
like showing someone a chess-playing machine, and saying
"Yes, it certainly behaves as if it were live, doesn't
it? But its just a machine really, although of course to
make it work we've got Capabianca in the cupboard at the
back." Both explanations manage to avoid attributing a
quality - teleology or life - to the whole only by
attributing it to an invisible part. I shall refer to
this feature of Freud's infctincts again in Chapter 5, under
the nickname of "cryptoteleology".
T1IINUB /
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TillHaS TiLJx -Ekh 1&..AYS UHCOKaOIOUS.
(93) I should like to be able to say a Good deal about
the things that in Freud*s view were always unconscious.
Unfortunately, Freud himself does not say very much about
them. He seems to have come to the conclusion, in the
course of analysing such phenomena as the Oedipus complex,
that there were some unconscious phenomena which did not
owe their unoonsciousness to expulsion from consciousness
and preconsciousness; these were phenomena which must,
as it were, have inherited instead of acquiring unconscious-
mess. Bee, for example, OP(1940, p.49), where Freud is
cataloguing the ways in which the id influences the
shape of dreams, and alter talking about elements that
have become unconscious through repression, goes on to
say -
"(d) Beyond this, dreams bring to light material
which could not originate either from the dreamer*s
adult life or from his forgotten childhood. We
are obliged to regard it as part of the archaic
heritage which a child brings with him into "tne
world,"before any experience of his own, as a
result of the experiences of his ancestors. We
find elements corresponding to this phylogenetic
material in the earliest human legends and in
surviving customs ..."
It was of course this feature which was developed by
Jung into so essential a part of his ystera. For Freud
it was certainly a good deal less important: the
assumption of pliylogenetically unconscious material was
perhaps the best way of accounting for a fex/ isolated




(99) It is perhaps orth considering briefly the sort
of phenomena which seemed to Freud to call for this
assumption. At first sight they were of two hinds.
First, there were emotions of inappropriate strength;
the boy's fear of castration is out of all proportion
to the likelihood of this catastrophe, but becomes less
unaccountable to Freud if he assumes that the boy has
some sort of recollection of a time when the catastrophe
was less unlikely. Second, there were the untrue stories
produced by his patients in the course of treatment.
Some of these were not of course offered as the truth;
they were admitted "phantasies"; others were thought
by the patient to be true recollections. But in either
case Freud believed that a phantasy had to be accounted
for by tracing an actual occurrence of which the
phantasy was a copy. This actual occurrence could be
one in the patient's own experience, of which the phantasy
was a much-distorted copy, the distortion being due to
the ego*3 unwillingness to admit a true recollection
of the occurrence. But in some cases it seemed more
likely that the occurrence had taken place, not in the




(IQlO ) I do not- think however that unconscious material
of this sort differed in kind from the material that
acquired unconsciousness as a result of repression. as
we shall see in paragraph 106, Freud thought at ono stage
that it differed from repressed material in that it
assisted the process of repressing this material by
exerting an attraction upon it - "dragging it down to
its own level" as it were: hut he seems to have thought
better of this. It is conceivable that Freud thought
it differed in another way: that is, that it did not
require repression to keep it unconscious, and did not
strive for consciousness like repressed raaterial. If
so, then it would be impossible for phylogenetically
unconscious raaterial ever to be maue conscious, even by
psychoanalysis, since, in Freud's view, psychoanalysis
merely removed repression, and could not provide the
force necessary to make something emerge from the
unconscious when this repression was removed. But I
think this an unlikely view for Freud to have held, both
on the grounds that he would have said so more plainly
if such an important difference had occurred to him,
and on theoretical grounds. The theoretical grounds
are that this phylogenetically unconscious material
seems to have consisted, like repressed material, of
ideas, and that these ideas, unless they differ
unaccountably /
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unaccountably from repressed ideas, consist of, or at
least involve, energy in the form of cathexis - that is,
energy seeking discharge. It is true that this discharge
is normally achieved by indirect means - such as dis¬
placement. But it must also be capable of direct
discharge - in the form of a conscious or preconscious
expression of the phylogenetically unconscious ideas.
The only possibility in the Freudian system which I can
think of as preventing this direct discharge (assuming
that repression is removed) is the absence of the
appropriate "verbal residues" or "visual residues" which
are to clothe an idea before it can be conscious or
preconscious. In other words, a man might not be able
to recollect, consciously or preconsciously, his ancestors'
practice of castrating boys because he had never learned
the words or experienced the visual images in which such
a recollection could be expressed. Obvious! in the
example I have chosen this is unlikely, and the sort of
case in which it might be plausible is very difficult to
imagine But even if it turned out to be true, it would
merely /
-.-.I.... "" ....... ........«Mi»n«r-.l.,.<.1lrie.-K>,
In a way, this argument is like the announcement of
Bertrand Russell's correspondent that she was a
solipsist and wondered why there were not more of them.
The very conditions which would give rise to a situation
in which an ancestral memory could not be recollected
because suitable words or images could not be found to
clothe it wouM-also make it Impossible to imagine"an
example, Fortunately for the validity of my argument,
we can assume that different people have different
experiences and therefore different verbal and visual
vocabularies, so that while I, for example, can not be
expected to imagine what sort of ancestral memory I amthus prevented from recollecting, l may very well be able
to imagine what someone else mi^it be prevented from
recoJ-Ie<5>+ 1miisnrO-v if •hhp>iT> p.x.ofiT'ifinc.fi Is -vrerv
different
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merely be an accidental reason for tiie permanent un-
:consciousness of phylogenetic material, and not a
reason founded on its essence.
(101) For tiiese reasons, I am inclined to think that
Freud1s phylogenetically unconscious material - though
different in origin from his ontogenetically unconscious
material, does not differ from it in its theoretical
capacity for being transformed into introspectible
material - that is, into conscious or preconscious
phenomena. It is therefore "always unconscious" only
in the sense that the circumstances in which it might
cease to he unconscious seldom, if ever, arise, and not
in the sense that it is by definition incapable of being
anything else. I think too that both types of
unconscious material are kept in the unconscious state
by the same factor - that is, by repression. This does
not mean that it is impossible, or even difficult, to
describe a class of phenomena that are invariably found
in the "always unconscious" form; Freud seems to have
had fairly definite ideas as to the sort of thing that
was phylogenetically unconscious, although he is not very
interested in them, and does not give us a detailed
description or catalogue. 13or does it mean that the
effects of phylogenetically unconscious phenomena upon
conscious /
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conscious or preconscious phenomena are necessarily
the same as those of repressed material, although here
again Freud is not as explicit as ve should like.
(102) There is one odd unconscious entity, however,
which is difficult to fit with certainty into the
division of unconscious phenomena into phylogenotically
unconscious and ontogenetically unconscious. This is
the unconscious part of the ego (and also the unconscious
part of the super-ego if, as I think, this is to be
distinguished from the former). The nature of this
unconscious entity will be discussed later. All that
I need say here is that it is unlikely that this was
regarded by Freud as kept in the unconscious state by
repression, and thus differs from other unconscious
phenomena in an important respect. I doubt however
whether Freud thought of it as phylogenetic in the same
sense as "racial memories", since the ego is something
which appears in the development of the mental
organis tion of the growing child. On the other hand,
it differs from other ontogenetically unconscious
material in not being wholly the result of experience;
it is difficult to imagine the human being failing to
develop an ego of some sort, whatever his experience.
Clearly,-too, it differs from the ideas which constitute
other /
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other unconscious material, both phylogenetic and
ontogenetic in that it is an organisation and not a
substance. The curious thing is however that Freud
probably regarded the unconscious part of the ego as
being capable of tr. ,nsf<ffc vation into something conscious,
without {as we shall see in paragraphs 171 et seq.)
having a clear notion of what the conscious part of the
ego was. Here, if anywhere, is something that night
have been regarded as incapable, even in theory, of
becoming conscious or preconscious; but it seems to
have been regarded simply as something which was seldom
introspected, but could be rendered introspectible by
means of psychoanalysis. I shall therefore discuss
it among the things that are "sometimes unconscious"#
THE COLLECTIVE uHCOHGCIOuS
(105) In case anyone is in doubt as to whether Freud
believed like Jimg in a collective unconscious, it is
perhaps worth a paragraph or two to make it quite plain
that he did not. He did, of course, hold two beliefs
in common with Jung, namely
(a) that there is enough similarity between the
way in which the minds of different
individuals work to make it possible to use
psychoanalytical explanations to account for
the /
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the behaviour of groups of people (as Freud
used It in GPAE, 19tl); and
(b) that some of the ideas to be found in the
unconscious cannot be accounted for by the
individual's own history/, but can be accounted
for by the history of the race to which he
belongs. (Freud also believed of course
that the structure of the psycnic meonanism
and the way in which it worked could be
explained as the result of evolution, but I
am not sure whether lung shared this view)•
It is possible that Jung's notion of the collective un-
:conscious is merely an elaboration of these two beliefs.
Jacobi quotes him as saying that "The collective un-
:conscious is the mighty spiritual inheritance of human
development, reborn in every individual • • . constitution".
(The emphasis is mine). If so, the difference between
Freud and lung on this point is simply in the importance
they attach to the content of ideas which have to be
accounted for by racial history: Jung considers them
all-important as causes of disorders, Freud considers
them negligible.
(104) I am sure, however, that Jung regarded the
collective unconscious as more than just a name for the
peculiarities of group behaviour and the ideas that
could not be explained by an individual's personal
history. Let me take two passages quoted by Frieda
Fordham in UP (1953, Introd.) Jung appears to have
been /
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been much impressed by a mental hospital inmate who in
1906 described visions, images and symbols that closely
resembled descriptions in a Greek papyrus that was not
edited until four years later. secondly, Jung appears
to have said of the "archetypes" that "not even our
thought can clearly grasp then for it never invented
then". I think that Jung believed two things to which
Freud would never have agreed, namely
(c) that certain ideas resulting from the history
of part of the human race can affect the
behaviour of any member of subsequent
generations, whether -r not he has any
genealogical connection with the part of the
race whose history accounts' for them, and
diether or not he lias encountered them in
his am personal history; aHcT~~
(d) that such ideas have some sort of existence
that is independent of the minds of the
individuals in whose behaviour they are
manifested, much, as Plato*s ideas did.
(105) The way is now prepared for an approach to the
mental phenomena that Freud regarded as capable of being
either unconscious or otherwise. As the preliminary
discussion may have indicated, these are not all of the
same nature. There are forces (repression), substances
(ideas), systems (ego and superego) and processes (con¬
densation, displacement, symbolism). The concept of
repression is so fundamental to an understanding of Freud
i-.hnt. -ft, Tina boon difficult to wosb oone a discussion of it
even until this stage, and it must undoubtedly be con¬
sidered first of all these concepts.
CHAPTER g«
Repression and its logical
significance*
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(106) The locus classlcus lor the description of re¬
gression is Appendix a to ISA, 1926. The 1915 essay
on Repression must also be used, but v;ith caution because
of the subsequent development in Freud's theories. (To
give two examples, Freud at,opted a new tneory of the
nature of anxiety in I&a: and - '..hat is more important -
he abandoned the theory that repression is partly due to
the attraction of what is already repressed on what is
about to be - see NIL, 1953 p. 92)1. Unless another
source is quoted, my statements are based on these two
passages.
(107) Repression (Verdrahgung) is one of the ogo's
"defence-mechanisms" against certain ideas, impulses or
external perceptions. It can be employed in conjunction
with one, or perhaps more, of the other mechanisms. Its
"essence lies simply in the function of rejecting and
keeping something out of consciousness". There are two
kinds of repression - primal repression, which denies
conscfcusness to something that has not become conscious;
and after-expulsion, hieh expels from consciousness
something that has entered it. When he talks of
repression, Freud usually refers to the latter, and I
shall follow this usage.
(108) /
^-At first sight, this is contradicted by ISA, p. 148,
where Freud talks of "the attraction exerted by the
une nscious prototypes upon t^e repressed instinctual
process". But he is describing here not the force
which is responsible for repression, but the habit
•(which he calls "repetition-compulsion") that makes it
difficult for the ego to "undo the repressions" (ibid).
?t?!ag? ih^SligaS^gSc^o*11131
repression, is a new feature.
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(108) Repression is not an act "that takes pi cc once
ior all". It demands "a constant expenditure of energy".
But in the next breath Freud says tiiat if this energy
ceased to be expended, a fresh act of repression would
be needed. Later, he uses the tern "insistence"
(..iderst and) for the "steady counter-pressure" that is
required. Unfortunately this is also used to describe
his patients' efforts to avoid the removal of the
repression, and I shall therefore use "repression" to
refer to the steady counter-pressure, and "act of
repression" to refer to the nitiation of this counter-
prcsoure.
(109) Repression is also a natter of degree. It can be
completely successful, but more often fails to exclude
from consciousness "derivatives" of what is repressed.
The nor^successful it is, the less do these derivatives
resemble what is repressed.
(110) The difficulties begin when we examine the neta-
:psychological accounts of repression. Firstly, it
involves an "anti-cathexis": this seems to be a charge
of energy which resists the tendency of the cathexis
(or "potential energy" - see paragraph 6) of whatever
is repressed to discharge itself and thus became ro-
:conscious. But in the UC8 (1915, CP IV pp. 114, 154)
it /
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it is suggested that it al. o involves "withdrawal of
the preconscious cathexis" which seems to be the
translation of the repressed "idea or mental act" into
words or visual images.
(Ill) The language of "press-ore anu counter-pressure"
was not intended to be metaphorical. Repression was
conceived as a force, exercised by one body, the ego,
upon other bodie , usually ideas, in opposition to other
forces, the instincts. It is true that there are passages
(sec the footnote to paragraph 100) where repression seems
to be regarded as a habitual behaviour of the ego.
This accords better with the nature of most of the other
"defence-mechanisms" - regression, for example, is a type
of ego-behaviour, and is difficult to describe in terms
of force. The distinction is important, not only because
behaviour is a concept of a completely different hind
from force, but also because it \ ould make it conceivable
that the ego was thought of merely as "disregarding"
whatever is unconscious, rather tin n actively preventing
it from becoming conscious2. To give an analogy, there
is a difference between starving a man by simply failing
to bring him food, and forcibly opposing his effotts to
reach food.
(113) /
^This is the "cognitive" account which I shall be
describing in paragraphs 114 ct seq.
93
(lis) It is quite impossible, however, to regard the
contents of Freud1s unconscious as passively allowing
themselves to be disregar&ed• The reason why he
sometimes spoke of repression as if it were a habit which
the ego has difficulty in "undoing" was that his ego was
not really a body of the kind that exercises forces in
physics. As I shall make clearer later (paragraph;
171) he failed to fit the ego properly into his psycho-
:logical mechanics, mid it retained some of the properties
which are ascribed to persons: it is not a puppet but
a manikin,
(113) It is interesting to consider what alternatives
there are to the Freudian conception of repression, I
do not of course mean to ask "What alternatives are there
to repression as an explanatory concept?" but rather
"Granted for the sake of argument that there is a need
for an explanation of certain phenomena in terns of
mental phenomena which are normally introspectible but
are not introspectible in the cases in question, then is
the Freudian description of repression as a force acting
upon these phenomena the only possible description, and,
if not, what other descriptions are possible?"
(114) I think that there are at least two other ways of
describing /
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describing repression. The first of these I shall call
the "cognitive" descri tion, since it treats repression
as if it v.ere essentially non-recognition. This non-
recognition can take two foms, either a complete "non-
axuareness" or a mistake as to the nature^bf what is
"repressed". A passage from Broad*s MPN (1925, p. 568)
will illustrate the "non-awareness" type of description -
"An aversion of introspective attention, which
begins by being deliberate, will quickly become
habitual. An analogy will make this plain. If
I have a tender tooth I shall at first deliberately
try to avoid biting on it, and shall sometimes
make mistakes ana hurt myself. But very soon I
shall automatically avoid biting on it. Bow
emotions and desires tend to recur; and, if I
at first deliberately avert my attention from
some of them, I shall very soon cone to do so
habitually. This habit, like any other, may
eventually bcccoe so strong that it cannot be
overcome by deliberate volition." (and see also
p. 330, (3)(b) )
Broad does not offer this as a descri tion of all the
phenomena which Freud would have regarded as examples of
repression. He also uses the "mistaken nature" type
of description for certain phenomena, and he may
(though it is hard to be sure) consider that other types
of description are appropriate in some cases. It is not
easy to be sure, because Broad does not regard "desires
end emotions" as being among the things that can be
"literally unconscious" (though he had different reasons
from Freud*s for coming to this conclusion),
(115) /
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(115) A much more striking example of the equation of
repression and "non-awareness" is provided by Angyal in
I'SP (1941, p. ISO) -
"There is also considerable truth in the ps; cho-
:analytic theory of repression. Repression is
a factor hich aggravates the split between the
psychological self and the rest of the personality.
Repression can be defined, as a first approximation,
as an inhibition of the symbolization° of certain
personality factors. The inhibition may be due to
the incompatibility of a personality factor ith
the psychological self. Inhibition of syabol-
:ization however also arises as a useful selection
between relevant and irrelevant factors (range of
attention). The lack of symbolization however
is not merely a function of inhibition but a more
fundamental incongruity between total organism and
the psychological self, because the psychological
self"represents only a small p rt of the total
organism. Only part of the biological total
process is symbolized by man in his present stage
of evolution".
(116) Examples of the "mistaken nature" description are
provided by Broad and Rus. ell -
"Another (course) is to recognise the existence of
the desire, but to pretend to myself and to others
that it is for some object which it is considered
respectable to desire ..." (IvIPN, 1925, p. 366:
and see the preceding pages for a similar treatment
of "misdescribed emotions").
"A /
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°"Symbolization" In iuigyal1 a language does not of course
have the restricted meaning that Proud gave it. Rather,
it recalls Peirce*3 use of the word "symbol". Angyal
uses the word to refer to all mental activities that
have a representational character - perception, memory,
•imaginot.-i nn ( reasoning. So that when he says that
something is "not symbolised"" he is merely lu
say, without using words which are foreign to his
terminology, that the thing is not perceived or thought
about,
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"A desire is called 'conscious' when it is accompan-
:ied by a true belief as to the state of affairs
that will brine quiescence; otherwise it is called
'unconscious'". (AM, 1921, p.. 76; see the preceding
pages for the discussion of which this is the
summary). Unlike Broad, Russell does not accord
the same treatment to emotions; he seems to take
the Freudian view that an unconscious emotion is
a contradiction in terms, and that the essence of
an emotion is that it should be consciously felt).
(117) I think that Anyal is the only one of the three
authors quoted who offers a description of the "cognitive"
type as a complete equivalent of the Freudian "repression".
Even he does not make it clear beyond doubt that he regards
repressed memories and ideas as being "unsymbolised"
memories or ideas in the same way as repressed desires
are unsymbolised "tensions" (to use Angyal's language).
However this may be, I think that there are obvious
inadequacies in any kind of "cognitive" account of
repression.
(118) The chief of these inadequacies is this. If I
say that a repressed desire is merely one of which I am
unaware or which I misdescribe to myself, I imply that
the only difference between it and the sane desire in
A
an unrepressed form lies in my recognition of it,"and
that /
%t is true that my failure to recognise it might have
'"effects ~on my behaviour:—but on a pure "lion-
recognition" view tiiejce could only be such as could
follow logically from non-recognition.
97
that there is 110 other difference between the two fonos.
This makes it difficult to give a satisfactory account of
the difference bfctween the effects on ay behaviour of the
desire in one form and the desire in the other form,
For example, let us suppose that I have a brother for
whom I have a violent and unrepressed dislike, I shall
tend to avoid his company and to be rude to him when I
cannot. If, on the other hand, my dislike is repressed,
then (according to Freud) I shall behave rather
differently; I may seek instead of avoiding his company,
end I may feci ill instead of merely rude when I am in
it; if I do hurt his feelings, it will be "unintentionally",
(119) The other possible description of the phenomena
of repression is of what I shall call the "substituted
action" kind. This describes repression in terms of the
substitution of some other action for the repressed one.
In the example which I have just given, my repressed
dislike of my brother wouM be described simply as replaced
by my feeling of illness or anxiety. This does not of
course reduce my repressed dislike to the status of
something that I merely "don't do": If it did, that would
be a fatal objection to this kind of description, since
it would, provide no means of distinguishing between the
status of this dislike and the status of all the otiier
things /
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tilings I don't do when I am unable to avoid my brother' s
company - such as wish to play chess. The latter are
not only innumerable but also of no significance for
any attempt to explain my behaviour in my brother's
company;whereas we are proceeding on the assumption that
my dislike of him is significant.
(120) I do not think however that the "substituted action"
type of description need have much difficulty in according
a special status to the "replaced" action. This can be
singled out from all the other actions that are not
performed in one of two ways. It can be described as
the action that I was formerly in the habit of performing
in the same circumstances; perhaps in my boyhood I did
dislike ray brother, and was intentionally rude and even
violent to him when in his company. There may however
be situations in which this method of designating the
"replaced" action will not work. Another man who is not
my brother may be my rival for the affection of the same
woman, and in his company I may exhibit the same
symptoms of illness or anxiety. If tnese symptoms are
to be explained by reference to my repressed dislike of
my rival, it will be necessary to distinguish this
dislike from all the other emotions that I do not feci
JhyU
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by designating it as the one that I night have been
expected to feel - the one, in other words, that I ould
have felt if I were a normal person. It is of course
possible to designate as the normal emotion for a
certain situation an emotion which, for all that is
known, 1 have never felt before, either because I have
never been in a situation of that kind, or because I
had become abnormal before my first encounter with a
situation of that kind. It will of course make it more
plausible to call an emotion normal if the situation can
be likened to past situations in which X have as a
matter of fact felt that emotion - for example, if my
relationship to my rival can be likened to my rolation-
:ship to ray brother whom I used to dislike - but this
is not essential.s
(121) The most striking difference between this sort of
description of repression and those of the "force" or
"cognitive" type is that it abandons any attempt to treat
what is "repressed" as if it had t ie same sort of reality
as /
5Lcst it should be objected that there are cases in
which the "substituted action" will fail to replace
the "repressed" action completely, and that there will
be by-products, such as anxiety, I ought perhaps to
make it quite clear that by the "substituted action"
T mann the total response which ha3 taken the place of
the former (or normal) response, unci wot just- part of
the new response.
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as the unrepressed - to put it colloquially, as if it
were still there. The subject of Freudian repression
is rendered unintrospectible and at the same time altered
so that its properties are not quite the same as before
repression. The subject of Angyal's repression is
rendered unintrospectible, and the subject of Russell,s
repression is misdescribed. In none of these cases are
the subjects annihilated and Given a purely hypothetical
or historical status, as they are in the "substituted
action" description.
(122) I have bee compelled to offer my own outline of
the "substituted action" type of description for two
reasons: first, because I have not been able to find a
clear example of it which could be quoted without a Good
deal of preliminary discussion: and second, because I
do not thinlc that a description of this kind is
necessarily bound up with one particular kind of psycho¬
logical system. But both these reasons must be quali¬
fied by admitting that there are psychological
systems that lend themselves more obviously than others
to this way of describing "repression". These are
ystems of the behaviourist or "reflexologist" type.
Dalbiez, in an interesting chapter of PHDF (194-0, Tel.II
eh.2) draws attention to the possibility of describing
repression /
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repression and the concepts connected with it (such as
displacement and sublimation) in Puviovian terms. It
is true that Dalbiez's purpose in this chapter Is to
show that the experiments of the reflexologists are
evidence for the hypotheses of Freud: but in attempting
this he makes it clear that Pavlov's language can be
used to describe phenomena of the kind observed by Freud.
(123) It would take too long to summarise Dalbiez's
comparison, and in any case it is probably unnecessary
to attempt an account of Pavlov's well-known experiments.
I shall merely borrow from Dalbiez one of liis well-chosen
quotations from Pavlov (LCh, p. 345) -
"One of my collaborators brought to ioy notice a
simple case of war psycho-neurosis. An ex-
officer used to relive battle scenes whenever he
fell asleep, shouting, running, giving orders,
etc. We succeeded in reproducing a similar
condition in a dog, in whom Dr. konradi established
several conditioned reflexes in response to the
various notes of an instrument, each reflex being
maintained by a different absolute reflex. The
first note was associated with the oral exhibition
of acid, the second with the offer of food, and
the third with a strong electric shock in one paw.
The current was so strong that it aroused a
violent defence-reaction. This violence was
further demonstrated by the fact that the two
other reflexes were also complicated by a
defence-reaction. Later the reflexes attached
to the oral exhibition of acid and the electric
shock were discarded and only the alimentary
reflex used. After some time the defence-
reaction became grafted onto the latter, which
grew weaker and wholly disappeared after two
months. A little later still, we were struck
fey /
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"by the following strange event: whenever the dog
fell into a hypnotic condition (the sure indication
of which was the appearance of the paradoxical
phase), the defence-reaction was aroused. V/hen
the co dition passed off, the reaction disappeared.
The analogy with the aforementioned clinical case
is complete. It is a further confirmation of the
usual explanation of such evonts: the traces of
very strong stimuli persist in the sub-cortical
centres, and emerge when the inhibitory influence
of the surface is weakened"•
(184) I think that this passage is a good example of the
difference between the Freudian and the "substituted
action" account of repression. Freud would have des¬
cribed Pavlov's "defence-reaction" as a memory forced
out of consciousness into the unconscious, but constantly
striving to return, and succeeding when the ego relaxed
its constant x^ressure. Pavlov, on the other hand, merely
talks of the defence-reaction as disappearing and re-
:appearing: he says nothing about its status in the
interim. It is true that he does talk about something
that persists in trie interim, namely "traces in the sub¬
cortical centres". But this merely serves to underline
the difference between his description and Freud's.
In Freud's, what persists in the interim is something
like the thing that disappeared and reappeared: in
Pavlov's It is aaething quite different. Moreover,
although Pavlov refers to his traces in sub-cortical
fpnt.rccj o<i "t.hp. np.unl oyplr.nation of such events", it i3
an /
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an explanation in theory only. It is like using the
atomic theory to explain the action of a levex*: it is
both more complicated than is necessary and probably
cannot be managed in practice. What we are really
doing in such a case is to reassure ourselves that
atomic physics, hich by its nature ought, we think, to
be capable of giving an account of all phenomena, is
theoretically capable of doing so in the case of the
particular group of phenomena with which dynamics deals.
In the same way, Pavlovfs introduction of a neurological
account of the phenomena of inhibition does not add
anything useful to his reflexological account: it does
not simplify the notation or make it any easier to
predict phenomena. It merely serves as a reassurance
that the phenomena studied by reflexology are no
exception to the assumption that a physiological acco nt
can be given (at least in theory) of all the behaviour
of living organisms. When this is clearly seen, and
when it is realised that the neurological explanation
is not an integral part of reflexology, we can see that
the reflexologists are attempting a task that involves
something very like a substituted action account of
repression. The task they have set themselves is no
less than the working cut of a set of concepts and rules
---for mv;nnlr. hohnvioiir with the 1east possible
reference /
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reference to what is not observed. When a reaction to
a stimulus is not observed, they formulate a law that
describes its non-occurrence: they do not accord a
special status to what they do not observe, and endow
it with causal properties,
(1:55) I do not mean to imply that this description
would fit all reflexologists, or that reflexologists
have consciously set themselves this task. It is only
too easy to find examples to the contrary. Bechterev,
in GPHR (1985, Oh. LI eh seq.) attempts to give an
account of the Freudian unconscious in terms of reflexes,
and in doing so distinguishes between two kinds of
reflex - the "conscious or accountable" and the
"unconscious or unaccountable". "Accountability" is
a translator's term which seems to stand for "occurrence
in accordance with expectation" (cf. loc. cit. p. 104).
But we find Bechterev attributing causal properties to
"unaccountable" reflexes, and generally talking about
them as if they were occurring uuobserved.
(126) From our point of view the reflexologists are
more "purist" than the behaviourists, who allow themselves
a great many more assumptions about the occurrence of the
unobserved. A few quotations w;U.1 11.)ns'ornto wills.
An /
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An article "by Hull in 1939 describes two kinds of
repression,. (MBP, 1939) .first -
"• . .animal experiments seem to show that if a
severe frustration or emotional shock occurs, the
organism may revert to a previously abandoned
type of goal. In psychoanalysis this is called
"regression". Sometimes, however, the emotional
shock may be so profound that its generalised
effects extend from tne goal in which the trauma
occurs to practically all such goals: this is
known in psychoanalysis as one form of "repression".
The other kind is described thus -
"When we have no functioning verbal reactions
conditioned to a past situation or present intent...
we obviously cannot tell about it. Such events
and motivations are said by psychoanalysis to be
"unconscious", whereas when e can tell about them
they are said to be "conscious". Since children
have few words before three or four years of age,
it is inevitable that thejwwhould not be able to
tell about events of that period, yet lasting
habits, including toilet training, are found at
this time. These events are naturally "unconscious
(1S7) The first of those passages is almost pure
reflexology, even to the extent of its use of terms such
as "generalised". It is the second passage that intro¬
duces the account of repression that is typically
behaviourist. By itself, of course, it is only a
partial account, confined to what Freud would have called
"primal repression" (see paragraph 107). But we find
this account taken further by Gustav Bergmann (PEP, Mind
1943, pp. 122 ot, set•')*'• Bergmann, who claims bo bo
following /
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following Hull, gives only one account of repression,
and makes no mention of tiie kind described in my first
quotation from Hull. His article is a more philosophical
attempt than Hull's to show how the observations of
psychoanalysis can bo described in the language of the
experimental psychology of learning. Among his
conclusions is this one -
"The experimental psychology of learning studies the
micro-mechanisms of which the so-called personality
mechanisms of psychoanalysis are the very complex
macro-result Let us in conclusion test
the plausibility of this scheme by enquiring what
light it sheds upon the metaphorical terminology
of th^psychoanalysts. aithin the limits of a
broad structural allocation one finds the Id rather
satisfactorily represented by the prime motivators
and those response habits which have been partially
extinguished by the 1earninro'ceJsT Ago and
Superego are somewhat cruder conceptions• What
they represent, personalised and endowed with some
driving power of its own, is apparently the
difference between the total pattern of the responses
as they would occur before, and as they actually do
occur after, the development of the symbolic
apparatus during the learning process. Conscious
are, by definition, those intermediate states of
the organism which contain the actual occurrence of
a verbal symbol and/or image ....
It seems plausible that the symbolic responses
are located relatively near the end of their chains
and that the reaction is therefore less easily
stopped short of overt expression if the process
has once reached the conscious stage. Repression,
that is the stooping of an initiated response
sequence before It reaches that stage, becomes
thus olausible as the result of strongly negative
statesf It also becomes plausible that anxiety,""
the general anticipatory response to such states,
is aroused whenever strongly inhibited response
so -nonces are about to reach consciousness. It
is significant in this context, and has been
-minted out by U.I.. mull,that the first famiqlug of
the libidinal hungers takes place in that period of
life-history where the child's symbolic apparatus
is /
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is still entirely missing or relatively rudimentary"
(The emphasis throughout is mine).
(128) Before considering whether this can he called a
"pure substituted action" account of repression, we must
be clear about the difference between it and Angyalfs
account, particularly since there is a strong superficial
resemblance. Angyal's account is a "cognitive" account
because the thing that is or is not "symbolised" is one
and the same as the thing that is not, or is, repressed.
Bergmann's account is not a "cognitive" one because what
is or is not symbolised in his "symbolic responses" is
something other than what is not, or is, repressed; his
symbolic responses no doubt symbolise stimuli. Put in
another way, AngyalTs symbols symbolise the rest of the
organism*s total response (the non-syrabolic part of it)
whereas Bergmannts symbols symbolise all or part of the
stimulus. It is of course possible in BergmaiujPs
account for one response to be symbolised in the symbolic
part of another (as in introspection) but not in the
symbolic part of the same response.
(129) I do not think, however, that Bergmann's is a
pure "substituted action" account• Repression, aor him,
is not the complete replacement of one response by
another /
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another, but the disappearance of only part of the
"repressed" response -- the symbolic part: note, for
example, that the "response habits" which he allocates
to the id are not wholl but only partially "extinguished
by the learning process". The crucial question, of
course, is hether the unextinguished residue of the
response is supposed by the behaviourists to be ob-
rservable or not. As Bergmann does not ive examples,
it is not easy to be sure of his view on this point.
Let me therefore take my example, in paragraph 113, of
my repressed dislike of my imaginary brother. If I
understand Bergmann correctly, my original response to
my brother's presence was partly symbolic (a feeling of
dislike, perhaps accompanied by imagery "with boiling
oil in it" or something of the sort) and partly non-
symbolic {perhaps a slightly increased blood-pressure
and a certain condition of the gastric mucosa). Lot
us call these two parts of the response 3 and NS.
According to Bergmann, repression consists of the stop-
jping of this response before it reaches the stage of
including S. It is however important to know whether
in such cases NS is supposed to occur just as it did
.hen the total response NS plus S took place. Are the
rise in blood-pressure and the change in the gastric
"mucusa / ~ —
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mucosa supposed to be the same as when S accompanied
them? Or are they intensified, or perhaps accompanied
or replaced by some new physiological response?
Bergmann appears to assume the f'oii.aer. Whether he is
correct or not is of course largely a matter for
clinioal observation, but may well turn out to be also
a matter of method. For it seems to me that Bergmann
is trying to use HS to supply a causal link between the
total response before repression and the total response
after it. So that if clinical observation showed that
after repression NS was intensified or even complicated
by some new physiological phenomenon, he might well call
this the original response, minus S but with NS in¬
tensified, or minus S but plus Y. For this reason I
suspect that WS is an assumption of much the same nature
as Pavlov's "traces in the sub-cortical centres". There
is of course this difference; I pointed out that
Pavlov's interim persistent was quite unlike the two
things, namely reflexes, that it was intended to link;
.hereas Freud's repressed entities resemble the mental
phenomena that they are used to link. Bergmann's non-
symbolic part of the total response is an attempt to find
a common constituent in the responses before and after
repression, while recognising the difference that gives
riae-V —
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rise to the problem. A common constituent of this lcin&
is desired by the behaviourists because the repetition
of responses is one of the assumptions upon which their
system is based. I do not mean to suggest, of course,
that it does not enter into other systems, such as that
of the reflexologists (and even into kreud's, under the
title of the "repetition-principle", although he used it
only as a last resort^. But it is easier for the
behaviourists tnan for ifreud to find a common constituent,
since he is looking only at what they mould call the
symbolic response, while they are allowed to look at a
total response which includes not only the symbolic
response but also a non-symbolic response that they are
i "
usually allowed to addume because it is unobscrvable.
I
(130) I think that I have said enough about the
behaviourists and the reflexologists to make it plain
that the account of human behaviour which they are both
attempting to give is of a special kind. It is an
account which confines itself to pointing out the
relationships between observable occurrences. My
abnormal behaviour in my brother's company is related
to the punishment or admonition I received in childhood
when I reacted antagonistically towards him. This is,
nrrnrr]ing to this sort of account, an instance of a
law /
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lav/ that children who are trained in a particular way
out of their emotional reactions to members of their
family later display abnormal reactions to them. This
in its turn is subsumed under a more general lav/, perhaps
to the effect that there are certain kinds (or intensities)
of emotional reactions that cannot be abolished by
training (or perhaps by certain methods of training)
without resulting in abnormal reactions to the situations
which formerly aroused the emotional reactions. It is
impossible to give more than a loose example to illust¬
rate the sort of system that is being aimed at. Between
the sort of laws that I have sketched out there would
really be a large number of intermediate ones. First
there might be laws about members of my own family and the
way in which they react to this sort of training: next
perhaps would come laws about people of certain
constitutional types (or of some other classification):
and so on. The phenomena of repression would be
described in some of these laws. The general law of
repression might be to the effect that there are certain
types (or intensities) of reactions that cannot, as a
result of training, be replaced by reactions that do
not include certain abnormalities: or it might be to the
effect that there are certain types of animal of which
thin is true; or thirdly it might say that there are
certain /
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certain types of training of which tliis is true.
(131) At first sight I might appear to have reached the
point where I ought to discuss the rival claims of the
Freudian and the substituted action account of repression,
and to arrive at a decision in favour of one or the
other. But it begins to be seen that these two accounts
are not in fact rivals in the ordinary way. They are
not irreconcilable alternative explanations of the same
piece of behaviour. If a reflexologist and a Freudian
were both given my life-history and ashed why X
exhibited ray abnormal symptoms in ray brother's company,
the former might reply -
"Because he is of a certain type and was trained
out of an antagonistic reaction of very great
intensity by a certain method". (He might not
of course find it necessary to refer to my type,
or the intensity of the reaction or the method,
but I have put these references in to show how
complicated his statement might be).
The Freudian's reply might be -
"Because he is repressing a (very strong) dislike
of his brother".
The point is that neither the Freudian nor the reflex¬
ologist ought to say to the other "Ho, ray explanation
is the true one". For it is impossible to find any
respect in hioh one" ,Ivo s the lie to the "Other.
(132) /
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(13S) The relationship between the two accounts is
interesting in other ways. Hot only can the Freudian
answer be given to the question "Why do I have these
symptoms?": it can also be given to the question "why
is the reflexologists explanation true?" This not
only underlines the fact that it is riot incompatible
with the reflexological explanation, but also draws our
attention to the fact that there are two answers to a
'"Why" question about my behaviour, or about the truth
of a reflexological law: one is a more general form of
reflexological lav;, while the other is a Freudian
statement. But the reverse is not the case: it makes
no sense to jive a reflexological statement in answer
to a "Why" question about a Freudian law involving
repression,
(133) If this logical relationship between the two
kinds of statement were unique, it should make us sus-
:picious and inclined to discredit either one or the
other kind, or both. But it is far from unique. It
is the relationship which we find in most sciences
between the two main kinds of statement which they make.
These I shall call "descriptive" statements and "model"
statements. The former are statements about occurrences
- Limit m-ii be "brwry^, thn tetter are essentially
about /
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about something that cannot be, and yet assist us in
some way to think about statements :>f the former hind.
The former include statements such as Boyle's lav;, the
latter the statements about molecular motion which
provide one hind of explanation of Boyle's law (the
other kind being of course a more general form of Boyle'
law, such as Charles' lav/),
(134) The distinction is of course one that has been
recognised for a long while: Braithwaite (in 3E, 1953,
p.90) says that it was pointed out by Hertz in the
nineteenth century, Braithwaite himself (ibid, ch.XV)
has worked out, with the aid of a symbolic calculus» a
definition of the logical relationship between what he
calls "model" and "theory"• Even so, however, it is
not always easy to be sure in oil cases whether one is
dealing with a statement about a model or a descriptive
statement, 'which Braithwaite would say is about the
theory proper, Por example, the chromosomes of
genetics undoubtedly beg n as models, which were un-
:observable and whose characteristics were assumed in
order to simplify the working out of statements about
the observable subject-matter of genetics. Now that
chromosomes have boon seen under the microscope, it is
not eaay-to—?»y rrhp-t.we-r mi-r statements about
them /
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them are "model11 statements or "descriptive" ones#
There is little or no difficulty in classifying the
diagrams of forces which we find in dynamics, or the
light-waves which can be used as a model for some but
not all optical phenomena. On the other hand it is
not easy to recognise as descriptive statements some of
the laws of physics which employ such general terms as
"mass" or "energy": how far can we tell what is
shorthand and what is a diagram? These problems do
not however destroy the value of the distinction between
the two hinds of statement, or the importance of realis¬
ing that they are both to be found in the field of
psychology#
(135) This realisation helps us to sec, for example,
that the laws of the reflexologists are almost pure
description, but that their references to traces in the
sub-cortical centres are model statements which have two
incidental features. First, they resemble the state-
:ment3 of genetics about chromosomes in that something
corresponding to the entities of the model has been
observed under the microscope. Second, they are much
less useful than most models: it is difficult to see
how in fact they do muico it easier ior us uo worm out
descriptive statements. VTe are also enabled-to see that
Freud's /
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Freud*s statements about repressed entities are model
statements which employ a different wind of entity from
the Pavlovian model, but which might very well be a
model for a purely descriptive reflexology. (I am
as uning, of course, that Freudian and Pavlovians
would agree in correlating the same pairs of ooeimrences,
which, thought it may not in fact be true, can be assumed
in the case of our ideal reflexology), The fact that
this is not more widely recognised is largely due to the
comparative rarity of descriptive statements in Freud*s
writings. Moot of his statements, even very general ones,
are about his model, and are not descriptive laws. The
reflexologists ana behaviourists, on the other hand, go
to the other extreme, and reduce their model statements
to a minimum.
(136) If, therefore, the Freudian repressed entities are
to be compared with anything, it should be with another
model, and not ith descriptive statements. Even so,
Bra3bhwaite*s logical analysis makes it clear that models
are not things that are necessarily incompatible with
each other. Two models used to facilitate thinking
about the laws of the scone science can be incompatible
(though Braithwaite does not give examples) but need not
be so. as instancegfof two compatible models for the
same science, he quotes the very models wnich we have
beon /
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been discussing - unconscious entities and physico-
chemical processes in the brain or body as a whole
(p. 343). Indeed, if the two models are used in
thinking about two different groups of laws of the
same science, even incompatibility does not seem to
me to matter until one cones to the point of sub¬
suming the two groups of laws under one unifying lav;.
Let us assume for example, that the wave-model and the
quantum-model which are both used in optics are in-
:compatible. once they are recognised as models, there
can be no objection to using the wave-model in thinking
about the laws that describe one group of phenomena and
the quantum-model in thinking about another group. No
difficulty should arise until one formulates a law which
is intended to cover the laws of both groups. Even then,
the difficulty, as I sec it, arises only if a model is
re uired to assist in thinking about this law. If we
are content with the formulation of the unifying law,
the incompatibility of the two models for the two groups
of laws subsumed under it is still nothing to worry us.
(137) What then are the features of a model to be taken
into account when we are comparing it with another




(a) The extent to which it does in fact make it easy
for us to tiiink about the descriptive statements
of the science. More precisely, the extent to
which it helps us to remember the statements
which we have already worked out, or been taught:
and the extent to which it enables us to work
out new statements and conditions for testing
them;
(b) The number of statements for hich it does
serve as a model, as opposed to the number for
nich it does not.
At first si,nt, these two considerations often lead to
o posite conclusions. Tne higher the percentage of laws
for w ich a model servos, t.,e less easy the model is to
handle in practice. The model of nuclear physics,
although it is thought of as serving very nearly ail the
laws governing the behaviour of matter, is of very little
use when we are thinking about the great majority of the
laws of dynamics or of biology; it is only there we
corac to the stage of trying to subsume whole groups of
laws under very general ones that it become .; useful.
Clearly we must distinguish between the theoretical
utility and the practical utility of a model. Theoretical
utility is of interest only to the scientist who is trying
to formulate unifying laws, or to tne metaphysician who
is trying to base an argument on the extent to which
scientists succeed in doing this. i'or other purposes,
that is for the application of discovered laws to
practical ends or for the working out and testing of now
laws /
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laws that are not of a higher order, practical utility-
is what matters.
(158) Practical utility depends to a great extent on the
resemblance between the entities of the model and the
phenomena which we observe in everyday life - that is,
on what I shall call the degree of "phenomenomorphism"
in the model. The more "phenomenomorphic" the model is,
the less the effort of imagination that is required to
make use of it. Examples of models that are phenomen-
: oiaorphio to a high degree are the anthropomorphic
deities of scene religions, or the "forms" of Plat®. The
entities of the atomic theory, on the other hand, have
grown steadily less phenomenomorphic as they have been
adapted to more and more general laws. Among phenomenon
rmorphio models we can distinguish those which resemble
explain
the phenomena that they are intended to/("autophenomeno-
:morphic") and those that explain one kind of phenomena
in terms of entitles of another familiar kind
("allophenomenomorphic"). iuithropomopphic deities
used to explain the phenomena of inanimate nature (for
instance, Neptune and stomas at sea) are allophenomeno-
jmorphic, whereas Plato's forms are autopnenomenomorphic:
a tresis what it is because of the ideal tree. The
rep res sod Freud are for the most part
autophenomenomorphic, /
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autophenoncnomorphic, although they also borrow
properties from the loss pkenomcnomorphio models of
nineteenth-century physics. depressed ideas are ob-
:viously autoplienomenomorphic, but sometimes the way
in which they are supposed to operate, by forcing their
way into the ego, or attempting to do so, and thereby
setting up disturbances, is more reminiscent of the
"hard massy atom" than of the conscious ideas on which
they were originally modelled.
(139) But there are several other ways in which models
ought to be subdivided. i.spnave seen that the entities
of the Model of genetics began by being imaginary, with
properties inferred from the obscrvables of the science,
but that with the aid of the microscope it is now possible
to observe tilings that have been .identified with these
entities. Cloud-chamber photography and other devices
seem to have performed the same service for atomic physics#
Borne people may of course wish to draw distinctions
between the way in which we can be said to observe a
chromosome or the track of an alpha-particle and the way
in which we way we observe -the inheritance of pink eyes
in rats: such distinctions presumably imply that the
microscope or the cloud-chamber are quite different from
the naked eye, or even from the naised ussistod by
spectacles. /
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spectacles. However this may bo, such observations are
commonly regarded as "verifying" the entitles of the
model. So that we can at least subdivide models into
"verified" and "unverified". But the "unverified" will
include at least two other hinds of model. There will
be those for which observations which one might expect
to disclose entities corresponding to those of the model
have in fact disclosed nothing of the sort: let us call
these "non-corresponding" models. A non-corresponding
model is not necessarily a discarded model: the science
of optics uses at least three models (rays, waves and
uanta) of which at least two must be non-corresponding.
Borne models are, and have always been, regarded as non-
corresponding; an example is the isobaric and isotherraic
lines of the meteorologists, or the contour lines of the
geographer. And fourthly there are the models that are
regarded as not yet tested for correspondence and yet as
not so obviously non-corresponding as to make testing
unnecessary,
(140) To which class does the Freudian model belong? The
answer to this question must await the discussion of the
entities that make it up. At this stage all that I can
do is to point out the fallacy of drawing any conclusions
from /—
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from tiie currency of other models that are held out as
explanations of the phenomena that Freud was explaining.
For we must keep in mind several possibilities:-
(i) such models may ho usable in theory only: I
cannot imagine hot/ the model of atomic physics
will ever be used to explain human behaviour.
It may well of course be used, and with profit,
to explain certain special behaviour of kinds
of living matter: but the sheer complication
of the human organism will almost certainly
prevent its behaviour from being described
and predicted in terms of nuclei, electrons
or similar entities.
(ii) even if universal models, such as that of
atomic physics, were usable for this purpose,
specialised models, such as Freud*3, might
still be preferable, either because they were
simpler to use or because they were more
easily accepted by patients. ;History is
taught to young children in terms of stories
about personalities, and not in terms of
economic forces, not only because personal
models are easier to use, but also because
children accept them, and would reject others.
{I shall return to this point in chapter 6).
(iii) there are several possible logical relation¬
ships between a universal and a specialised
model. Both might of course be non-
corresponding; or one might be corresponding
and the other not. But pernaps it is less
obvious that both might be corresponding:
electrons and chromosomes may be an example
of such a situation. Sometimes an inference
can be drawn from their compatibility; if
the universal and the specialised models •
were co. .patible, either or both or neither
might be corresponding. But if they were
incompatible, it is difficult to imagine how
they could both be corresponding.
(141) /
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(141) It is tempting but, I think, fallacious to argue
that because Freud's unconscious entities are ex: hyeothesi
unintrospectible, he has devised a model that is ex
iiypotiiGsi "unverifiable". For this argument depends 011
the assumptions (i) that all the characteristics of
Freud's unconscious entities are observable by intro¬
spection and (ii) that what i3 observable by intro-
:spection is not observable in any other way. Freud
would certainly have challenged the first of these: for
he believed that all mental events had characteristics
that were in theory at least observable by the investigator
of cerebral anatomy and functioning. The second
assumption is at first sight on safe ground, for it is
difficult to imagine how an introspectible characteristic -
such as the colour of my memory of a postage-stamp -
could be observed by any means but my introspection. But
Ehrenwald has suggested (TMP, 1947) that some phenomena
are most easily explained on the assumption that some
people are telepathically aware of the repressed thoughts
of others; and if his explanation gains currency it will
be a nice question for the philosophers of the future
whether such telepathic awareness of unconscious entities
should be regarded as non-introspective observation of
some or all of their introspectible characteristics^ I
-■hh-jnlr rm nhnl i inri, hnxieive.v, n simpler WQV Of deciding
whether Freud's unconscious entities are "corresponding",
as soon as we begin to examine them closely, as we are
nb ut to do.
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chapter s«
The entitles of the Freudian unconscious*
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(14-2) In this chapter I shall describe and discuss the
things that Freud talked of as "unconscious", principally
with a view to determining what sort of a model his
unconscious is. These things are -
Ideas




(143) The notion of "ideas" (vorstellungen) was one of
the things that Freud owed to Herbart. The latter*s
system has been summed up as follows
"Herbart dealt with a dynamics of the
soul. Its ideas are all struggling
for realisation in consciousness, kept
down in a state of tendency below the
limen of consciousness because there is
not enough room for all in consciousness.
The ideas thus come into conflict and
inhibit one another ... " (Boring, IiEP, 1950
p.702)
The resemblance is most striking. If we regard Freud*s
system purely as a "dynamics of the soul", and disregard
his views on the nature of the forces that provide these
dynamics, we might say that his contribution to the
Herbartian system was to suggest why it was that one kind
of idea rather than another succeeded in establishing
itself in consciousness. But this is by the way.
(144) The metapsychological nature of ideas has already
been discussed in paragraphs 37 et seq. They are
cathexes/
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cathexes, parcels of energy in potential form#
Occasionally tliey are referred to as mental acts
(see, for example, UCS, 1915, CP IV p. 106). But
for practical purposes they are treated as things,
or ubstances, hich are acted upon by impulses and
repression as physical bodies are acted upon by
gravity or magnetic attraction. Affects are the
qualities exhibited by some of these substances when
they enter consciousness.
(145) But EI, 1920, p.21 et sea. makes it clear that
there is an important difference between an unconscious
and preconscious idea: "the former is worked out upon
some sort of material which remains unrecognised,
whereas the latter (the Pes) has been brought into
connection with verbal images ... These verbal images
are memory-residues; they were at one time perceptions,
and like all memory-residues they can become conscious
again ... It dawns upon us like a new discovery
that only something which lias once been a Cs perception
can became conscious and that anything arising from
within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become
conscious must try to transform itself into external
perceptions; this can be done by way of memory-traces."
And so on1. Freud soon sees that it is not always
verbal /
1In UCS, 1915, CP rV p. 134, he says that a conscious
idea is a "Uortvorhtellung" plus a
while an unconscious idea consists oi tno lat^o J
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verbal image tliat are used to express ideas, and
brings in other .tenor ies of external perceptions, for
ex nple "thinking in pictures" which "in some ways
approximates more cloooly to unconscious processes
o
than does thinking in words..#"
(146) The verbal or visual images in which ideas are
expressed are thus not part of their essence. Uhat
their essence is, is riot so clear. froud is in one
of his Kantian moods, and is reflecting that since he
has stripped nis ideas of all perceptible Qualities,
what is left must bo unknowable. This has the
advantage of explaining why the unconscious idea is
unintrospectible: indeed it manes it impossible that
it should be introspectible. I am not at all sure
that Kreud need have adopted this curious position,
and still less am I sure that he remembered on all
suitable occasions that he hau done so.
(147) /
^There is a passage in ML (1933, p. 100) that is, I
think, imique. i'reud says that the energy of
instinctual impulses must, in the id, "be far more
fluid and capable of being discharged, for otherwise
we should not have those aisplacements which are so
characteristic of the id and which are so completely
independent of the qualities of what is catnected.
(In the ego we should call it an idea)". This tint
of a complete difference between conscious ihoas nd
their unconscious counterparts is nowhere amplified,
:.nd should not perhaps be taken too seriously. It
may mean no more than the difference described in
this paragraph.
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(147) However that may he, we must consider its effect
upon the logical status of the Freudian "idea". When we
see it stripped of all that makes it observable, we are
bound to wonder whether the unconscious idea is really the
sort of thing that could conceivably be observed under any
circumstances. In the last chapter (paragraph 141) I
pointed out that just because Freud*s unconscious entities
were ex hypothesi unintrospectible we could not argue that
his model was "unverifiable". But it may very well be
that his description of his unconscious ideas may be such
that they cannot possibly correspond to anything observable.
We saw that there are entities like this in some models;
the isobars and isotherms of meteorology are not observable.
It is true that an isotherm is visualised as occupying a
certain position because certain observations have been
made with thermometers; but it is more than all these
observations - it represents all the observations that
could be made at all the points through which it passes.
You cannot see, feel, smell or hear an isotherm; in fact
you cannot even take its temperature. It represents „
a potentiality.
(148) Freud*s "ideas" are beginning to look rather like
isotherms. All that one can say of them is that they
are/
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are things that in certain circumstances could turn
r
into something introspectible. It was ...John Stuart Hill
who once described a material object as "a permanent
possibility of sensation". Freud*s ideas are the
material objects of the mind, and Blight almost be
described as "permanent possibilities of introspection".
(149) An important feature of Freud's notion of ideas
is their complexity. lie does not deal in such
comparatively simple ideas such as that of "my father";
it is always "my father dying" or "my father punishing me"
He thus avoided a difficulty which would have arisen as
soon as he gave examples of unconscious ideas. For an
idea such as that of "my father" cannot be unconscious,
or I should never think of him consciously or
preconsciously. Bhu it is not illogical to talk of my
idea of my father punishing rae as unconscious, and at the
same time to say that I have a number of other conscious
or preconscious ideas involving him*
(150). But Freud's notion of symbolism is not altogether-
consistent with this. Without anticipating my later
remarks on symbolism, I can point out that mott of the
symbols he describes stand for comparatively simple ideas
which/
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which are supposed to tie unconscious. What is more,
the symbolised ideas are usually preconscious. To give
an example, it is inconsistent of Freud to say that in
a dream a staircase is a symbol of coitus (NIL,1933,p.36)
if the dreamer is ordinarily capable of entertaining
the idea of coitus consciously. Nor does he escape the
inconsistency by saying that what is unconscious is
the idea of coitus with so-and-so, unless he also makes
it clear that the symbol is a symbol not of coitus
simply, but of coitus with so-and-so: and to do this
he must surely point to some element in the symbol that
represents so-and-so. In fact, some of Freud's
examples can be explained in this way (for example,
Hans' dream of smashing the railway-carriage window -
CP III, p.264).
(151) We have seen that, like most philosophers and
nineteenth-century psychologists, Freud distinguished
mental phenomena3 into ideas, affects and desires, but
that he regarded the third of these categories as
reducible to combinations of the first two. This left
him with two distinct kinds of mental phenomena, ideas
and affects. And we have seen that he regarded the
former/
^1 am of course leaving out of account the ego and
superego, which are not introspeetible phenomena like
soon?'Freud^did^not^oleaSy appreciate^his, andTn
consequence came to ctoious conclusions about the
uneonsciousnessof parts of the ego and superego.
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former as the only kind that were capable of being
unconscious in the strict sense of the -word: the
latter were merely properties that were manifested by
the former on entering consciousness. When I
discussed this doctrine that the essence of affects
was to be consciously experienced, I promised to
suggest a reason for this distinction between them
and ideas.
(152) The essential difference between an idea and
an affect is the content which the former possesses
and the other lacks. What distinguishes one idea
from another is the difference in the things of which
each is the idea: but what distinguishes one affect
from another is its quality (that is, the difference
between fear, pity and horror) or its intensity. If
it is objected that fear (or some other emotion) is
directed towards an object, that fear is fear of
something and that a man,s fear of water is thus to be
distinguished from his fear at snakes, the answer is
presumably that the relationship between affect and
object differs from that between idea and content, and
that the former is not essential, since the occasional
instances of fear without an object ("nameless dread")
do/
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do not mean that fear is not an affect. Freud would,
I think, go even further than this, and would say that
when, as in most cases, the fear appears to have an
object, it is in reality an idea of the object,
together with the attached affect of fear.
(153) However this may be, I cannot find in Freud
(and I have not so far found in the Freudians) any
appreciation of the real nature of the content of an
idea. They fail to distinguish it on the one hand from
the object (the real water or the real snake) and also
from the act of ideation, of entertaining the idea
(the act of thinking of the snake or of the water).
As a result, the indestructibility that usually belongs
).
,
to the content of an idea is mistakenly attributed to
the act of ideation. The content of my idea of a
snake, unlike both the real snake and my thinking of it,
cannot be done away with, although it may, I suppose, be
altered in a sense. But if I fail to distinguish my
thinking about the snake from the content of this
thinking, 1 shall come to regard this thinking as
something indestructible, and when I cannot find it in
the normal place, I shall begin to look for it in odd
places. It is this confusion that leads people to
thin&jS
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think of memories as "stored in the mind", and to
conclude that "one never really forgets anything",
.and it seems very likely that the same confusion led
Freud to distinguish between ideas as tilings that are
indestructible and affects as tilings that make no
pretence to be. As a result, it was only a small
step to the conclusion that when an idea ceased to be
consciously thought of, it must continue to exist in
the unconscious, whereas when an affect ceased to be
felt it merely ceased to be felt.
(154) But most Freudians have ceased to think in
terms of the ideo-motor theory, Ho doubt this is
partly because it has been discredited experimentally;
but it may also be due to the recognition of a clinical
fact. In psychoanalytic language, this is the fact
that symptoms are not relieved solely by the
derepression of ideas: the ego must also experience
the appropriate affect. In layman*s language, it will
do me no good simply to remember my encounter with a
large dog in a passage-way: nor even to remember that
I was frightened at the time. I must both remember
the encounter and experience the fear.
(155) /
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(155) We therefore find the neo-Freudians talking
of unconscious entities of other kinds. First there
is the unconscious process. We shall see that for
Freud the so-called unconscious processes were of a
special kind, although he sometimes used the word
"vorgang" to refer to ideas or thoughts. It is this
more general sense which the neo-Freudians seom to
have developed, until they use the word as an
umbrella for everything that happens in the mind.
Brierley, for example, says -
"The full psychological reality at any moment
is the totality of activated processes,
conscious and unconscious." (TPA,1951,p.l65).
"In metapsychology it is assumed that the
mental process is the hypothetical unit of
psychic life" (ibid.p.105).
"The hypothetical unit of experience
corresponding to the hypothetical unit-
process is not an atomic impulse, affect or
presentation, hut a relationship of impulse,
affect and presentation ... Hypothetical units
are convenient figments to illustrate the
parallelism between subjective reaction and
objective wave of activity, but in fact the
simplest conscious experience is probably the
equivalent of a whole series of processes ....
whether viewed subjectively as experience or
objectively as process-activation, mental life
is a sequence of adaptive responses." (ibid.p.108)
A mental process seems, from these and other passages,
to be something very like the combination of stimulus
and response in which the behaviourists deal. What is
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quite clear, particularly from the last of these
quotations, is that the process itself is not the kind
of thing that could conceivably he introspected.
Introspectihility is reserved for something that appears
to "be completely epiphenomenal, although of course it is
still of major importance whether a process is
"conscious" or "unconscious" - that is, whether it
belongs to the ego-organisation or not. (See the
passage from which the last quotation i3 token).
(156) The other concept which some neo-Freudians
have substituted for ideas is that of "object-relations".
This has enabled Melanie Klein and Fairbairn to devise
elaborate models. Without attempting to expound their
systems (which I am not indeed qualified to do) I can
illustrate the nature, and the difficulties, of the
concept by the following passage from a lecture by
Fairbairn. After describing the superego as an "internal
object", he goes on -
"Freud's theory of the mental constitution
is thus seen to imply that object-
relationships exist within the personality
itself as well as between the personality and
external objects ... Melanie Klein, while
accepting Freud's concept of the superego
together with his whole theory of the mental
constitution, has been led to envisage the
presence or a multiplicity of internalised
objects/
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objects in addition to tlie superego.
These ..• are considered to represent
various aspects of parental figures as
interpreted, not only in terms of actual
experience in childhood, but also in terms
of the child*s own instinctive tendencies
and emotional reactions. On the basis of
the resulting concept of internal objects
there has been developed the concept of a
world of inner reality involving situations
and relationships in which the ego
participates together with its internal
objects. These situations and
relationships are comparable with those in
which the personality as a whole participates
in the world of outer reality: but the
form which they assume remains that conferred
on them by the child*s experience .... The
world of inner reality is conceived as
essentially unconscious: but this does not
preclude its manifesting itself in
consciousness in the form of dreams and
phantasies ...... Freud*s original
distinction between the conscious and
unconscious now becomes less important than
the distinction between the two worlds of
outer reality and.inner reality."
(TEAP,1952,p•126)
(157) Here a^n, the concept which has been
substituted for the "idea" is something that could not
itself be introspected under any circumstances. But
while an "object-relation" cannot be introspected, it
can be the object of self-description, and has thus a
different status from that of the "process". What
is more, an object-relation seems to me to consist
very largely of components that could conceivably be
introspected/
, of course-, a fuller exposition in
PSP(195S)
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introspected, although, the relation itself could
not. For it seems to me that an object-relation
is really a collection of emotions and beliefs
which have "been grouped together because they "are
about" the same object. Indeed, when we consider
the doctrine of "internalised objects", it is
difficult to see how these differ from the Freudian
"ideas". We must not of course make the mistake of
thinking that the object-relation is completely
described when we have listed its components:
there is still the element of relationship, the
fact that, for example, I cannot think about my
brother {or as Freud might say, entertain the idea
of hira) without feeling hate and believing him to be
ill-intentioned toward me. Thus most of the
components of van object-relation are the
introspectible entities of Freud, but the relationship
is non-introspectible and at most the object of
self-description.
(158) The difference between the concepts of
"process" and of "object-relation" is of real
importance for an understanding of Freudfs own logical
position. For each of these concepts is the
development of a different side of Freud1 s doctrine*
On/
13Q
On tiio one hand, there is the doctrine of mental
entities that are introspectihle in nature hut are
sometimes found existing in an unintrospectihle
position# The concept of object-relation is the
direct descendant of this doctrine. On the other
hand, there is the doctrine of entities that are by
nature unintrospectihle - energy, cathexis,
anticathexis, memory-traces - and it is to this
family that "process" belongs. In the previous
chapter we saw how the former of these doctrines -
the doctrine of repressed entities - was in reality
an attempt to provide an autophenomenomorphic model
for the explanation of human behaviour, and that this
model, though specialised, is not for this reason
necessarily incompatible with the universal model
which is offered by physics, and is not necessarily
non-corresponding. But in Ireudfs metapsychology
we seem to be presented with an alternative model,
which differs in important respects from the model
composed of repressed entities. First, it seems to
be an attempt to link the explanation of human
behaviour (including introspectible mental events)
to the universal explanation of phenomena offered by
physics: if so, it is not a specialised model.
Secondly,- i t i.q n I 1 nphrynnrnnr.omorphic ; its Working




(159) if Freud's concepts are recognised as
belonging to two quite distinct models, which are
of different igical status, it will be found much
easier not only to unravel many of his obscurer
passages, in which he turns from one model to the
other without realising what he is doing, but to
understand why neo-Freudian doctrine should have
divided into these two main terminologies, and why
their users are so puzzled at the division and
anxious to prove both their own and the other's
orthodoxy, like two monasteries each of which
possesses the miracle-working body of the same saint.
Indeed it is paradoxical but true that although the
object-relation model is the legitimate descendant
of Freud's autophenomenomorphic model, and as such
more orthodox than the descendant of his
metapsychology (which was after all a by-product of
his discoveries), the original propounders of the
concept of object-relations were under grave
suspicion of heresy,
(160) But quite apart from its historical interest,
the object-relations model throws an interesting light
on the "idea-plus-affect" model if we recognise the
former/""
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former as a more refined form of tiie latter. For
an object-relation is a very tliinly disguised
description of a potentiality. It is, as I have
suggested, a name for the somewhat complex fact that
I cannot, for example, think of my brother without
certain emotions and beliefs. It is more than a
name for a particular occasion on which I think of him
in this way, and it is more even than a name for all
the occasions on which I have ever or will ever think
of him. It includes, besides these occasions, other
hypothetical occasions of the same kind which did not
occur or will not occur. What is more, this
particular object-relation includes all the differing
degrees or qualities of emttion which I have felt, or
will or would feel, towards my brother in various
different circumstances. All this suggests that the
"idea-plus-affect" model may really be a cruder kind
of potentiality model. We have seen that the
permanent existence which Freud attributed to ideas
was probably due to the confusion between the act of
ideation, the content and the object. This helped
to disguise the difference in logical status between
an act of ideation and the ability or tendency to
perform that act. We have seen too that the
affective/
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affective part of tlie object-relation was regarded as
nothing but the effect of the entry of the idea into
consciousness. Thus my tendency to think of ray brother
with hate and suspicion, which Klein and Fairbairn would
call ray object-relation toward ray brother, is broken
down by Freud into an indestructible idea of my brother
and its property of giving rise to the affects of hate
and suspicion when it enters consciousness.
(151) In the last chapter I pointed out that models
could be divided into "corresponding" and non-correspond-
:ing". 'l'here is no doubt that Freud ..ould have called
his model "corresponding" if the issue had been put to
him. And I also suggested in the last chapter that
we cannot argue from the unintrospectible nature of
Freud's unconscious entities to the impossibility of
testing them for "correspondence"', that is, of
"verifying" them. But we have seen in the present
chapter that his model has been replaced in psycho-
:analytic practice (as ..ell as in academic psychology)
by other models, and that its most direct descendant
is a potentiality model. This fits the conclusion
which we reached at the end of Chapter 1, namely that
Freud's distinctions between consciousness, pro-
:consciousness and unconsciousness were such that it
v/as logically possible that his unconscious entities
consisted /
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consisted of potentialities which are not the subject
of self-description, and that there could be three
reasons why they were not the subject of self-
description.
(162) I do not think that we can regard potentiality
models as "corresponding". When the entities of
models are things like -viruses or chromosomes we can
look through microscopes and say "That must be a virus -
so that's what it looks like". But when the entity
is a potentiality, no observation like this can be
regarded as an observation of the entity. A potential¬
ity is unobservable because it is a name for a very
large number of events, some of which actually occur,
but some of which are ..erely possibilities. An isobar
is not observable because it is more than the measure-
:ment of the barometric pressure at a particul r place,
and more even than all the similar measurements that
led to its being traced on the map: it is a name for
all the measurements that might be made and might
result in the same barometric reading at that
particular time. For the same reason you cannot ob-




(163) bo that, v/hile Freud's autopiienomenomorpiiic
model v/as intended by liim to be "corresponding", and
while verification of its correspondence is not
logically inconceivable, its chief entities have been
replaced in psychoanalytic practice by tv/o models,
of which one is not autophenonenomorphic (the
"process theory") while the one that is seems to be
non-corresponding.
THE UIICOHSC10 JSHE3.J OF iduiTS Of EGO AKD aUPEuEGO
(164) The nature and properties of the Freudian ego
are in themselves a subject fully as complex and as
difficult as those of the unconscious. I must,
hov/ever, say something on this subject before going on
tqtiiscuss Freud's theory that part of the ego was un-
iconscious. Fortunately, the examination of other
Freudian concepts has to some extent prepared us for
the sort of obscurities that are to be expected in
this concept,
(165) As we have seen, the concept of the ego was a
comparatively late development in Freud's thought.
He used the term as early as 1893, if not earlier (see




is not until 19U3 that we find him describing the
distinction between the q^o and the id as a net; addition
to his theory (EI, 19£3, ch. S). Until;then, the
term "ego" tends to be used without definition and
vaguely: in the essay on Charcot it is simply the
equivalent of "the other mental processes" when ho
is describing their relation, hip to a repressed
memory. In EI, however, he tries to define it, and
to arrive at an idea of its relation to unconscious
mental entities. Thereafter, the ego is of increasing
importance to Ereud and to his followers, and they
concentrate more unu more on dissecting it and studying
its behaviour. I thin, that this development took
place for this reason. The "discovery" of unconscious
mental entities provided a picture of a mental
machinery that looked at first like accounting satis¬
factorily for all the abnormalities of human
behaviour: to understand human behaviour it now appear¬
ed to be sufficient to study these unconscious
entities. The concept of the ego was necessary only
as the thing that on the one hand exercised the force
called "repression" and on the other hand was sub¬
jected to the forces of the instincts, either in
straightforward shape or in the distorted form resulting
from /
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from repression. It was simply needed, as the subject
of the verb "to repress" and as the object of the verb
"to motivate". Eventually, however, it became clear
that the study of the unconscious alone was not enough
to account for all behaviour. Instead of being a
simple, uncomplicated pronoun the ego betrayed
idiosyncrasies. It turned out that it did other
things as we11 as "repress": it could be the subject
of the verbs "regress", "project", "introject" and so
forth. A fully satisfactory account of behaviour
therefore called for an account of the behaviour of the
ego. It was as if Freud had tried to construct an
automaton that would behave like a person, and had at
first thought that a system of springs and cog-wheels
would serve: and as if he then found that to make it
work he had to substitute a manikin for his main
cog-wheel,
(166) As vie shall see, the development of the concept
of the superego is partly an attempt to restore to the
ego the status of a mere cog-wheel. It is an attempt
to rovide the mainspring of the ego's behaviour
towards the rest of the psychic machine. In this way
it is an effort to escape from the infinite regress
which /
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which appeared to be on the point of commencing as soon
as the complexity of ego-behaviour had. to be acknowledged.
The superego is a sort of ego within the ego: but not
every superego behaves in the same way - some, for
example, allow the ego to entertain impulses and ideas
which are banned by other superegos - and the infinite
regress appears to be about to begin. Probably
unwittingly, Freud makes an adroit escape from the
eventual necessity of assuming a sort of ego within the
superego by ascribing the behaviour of the superego to
the influence of parental training, and thus in effect
making it a specialised part of the id, due not to
inherited constitution but to environment.
(167) When Freud first attempts to describe the ego,
his description is confused by a good deal of cerebral
; natorny, which the charitable might try to explain
away as metaphor, but which is probably due to Freud*s
belief that a fairly close correspondence could be
traced between his concepts and the functions of parts
of the brain.
SfWe shall now look upon the mind of an individual
as an unknown and unconscious id, upon whose
surface rests the ego, developed from its
nucleus the Pcpt. - system". (EI, p.S8)
and /
14-7
and a couple of pages later -
"The ego is first and foremost a body-ego: it is
not merely a surface entity but is in itself the
projection of a surface"
to which the "authorised note by the Translator" is as
follows -
"i.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily
sensations, chiefly from those springing from
the surface of the body. It may thus be
regarded as a mental projection of the surface
of the body, besides, as we have se n above,
representing the superficies of the mental
apparatus" (ibid. p. 51).
Freud goes on -
"If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for it
we can easily identify it with the "cortical
hoiuunculus" of the anatomists, which stands on
its head in the cortex, sticks its heels into
the air, faces backwards and, as we know, has
its speech area on the left-hand side.^"
(168) In later works, Freud is less obsessed by
anatomy.
"The ego is identical with the id, and is merely
a specially differentiated part of it. If we
regard this part by itself in contradistinction
to the whole, or if a real split has occurred
bet eon the two, the weakness of the ego becomes
apparent. But if the ego remains bound up with
the id and indistinguishable from it, then it
« isplays its power. The same is true of the
relation between the ego and the superego. In
many situations the two are merged: and as a
rule /
__
50n p» 29 Freud has just said "the ego wears an
auditory lobe - on one side only, as we learn from
cerebral anatomy".
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rule we can only distinguish, one from the other
lien there is a tension or conflict between
them. In repression the decisive fact is that
the ego is an organ!sation6 and the id is not.
The ego is indeed the organised portion of the
id ..... . The ego is an organisation®. It
is based upon the maintenance of free intercourse
and of the possibility of reciprocal influence
between all its pacts. Its desexualIzed energy
still shows traces of its origin in its tendency
to bind together and unify, and this necessity
to synthetize grows stronger in proportion as
the strength of the ego increases." (ISA, 1986»
pp. 31-34).
Again
"A special organisation^ has arisen which hence
forward acts as an intermediary between the id
and the external world. This region of our
mental life has been given the name of ego.
The principal characteristics of the ego are
these ... The ego is in control of voluntary
movement. It has the task of self-preservation.
As regards external events, it performs that
task by becoming aware of the stimuli from
without, by storing up experiences of tliern
(in the memory), by avoiding excessive stimuli
(through flight), by dealing with moderate
stimuli (through adaptation), and finally by
learning to bring about appropriate modifications
in the external world to its own advantage
(through activity). As regards internal
events, in relation to the id, it performs
that task by gaining control over the demands
of instincts, by deciding whether they shall bo
allowed to obt; in satisfaction, by postponing
that satisfaction to times and circumstances
favourable in the external world or by suppress¬
ing their excitations completely. Its
activities are governed by consideration of the
tensions produced by stimuli present within it
or introduced into it ... It may be inferred
from the atat9bf sleep that £ its/ organization
consists in a particular distribution of
mental energy," (OP. 1940, pp. 15, 16).
The word is the same in the German.
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(169) From tliese descriptions wo can draw one or two
conclusions about the Freudian ego, First, it is made
up of the same constituents as the id - ideas, subject
to the impulsion of the instinctual forces. It is
true that affects are confined to ideas that have
entered into consciousness, and therefore into the
ego: but affects are merely, for Freud, properties
of ideas that belong to them at all times and are
merely actualised in consciousness. The ego is not
therefore another hind of substance. Secondly, it
has no motive power of its own. For this power it
has to depend on the same instinctual forces as the
id. Even the force of repression is probably the
resultant of the instinctual forces (albeit distorted
by training) that impel the conscious ideas which are
incompatible with the repressed ideas. Thirdly and
consequently, it is distinguishable from the id
solely by possessing the quality of "organisation".
(170) What sort of a quality is organisation? For
Freud, it seems to consist in "the maintenance of
free intercourse and of the possibility of reciprocal
influence between all its parts". It is thus a quality
that shows itself in the behaviour of the egof s
(such /
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(such as affects) tliat show themselves "on immediate
inspection", as it were. An analogy will make the
difference clearer. If I look at a game of chess
which has reached, let us imagine, the middle game, I
can tell by "immediate inspection" that some of the
pieces are black and the rest white. But not until I
observe or imagine the behaviour of the pieces can I
tell that White is organised into a defence against
an attack by Blaclfc knights and King's rook. I say
"observe or imagine" because it may be objected that
if I am a sufficiently good chess player or critic I
can tell at a glance that White and not Black is
organised into a defence and so forth: to which the
answer is of course that in order to do so I must
imagine the behaviour of the pieces and that if I
could not do this I could not detect any kind of
organisation in a game of chess. I am not of course
denying that there may be types of organisation that
arc detectable by "immediate inspection": the
philosopher of aesthetics might, I suppose, point to
the organisation of the parts of a painting to show
that there is at least one such type. Whether this
is organisation in the same literal sense as the
causal type that I have been describing, or whether
it /
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it depends on the behaviour of my visual apparatus are
questions that I cannot discuss: but I think it is
plain that the organisation of the constituents of
Freud*s ego is not of this ind. The point is of
importance when we come to consider the alleged
unconsciousness of part of the ego.
(171) For the moment, however, I want to draw attention
to'the difficulty of reconciling the ideo-motor model
with the fact that the' ego is defined in terras of an
organisation that in its turn is defined in terms of
behaviour. For the ideas of the ideo-motor model are
not bits of behaviour: they are things, substances,
mental atoms. They may, like comets, enter and leave
the system that is called the ego, and they may exert
forces upon one another: but they themselves are not
actions. It is true that they are sometimes spoken
of as processes, or as having processes that correspond
to them: but such processes belong, as I have pointed
out, to the netapsychological model, and not to the
ideo-motor one. As soon arjtyou appreciate this, you
begin to suspect that the ego defined in terras of
organisation - what I shall call the "organisation-ego"
belongs to the metapsychological model and not to the
~idco-iaotor / —
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ideo-motor model. The ego that "belongs to the ideo-
motor model must be one of two other things, both of
which can be detected occasionally in Freud's writings.
Either it resembles the ideas in being a sort of mental
molecule whose constituents are mental atoms, and in
being able to exert forces - such as repression - upon
them: or it is a mere location which ideas enter or
leave under the compulsion of forces, a sort of mental
billiard-table round which mental billiard-balls
ricochet and disappear into pockets. But we have seen
that Freud did not clearly distinguish between his two
models, and it is not surprising therefore that he did
not realise that each of them required a different sort
of ego. It is of course with the ego as part of the
ideo-motor/that we are concerned when we come, as we
are about to do, to the doctrine of the unconsciousness
of part of the ego.
(172) The view that parts of the ego and super-ego are
unconscious seems to have been a comparatively late
elaboration of Freud's theory. The first clear
statement of it that I can find is in MIL (1953,
pp. 93 et seq.). Later still, in OP (1940, p.4-5), he
says something which casts a certain amount of doubt
on *ii<aj; QEL '^1C passage in MIL. "Large
portions /
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portions of the ©go, and in particular of the super¬
ego, which cannot be denied the characteristic of
being preconscious, none the less remain for the most
part unconscious in the phenomenological sense of the
x;ord". (OP, p. 43}. But the passage in IJIL is quite
unambiguous. Immediately after a clear statement of
the difference between the "dynamic" or proper sense
of the word "unconscious" and the "descriptive" sense,
more properly named "preconscious" (see paragraph 49)
he goes on to spe k of the "discovery, inconvenient at
first sight, that parts of the ego and super-ego, too,
are unconscious in the dynamic sense. . (NIL, p.96).
(173) The explanation of the OP passage may be that
Freud is talking of the very parts of the ego and super¬
ego which are not "dynamically unconscious" - and that
the two passages between them cover the whole of the
ego and super-ego. Or the OP passage, in which Freud
is trying to establish a new point about the pre-
the
: conscious, may be merely /argument of an opportunist,
which Freud sometimes was. The third possibility,
that the NIL passage was superseded by the OP one,




(174) Tlie second question is what the distinction was
between the unconscious part of the ego and the unconscious
part of the super-ego. I am inclined to think (though
not with any confidence; that the answer is in NIL
p. 92. After drawing attention to the unconscious
resistance of patients, Freud says -
"The resistance can only be a roanifestation of the
ego • • * Now that we have posited a special
function within the ego to represent the demand
for restriction and rejection, i.e. the super¬
ego, we can say that repression is the work of
the super-ego - either that it does its work on
its own account or else that the ego does it in
obedience to its orders. If now we are faced
with the case where the patient under analysis
is not conscious of his resistance, then it
must be either that the super-ego and the ego
can operate unconsciously in quite important
situations, or, which would be far more
significant, that parts of both ego and super¬
ego are themselves unconscious « (Later
he makes it clear that he accepts the latter
view).
(175) This passage suggests that the evidence for both
the unconscious part of the ego and the unconscious part
of the super-ego is the phenomenon of resistance, and
that the only difference between the two is that the
former does the repressing under the influence of the
latter. The argument seems to be this:
I. a) My patient is "resisting"
b) From what he says (and 1 accept it) he
cannot introspect his resistance.
cT what "resists" is the ego.
d) Therefore the ego is doing something
which is not introspectible.




II. f) f'hc reason for the resistance is the
influence of the super-ego (whose
origins and functions have been
demonstrated elsewhere').
g) Introspection does not detect this
influence at work.
h) Therefore it is the influence of a
part of the super-ego wniciyls not
introspectible•
(176) It is sometimes suggested that Freud's psychic
entities, such as the super-ego, were very largely
metaphors, designed to enable his patients and readers
to visualise the way in which their minds functioned,
I find this very difficult to reconcile with passages
like the one just quoted, where the whole argument is
based on a conception of ego, super-ego, and repressed
material as bodies which interact according to laws
that closely resemble physical laws. The ego exercise
a force upon certain ideas because it in turn is acted
upon by a force exorcised by the super-ego: and
because we cannot see the portions of them which are
involved in this psychic leverage, we must conclude
that they have invisible portions.
(177) The whole argument turns upon the assumption
that /
7
Fx (1920, Ch. Ill)
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that repression and the ego belong to the sort of
things that could conceivably be introspected. There
is of course no absurdity in the assumption that the
ego is introspectible if all that is meant is that all
its constituents are introspect ible: for, as we have
seen, its constituents are ideas and affects, viiich
iireud certainly regarded as introspect ible. But I
suspect that 1'Teud meant something mure than this,
although he does not seem to have a very precise notion
of what that something was. He cannot very well have
thought that one could simultaneously introspect all
the constituents of the ego. He may have thought that
one can introspect several of its constituents
simultaneously, together with the relationship between
them that he describes as "organisation". In fact,
as we have seen, the organisation of the ego's
constituents is not something that could present
itself to immediate inspection: it is something that
can be apprehended only by wathhing the interaction of
these constituents (or, as Ireud calls it, the
"maintenance of free intercourse and of the possibility
of reciprocal influence" between them) over an




(178) Nor is it easy to imagine tlie nature of the
constituent or constituents of the unconscious part
of the ego, which must, on Freud's showing, be an
idea or ideas which are in theory introspectible but
in practice unintrospectible. These ideas are
thus in exactly the same position as repressed ideas,
with the sole difference that their unconsciousness
cannot be the effect of repression, since this would
involve an infinite regress. This i3 not an
insuperable objection, since we have seon ( in
paragraph 100) that Freud may have believed in
material which was naturally unconscious. But what
are we to think of as the content of these ideas
that make up the unconscious part of the ego? I can
think of no plausible answer, and Freud does not help
(179) Freud certainly believed that repression could
as a result of psychoanalysis, be intinspected (NIL,
loc. eit.). But I think that this was the result of
a failure to make two distinctions. The first is
between the "act of repression" and "resistance" (see
paragraph 108). As Freud himself pointed out at the
beginning of his essay on Repression (1915, CP IV p, 8<
the former resembles conscious condemnation which he
defines as "rejection based on judgment". It can
quite plausibly be asserted that condemnation is an
occurrence /
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occurrence which we can and do introspect (and as I
am concerned only to shot; the grounds of Freud*s
belief, it does not matter whether a sophisticated
view of introspection would deny this). This "being
so, the act of repression, being of the same nature,
is in theory introspectible. 'what is more, it may
v;ell be the case that psychoanalysis can enable the
patient to introspect not only what he formerly
repressed, but also a process similar to that which
similar,
occurred '.lien he first began to repress it -/that is,
to the original act of repression. But even if we
grant that an act of repression can be made intro-
:spectible (or t least replaced by something that is
introspectible), it does not follow that repression, in
the sense of constant resistance, is introspectible.
I may decide to concentrate on something, and this
decision may be introspected: but it doe.- not follow
that my concentration is introspectible.Q
(180) /
8If it is maintained that concentration (or resistance)
is sometimes introspected, this is probably due to
the failure to draw the second of the distinctions.
I have referred to this in paragraphs 54- and 55 as
the distinction between introspection and self-
description. In other words, I suggest that the
process by which I become aware of ray concentration,
though it may include a certain amount of intro-
:spection, also inc lucles compar ison and general!sat Ion.
what I am thinking about, remembering that I nave been
thinking about the same thing for some time past,
noting that I cannot remember having thought about
anything else recently, comparing this with my usual
behaviour, deciding that it is sufficiently abnormal
to be given a name, and calling it' "concentration".
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(180) So far, I have been discussing the unconscious
part of tlic ego, and have only referred in passing to
the unconscious part of the super-ego. It is not
always easy, however, to tell whether a reference by
Freud to the unconscious part of the ego includes or
excludes the super-ego: and I think the passage quoted
in paragraph 174 shows tne difficulty which he had in
distinguishing them,
(101) I must attempt a summary of those of Freud*s
statements which throw light on th© nature of this
concept, since it seems to me one of the most difficult
to understand. I need not of course do more than
summarise Freud*3 well-known theory of the genesis of
the super-ego, or of the role which it plays in mental
life.
(102) It is a "genuine structural entity" and not
merely the personification of an abstraction (NIL,
1955, p. 00). It is a "modification of the ego"
as a result of an "identification" with the parents
(II, 1923, p.44). "In many situations the two £pG*
ego and super-e are merged; and as a rule we
cfin only distinguish one from the other when there
tp.nnif4B-^p fw.-.-r-i i rvh between thaa:" to this
extent /
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extent their relationship resembles that between the
ego and id, the former being the organised portion of
the latter, (I8A, 1986 p» 51): (see also p. 46 of OP,
1940). "It is the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which
the ego measures itself ... and whose demands for
ever-increasing perfection it is always striving to
fulfil • • • This ego-ideal is a precipitation of the
old idea of the parents, an expression of the admir-
:ation which the child felt for • • • them" (NIL, 1933,
p. 88) "By setting up this ego-ideal the ego masters
its Oedipus complex and at the same time places itself
in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially
the representative of the external world, of reality,
the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the reprosent-
:ative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts
between the ego and the ideal will, as we arc now
prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast
between what is real and what is mental ... Through
the forming of the ideal, all the traces left behind
in the id by biological developments and by the
vicissitudes gone through by the human race are taken
over by the ego and lived through again by it in each
individual" (HI, 1983, p. 48)
41B5) /
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(183) The conscious manifestations of the super-ego
appear to be feelings of guilt, inferiority, depression,
occasionally self-approbation (NIL, 1933, p.83, 04) and
the sense of compulsion to do or refrain from certain
actions (or thoughts). There is also the statement
(in EI, 19S3, p. 33-45) that another manifestation may
be "an unconscious sense of guilt", which ifreud makes
in the full knowledge that it is inconsistent v/itli his
belief that there are no unconscious affects. These
manifestations must not hot/ever be regarded as con-
:stituting the super-ego, or indeed as anything more
than its effects upon the ego, wh.ch it produces by
means of what is described as "punishment" or
"criticism", or, less metaphorically, as "tension",
(104) what is it then that produces these effects?
It cannot be merely a special subdivision of the
"organised processes" that constitute the ego, for
that would require us to suppose that such processes
cither are these manifestations (guilt, depression
and so on) or are related to them in some epiphenomenal
way: whereas it seems quite certain that their
relationship is a causal one,
(185) Itrls possible LhaL the answer lies in Ihio -
ego-ideal (Idealich - see N, 1914, CP IV, p, 51).
kreud /
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freud may have regarded this as a complex of ideas,
and, as wo have seen, ideas were the substances of
the mental world which Freud pictured: they were just
the sort of thing to produce effects on the ego of this
hind. I cannot put this suggestion forward with
complete confidence, but it seems to me to explain two
facts which take some explaining# The first is the
importance of the ego-ideal to the concept of the
super-ego, an importance quite out of proportion to the
comparatively infrequent instances in which the
ordinary human being is consciously influenced by
anything resembling an ego-ideal. The second is that
in at least two passages (EI, p. 51 and OP p# 123)
Freud speaks as if the super-ego is of the same nature
as the id and as if the essential difference between
thorn were that the id represents "the organic past"
(i.e. the influence of the evolution of the sx^ocies)
while the super-ego represents the early experience
of the individual.
(186) The more closely the super-ego is examined, the
more closely it is seen to resemble the id in its
nature and operation. Both (if I am right) consist
of ideas producing effects upon the ego: in both
-cases the effects consist either of behaviour or-of
affects /
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affects or both. xhere arc/only two important
differences between tlie tv;o concepts. The first is
their origins: the second is that the id is regarded
as "being "external" to the ego, while the super-ego
is "internal" to it - in some passages, a part of it,
(187) The need for a super-ego seems to arise from
the way in which Freud tried to anatomise the mind
into two main systems - the id, and the mediator
"between the id and the external world, the ego. The
behaviour of the latter was intended to be explicable
by reference to the forces exercised upon it by the
id and the external world. In certain circumstances,
however, the ego behaved in a way which could not be
explained as the mechanical result of these forces:
it was still, one might say, a personality, whose
behaviour was to some extent determined by its history.
(108) Freud might have explained this as the result
of modifications in the constituents of either the id
or the ego (or indeed of both) which had been produced
by the history of the individual. That he did not
adopt these solutions was probably due to his
assumption that the constituents of these two systems
could not be modified, but could only bo made more or
less /
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less conscious, or be catliocted with more or less
energy.
9
(189) It is true that Freud does describe the super¬
ego in at least one passage as a "modification of the
ego" (see paragraph 182). But it is clear from the
context of this as well as the other passages that it
wts, as Freud said, to be regarded as a "genuine
structural entity", which could, on occasion at least,
operate quite independently of the ego, and which could,
as we have seen, produce effects on the ego while
remaining "unconscious" itself.
(190) What then is the distinction between the conscious
and unconscious parts of the super-ogo? The difficulty
appears to be to identify something that can plausibly
be called the conscious part- Once we have realised
that guilt, depression and so on are effects and not
constituents of the super-ego, there is little left
that is conscious. The simplest way out of the
difficulty would be to suppose that Freud was not
troubling to distinguish effects from constituents when
lie thought of a conscious super-ego.
jbjl-ouu-s actual reasoning was no doubt less logical.
For instance, he uses the "delusions of observation"
foil rid in some psycIio'Gics air an arg umoi it- for- rogardrng-
the super-ego as a separate internal system (NIL,
1933, p. 01).
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(191) This my well have been the applanation.
Certainly, the distinction between effects and con¬
stituents is not made by inmost Jones, even where
he lias made a special attempt to describe the dif-
:Terence between conscious and unconscious super-ego,
(iXS, 1927). he suggests that the conscious part
corresponds very closely to what is commonly called
conscience: "considerations of reality, with knowledge
of actual life, have been allowed for in its formation".
The unconscious part, on the other hand, is irrational,
unrelated to reality, derived from few sources (chiefly
of course the parents) and is infantile in attitude.
Uhat he appears to be distinguishing here are two
different sorts of behaviour on the part of the ego:
he may not mean that this behaviour constitutes the
super-ego, but if he regards the super-ego as something
more, he has distinguished its parts only by means of
their effects on the ego.
(192) On the thoory that the super-ego is essentially
a complex of ideas, it would obviously be possible
to distinguish those that are conscious or preconscious
from those that are unconscious. nn idea which could
be introspected in order to explain certain sorts of
behaviour 7
1G6
behaviour 1° uould bo a constituent of the preconscious
super-ego, and an idea which, though regarded as
causally responsible for certain sorts of behaviour,**"0
was not introspectible would be part of the unconscious
super-ego.
(193) ho that in so far as Freud distinguishes the un-
;conscious super-ego from the unconscious ego (and of
course he does not always do so) it is a miniature and
specialised id. Its effects upon the ego, like those
of the id, consist either of actions or affects. If
my earlier suggestion is accepted, it consists like
the id of a complex of ideas. Freud was aware of
this resemblance (see, for example, OP, 1940, p. 128-3)•
For him, however, the difference in origin involved a
difference in metapsychological status. The impulses
of the id are forces exerted by the bodily organs of
digestion, reproduction and so on - that is, by the
inherited structure of the organism. But some (if
not all) behaviour can bo fully explained only by
referring to the early history of the particular
organism. /
■^"Behaviour" in this context of course includes
having feelings of guilt and so forth, as well as
performing the actions which would have avoided
such feelings, and the vague phrase "certain sorts
of behaviour" could be uerined by raT^r^-noe to-the
feelings of guilt, self-approval and the like which
accompany, or are the alternatives go, a ride class
of actions.
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organism. In efrect Freud said that this must he
because tne Forces exerted by its inherited structure
were opposed by Forces exerted by something created or
implanted in tiie organism.
(194) There are two interesting features of the super¬
ego, which can be seen raore clearly when it is described
in this crude way. The first is apparently a
criticism of my simplified description. For my
descri tion would include all the effects of an organism's
history on its behaviour. But the Freudian super-ego
does not include all this. Yet it is very difficult
to define the difference between the effects which Freud
would and those wuich he would not have attributed to
the super-ego. He would no doubt have tried to base
his distinction on the source of the acquired behaviour:
if this source was the parents - or people in a
parent-like relation to the child - then the
behaviour would be attributable to the super-ego.
But this would include all sorts of behaviour, such
as speech or the way in hich a man brushes his teeth.
And if the source of "super-ego behaviour" (as I
should like to call it for the sake of brevity) is
not limited to the parents (for orphans have super-egos)
-it is aif'F-jnnlt tn "or, porn fitly, what sources should be
included /
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included and excluded. Eventually, perhaps, v/e
should be faced ,1th. the necessity of allowing all
behaviour acquired by imitating other persons to be
"
superego beliaviour" •
(195) nil I am trying to do here is to establish the
difficulty of drawing a satisfactory distinction in
kind between "super-ego behaviour" and other learned
behaviour. Yet Freud must have thought it possible,
for a great deal of learned behaviour was clearly
regarded by him as not being "super-ego behaviour".
Nor is it easy to "understand where these other kinds
of learned behaviour fitted into his system. Some
of them were certainly attributed to dynamically
unconscious ideas, others again to a preconscious
source (such as the "verbal residues").
(196) The other striking feature of the Freudian
concept of the super-ego is the extent to which it is
a reification, and even a personification, of the
phenomena of habit.11 The process which resulted in
this /
H — - —~ — — —
It is interesting to note that there arc only two
phenomena that Freud describes in terms of habit.
One is the tendency to recall or even re-enact
unpleasant experiences, the other is the tendency
to repress again what has been "de-repressed" in
the course of treatment. To explain those, Freud—
makes use of the concept of the "repetition-
compulsion". This is a last resort, and a con-
:fcswion of the failure of other concepts to explain
the phenomenon. I believe that Freudians now;
explain the recall or re-enactment of the unpleasant
by the concept of masochism.
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this reification seems to have consisted of the
folio ing steps -
1. the observation that certain actions and
affects cannot be explained entirely in
terms of ego and id.
2. the observation that the more striking of
these resemble actions and affects produced
in the child by its parents.
3. the observation that some of the actions and
affects are accompanied by thoughts of a
parent or parent-like pei'son.
4. the conclusion that this concomitance
betokens a cause-efrect relationship.
5. the assumption that the affects and actions
v/hich are not accompanied by such thoughts
in an introspectible form are nevertheless
caused by them in ex. ctly the same -./ay as
those that are.
G. the conclusion that there exists in a non-
introspectible form a complex of ideas of
one's parents (and of other parent-like
persons) operating upon the ego to produce
certain actions and affects.
(197) The point upen which X want to make in passing
is that the first of these steps rests on the notion of
the ego (and for that matter the id) as something v/hich
is not susceptible of alteration. Any change in its
behaviour therefore calls for an explanation in terms
of a force acting upon it. To say that the ego
acquired the habit of feeling guilty when it lost its
/tamper / !
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temper would, not, for Freud, have been an explanation
of its feeling of guilt. For him, the feeling must
be the effect of something acting upon the ego, and
tnis something must be the idea of the persons who
first produced these effects upon the ego.
unconscious PROCESSES.
(198) Freud constantly refers to "unconscious processes".
"Process" is used by his translators as the equivalent
of both "vorgang" and "akt". The former, however, is
the more frequent, and 1 understand that like "process"
it connotes a succession of events or states, involving
the notion of change.
(199) What these unconscious processes were is a very
important question for the understanding of the true
nature of the Freudian unconscious. I think that he
sometimes used "vorgang" or "akt" to mean simply "idea",
or more precisely its metaps;/ehoiogical equivalent.
(8ee, for example, NIL, 1953, p.75). We have seen,
of course, that in the autophenomenomorphic model ideas
played the port of unchanging substances, but I have
already suggested in the introduction that t&e
—catliexia /
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cathexis which, is the essence of the metapsyetiological
equivalent of an idea nay "be like an electric current
in a metal ring. This would explain how Freud could
call it a process; it is an endless process, which
does not result in change, rather like perpetual check
in chess.
(200) We must consider, however, the possibility that
in some contexts Freud is thinking of sequences of
ideas^as "unconscious mental processes". I have
pointed out that intellectual operations, ouch as
reasoning and calculating, were not regarded as
unconscious. But a great part of our conscious mental
life consists of sequences which are not of these kinds
trains of thought about subjects with only remote con-
rnectiono, or even phantasies (daydreams). Can some
of Freud*o unconscious processes be of this nature?
(201) Certainly he sometimes talked about unconscious
phantasies. Most of these references are in a fairly
early essay (HPB, 1908, passim) and later ones (for
example in R, 1915, CP IV, p. 87) are not so clearly
references /
Vorstellungsablaufe (OP, 1940, p. 42) is
translated by Strachey as "sequences of ideas'.
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references to unconscious phantasies13. it is ofton
difficult to he sure whether Freud is talking about
the unconscious proper or about the preconscious (see
Chapter 2).
(202) I should very much like to know for certain
i.hether Freud believed in unconscious phantasies in
his later years, or whether he abandoned this belief
as he abandoned the notion of unconscious calculation
(see paragraph 62). For there are two ways in which
he would have had difficulty in reconciling it with
his other beliefs. We have seen that phenomena
involving "verbal images" or "thinking in pictures"
are not unconscious but preconscious or conscious,
although of course the verbal or pictorial images may
clothe something that lias hitherto been unconscious
(paragraph 145). To be consistent with this belief
an unconscious phantasy would have been something very
different from a conscious or preconscious one.
(203) The other belief with which Freud would have
had to reconcile this notion is the permanence of
ideas. /
.
"^Varcndonck, however, in his book PI), (finished in
1921, with a foreword by Freud) seems in no doubt
—that Freud believed In unconscious as distinct
from preconscious phantasies (see p. 19).
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ideas • we saw at tiie beginning of this chapter,
Freudian ideas are not things that occur and then cease
to be; they are indestructible substances. Yet if
they do not occur, but exist, what sort of a thing is
a sequence of ideas? A conscious or preconscious
sequence is not too difficult to visualise; it is the
order in which the ideas emerge, are clothed in verbal
or visual images and are the subject of attention
(although there are difficulties here too, particularly
in "preconscious ideas"). But this cannot be the
nature of an unconscious sequence, for in the unconscious
the ideas are not clothed in images, nor are they the
subject of attention. All that an unconscious
phantasy can be is the collection of ideas that would
form a conscious sequence of the kind called a
"phantasy" plus whatever it is that links them together
in this way; it cannot be a literally unconscious
sequence,
(804) There is no doubt that one of the things that
Freud thought of as an unconscious process was
repression. But, as we have seen, repression, in the
sense in which it is a conscious phenomenon, is not a
process at all, but a force. It is true that what I
have /
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have called the "act of repression", that is the
expulsion of an idea from consciousness and pre-
:consciousness, might he regarded as a process#
Certainly it involves change. hut is it unconscious?
Freud may have thought so, for he did not clearly
distinguish it from repression as a constant force,
and as we have seen he thought that this force was
exercised by an unconscious part of the ego. I do
not think however that he was really thinking of this
when he referred to unconscious processes.
(205) I am quite sure tnat in the great majority of
cases he was thinking of the processes involved in
what he called the "dream-work" (see, for example,
WIL, 1933, p. 28-9, or OF, 1940, p. 50-1). These
are, of course, symbolism, condensation, displacement,
dramatisation, I have not included "secondary
elaboration" as there is no doubt that Freud regarded
it as preconscious, not unconscious.
(206) "Dramatisation" (derateHung) can also, 1 think,
be disregarded. It is mentioned as one of the
processes of the dream-work in ID (1900, p. 315 ot seq.),
but not in 0PA (1940) or the other late works, although
Arnest /
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truest Jones (PPa, CIi. XI) and Haaly, Bronner and
Bowers (BMP, 1950 p. 258) include it in their list. I
think that its omission I'rori Breud1 s later works is
significant,for it implies two things which do not
accord very well .ith his other views. In essence it
appears to be the representation of abstract or complex
relationships (such as time, causal connection,
repetition) by simple concrete or pictorial relation¬
ships between elements of the dream. Thus a causal
relationship between A dnd B is expressed by dreaming
first of A and then of B (or of course of A and B in
disguised forms); while repetition of an incident
involving a person con be represented by seeing two or
more images of the person simultaneously. T is implies
first that the unconscious is trying in dreams to make
statements and convey repositions, and second that
the preconscious is forced to express these statements
in an exceedingly crude form. This is an almost
complete reversal of the sort of activity that Proud
elsewhere attributes to the two systems, and he nowhere
attempts to justify it. I therefore suggest that it
can be safely assumed that Bread discarded
"dramatisation" as one of his "unconscious processes".
fften /
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(SQ7) This leaves three "unconscious processes" to he
considered - symbolisation, condensation, and displace¬
ment. Symbolisation (symbol!sierung) is not, so far
as I can discover, discussed by Freud from the meta-
xpsychological point of view. It is, of course,
fairly clear that he thought a symbol was. It is an
idea which (or sometimes an object the idea of which)
appears in conscious or preconscious mental processes
in place of another idea which is prevented from
appearing in them by repression. (Ernest Jones would,
I think add that the prevention might be the result not
always of repression but sometimes merely of the mind*s
incapacity - ERA., ch. VI). But what the procesi/bf
syrabolisation consists of is not so clear.
(208) It is not, of course, merely the act of thinking
of the symbolic idea, for this is a conscious process#
It must be something which helps to account for the
occurrence of the conscious idea. It cannot be a
process of transformation of the repressed idea into
the symbolic idea, for the repressed idea continues
to exist and to give rise to symbolic ideas on later
occasions. To put this argument in another form,
symbolisation cannot be regarded as a series of
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events in which the symbolised idea is the first event
and the symbolic idea the last, since the symbolised
idea is not an event at all, but an existent. Indeed,
I have little doubt that Freud also thought of the
symbolic idea as an existent, which differed from the
symbolised idea in being conscious or preconscious
anile the other was unconscious. If so, of course, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a
process which could link then in the way in which
Freud thought of them as being linked. X am inclined
to think that what Freud was describing as a process
was really a relation of some kind. To give a crude
example, if I deputise for someone at a meeting, there
is no process of deputising which is distinct from my
attending the meeting, and which goes on outside tho
comdttee-rooiii either before or during the meeting.
"Deputising" is a relation between me and my principal -
or, more precisely, it is my attendance at the meeting
described in the light of my relation to my principal.
(£09) however this may be, one or two things seem
certain. If symbolisation is a process, then an
essential part of it, the symbolic idea, is conscious
or preconscious. Secondly, it does not seem to
involve /
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involve any change in the symbolised idea. Moreover,
whether it is to be regarded as a process or relation,
it is very much more complex than the psychoanalytic
description of it would lead us to believe. I have
already pointed out (in paragraph 150 on "ideas") that
it is not. plausible to talk as if what is symbolised
is something comparatively simple, like the idea of
coitus: for the idea of coitus can quite easily bo
consciously entertained. There is no good reason why
I should use a symbol, such as going up stairs, for an
idea which is conscious or preconscious. The theory
of symbolism becomes plausible only when the symbolised
and the symbolic are comparatively complex: for
example, when coitus with a parent is symbolised by
going up the stairs in the parent*s house. I think,
however, that we must go further than this. To be
complete, the description of the symbolic and the
symbolised must include whatever affect is attached to
the ideas. In my example, it is a repressed desire
for coitus with a parent that is symbolised by a
pleasurable idea of going up stairs in my parent's
house (not that the affects are always as similar in
the symbolised and the symbolic). I should like to
make the suggestion, in passing, that the apparent
au.lt iplicity of symbols-for the sane thing is
explained /
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explained by the complexity of the symbolised: for
example, that dreams of flying; and dreams of going
upstairs do not really symbolise the same thing,
coitus, but that each symbolises a different aspect
of it (or, more precisely, a different attitude towards
it). Synonyms, in fact, do not exist in symbolism
any more than in ordinary language#
(210) So that when the Freudians regard symbolism as
a universal language, for which it is possible to
compile a dictionary, they are over-simplifying. I
am not denying that it may be helpful, and in a limited
sense true, to say that going upstairs symbolises
coitus# But we must not be misled by this into the
notion of symbolisation as a process or relation which
connects simple ideas such as these#
(211) if the two remaining processes1- of the dream-woric
condensation and displacement - are examined in the
light of these remafeks, it will be found that ray
generalisations apply to them also# First, it is just
as /
In case anyone should ask whether Freud's "primary
process" (primarvorgang) is not another candidate
for the title of "unconscious process", it is
perhaps worth a footnote to explain I.hut this is
his name for the combination of condensation and
displacement. This is clear from UGB, 191b, OF
IV,"p# 119 and OP, 1940, p. 52.
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as difficult to visualise in v/hat the "process"
consists: that is, there are the same grounds for
suspecting that Froud was really trying to describe
a relation. Secondly, both "processes" terminate
in a conscious (or preconscious) phenomenon, Thirdly,
they do not seom to involve any change in the unconscious
elements in the "process". Fourthly, whether they are
processes or relations, the elements which they connect
are complex, and cannot be adequately described in
terms of ideas alone (or, in the case of displacement,
of affects alone). It is less surarising, of course,
that these generalisations apply when we see how
closely condensation and displacement resemble symbol-
:isation: indeed, I think that condensation can fairly
be regarded as a special ind of symbolism, differing
from normal examples in matters of degree: if I use
A in a dream to represent X, Y and Z, the connection
is simply more complex and less likely to recur in
a recognisably similar form, than if I use a to
represent X alone.
T1H Tlihi,Lh8oliE83 OF TIH UNCUKS0I0U3
(218) At the beginning of my Introduction I referred
briefly to the ways in which the entities of Freud*s
unconscious differed from the sumo ontiticc in - their
conscious /
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conscious form. According to Freud tiiero ore four main
characteristics which distinguish the unconscious iron
the prcconscious and the conscious. These are -
(a) exemption from mutual contradiction and
ab3ence~oF negation." Two incompatible
ideas or impulses do not cancel each other
out, hut exist side by side and if they
manifest themselves do so by means of a
compromise, which is as it were a
resultant of the two forces:
(b) mobility of cathexis. The cathexis, or
"charge" of one idea can be transferred to
another, particularly if the former is
repressed, and an idea may thus have
behind it the "force" as it were- that but
for repression would be distributed among
several ideas:
(c) substitution of -psychic for external
reality. "TlieTxrposslbflity of attaining
an end, or the fact that to do so ould
have harmful consequences for the
individual, persuades the conscious mind
not to desire it, but it will not affect
an unconscious desire.
(d) timelessness. as this is by far the most
intei%£tlng of the four, I shall quote
Freud's own words: "The processes of the
system Ues are timeless (zeitlos);
they are not ordered temporally (seitlich
geordnet), are not altered by the passage
of time, in fact bear no relation to time
at all. The time-relation also is bound
up with the work of the system Cs."
(UC8, 191b, OP XV, p. 119).
(213) I have not been able tqCind any writer who has
attempted to explain the fourth of these characteristics.
I'Iug other three are easy enough iTo understand. when one
grasps /
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grasps that the model is based on ordinary dynamics,
with ideas being impelled by forces as billiard-balls
are impelled by a cue and their momentum. But what
does Freud mean by his "tinelessness"? X think that
the clue lies in the subject we have just been aiscuss-
:ing, the nature of the so-called "unconscious
processes". We have seen that they are not really
processes at all, but relations between unconscious
and conscious ideas. We have also seen that another
thing that Freud sometimes talked of as a process,
namely repression, is really conceived of in his model
as a force. I have also suggested that if by
unconscious processes Freud occasionally means nothing
more than the ideas themselves, these are processes
only of a very special kind, since they do not change;
they are like a mouse in a treadmill or an electric
current induced in a metal ring. Jo that in the
Freudian unconscious nothing progresses. There is no
real change in its inhabitants: all that happens is that
they leavglt or enter it, and while they are in it they
are immobile. There are no "goings-on" (vorgangen)
in the unconscious. X think that Freud had an
inkling of the real nature of the model he was describing
I do not mean that he regardei^lt as a odel, with all
the /
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the possibilities of correspondence or non-correspond-
:ence and so on that this implies; but I think that
he realised that the sort of world he was trying to
describe when he drew his picture of the unconscious
was really a frozen, lifeless world, in which there
was no change and therefore no time*
CHAPTER 4.
Freud*s arguments for unconscious
entities#
185
THE jyiGULlfETa !QM THE ~U~MCOLiBC10J3.
(214) ffeud used several arguments to support his
belief in unconscious mental entities. But he did not
collect them into a single systematic statement: he
uses one argument here, another there. as a result
it has been left to others to sort them out and
distinguish them.
(215) Mealy, Bronner and Mowers (BLIP, 1930, p.22J1
distinguish seven "main"arguments. Levine (TU, 1923,
p. 92 et seq.) gives five, but one of them is really
concerned not with the existence but with the status
of the unconscious - with the question whether it is
"mental". I shall show, in the course of my
discussion of Lc.vine's other four arguments, how
Mealy, Bromier and Bowers' list fits into his
classification.
(216) I shall nickname his four arguments -
a) the argument from other minds
b) the argument from discovered causes
e) the argument from continuity
d) the argument from results.
I /
————————————
"m?heir statements correspond fairly closely in
difficult because they omit any reference to their
sources. This is a stupid omission, which arouses
one's suspicions; but they are on the whole to be
trusted.
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I shall try to state them in a more rigorous way than
Levine, who tries to follow Proud*s ovjn diction far too
closely. I am of course concerned with the arguments
themselves and what they ,;rovc or render probable. I
am not qualified to criticise the evidence on which they
are based, except where the evidence is su posed to be
obtained from introspection. I shall not for example
challenge the claims maue for post-hypnotic suggestion,
at least in so far as they relate to observable facts.
THE iUiGUlDdsTl1 FROM 0T1IEK IUHD5.
(217) It is not easy to state this argument2 precisely
without arcing the. fallacy too plain. Levine puts it
in this form:
"Strictly speaking, each one of us has knowledge
only of his own mental processes. Those of
other persons are known by inference ...
Psychoanalysis ... only requires us to follow
a similar line of inference in the case of our
own self. In other words, when we meet with
behaviour which has all the appearance of
expressing psychic activity, we are entitled
to infer a psychic source in our own being for
that behaviour, that is, the Unconscious. It
is then as valid an inference as that of the
consciousness of other persons." (Lovinc goes
on to explain why Proud denied that this argument
demonstrated the existence of a second
consciousness)•
(218) The weakness of this argument appears as soon as
we J
The argument is not in Si IP
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we aslc what the evidence is on which the inference to
other minds is based. It is of course the similarity
of certain actions of other bodies to our own. From
introspection we know that these actions are for the
most part accompanied by mental events (for the present
purpose the temporal or causal relationship between
the two is immaterial). lie therefore conclude that
when we observe similar actions in other boaios they
are accompanied by similar mental events. But what we
are trying to account for are of course those actions
of our own which introspection does not show to be
accompanied by mental events.
(219) The argument is thus of this form: "most of my
actions of a certain kind have mental accompaniments.
Other people*s actions of a certain kind therefore
have mental accompaniments. Those of my actions of
this kind, therefore, which are not known to have
mont 1 accompaniments probably have them". The second
step ought of course to be "8one actions of this kind
by other people probably have mental accompaniments".
In fact, the introduction of other minds into tho
argument contributes nothing but confusion. If they
are left out, it is reduced to this: "I know by
introspect ion that or my rations of a certain kind
have /
188
have mental accompaniments: therefore the rest probably
have",
(£20) In this form, the argument cannot bo dismissed
so lightly, for it is of a hind used in other scientific
inquiries. If infection with the smallpox bacillus is
accompanied by fever and a rash in some cases but not
in all, wo are able to draw a conclusion; but not of
the hind which Freud has drawn, be conclude either
that we are deceived, and that the remaining cases
really have fever and a rash, or (if we trust our
observations) that there is some difference between
the cases which showed these symptoms and those that
no
did not. This pair of alternatives is of/use to us,
of course: it is merely a stepping-stone from which
we pass to some experiment which will point to one or
other of the alternatives as the explanation, be
are not satisfied until either a delay has allowed
the usual symptoms to . anifest themselves, or we have
concluded that the immune cases have an organism in
their blood which destroys the smallpox bacillus,
(221) In other words, the observation that "most Xs
are Ys" neither proves nor raalces probable the con-
wlnplrm -i-.iurh "t.ue other Xs ore Ys, too" unless a
thorough /
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thorough investigation fails to suggest a relevant
difference between those Xs that are seen to be Ys
and those that do not seem to be. For we are not
dealing with a situation in which all the observed Xs
are Ys and we now that the observed Xs are most of
the Xs: on the contrary, some of the observed Xs
have been observed not to be Ys.
(822) It is now clear that there is an important
assumption underlying this argument of Freud*s, namely
that similar effects have similar causes. If action
X is usually the effect of mental event Y, then,
whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary, it
must bo so in the remaining cases. Therefore,
Freud argues, mental event "Y, though not observable
in the remaining cases, must have occurred just the
same, the only difference being that it was not
observable.
(223) If this simplification of the argument is a
fair one, then it is a fair criticism to point out
that it leads to a conclusion rather different from
Freud*s: that is, to the conclusion that in the
cases in which mental event Y is not observable it
does / r
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does not differ in any relevant respect from mental
event Y in the cases in which that event is observable.
In other words, that there is 110 relevant difference
between conscious and unconscious mental events.
(224) It is necessary to qualify this conclusion by
using the phrase "relevant difference", since the
process of classification which enables any two -events
to be regarded as similar must always involve dis¬
regarding some features of both as irrelevant. So
that although we have seen in earlier chapters what
important distinctions Freud drew between conscious
and unconscious mental events, we must still consider
whether he would have considered them relevant.
(225) It is perhaps hardly fair to quote ag: inst
Freud at this point ills statements that the unconscious
could not In normal conditions bring about any purposive
muscular acts, witn the exception of those already
organised as reflexes." (see paragraph 64): or his
remarks about the "timclessness" of unconscious
processes, which might be expected to prevent them
from preceding or accompanying actions in quite tho
same /
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same way as conscious processes#3 .and it must be
remembered in Freudf s favour tiiat lie seems to have
regarded the consciousness of mental events as strictly
epiphenomenal. (See paragraph 4-8),
(280) 'I'llis last observation is in all probability the
key to the problem. "Consciousness" for i'reud was an
epiphenomenal quality which distinguished conscious
from preconscious processes. Causally, the two were
indistinguishable. When I'reud used his "argument from
other minds" he was, in all probability, failing to
distinguish between preconscious and "dynamically
unconscious" mental entities (see paragraph 49). Ills
argument is evidence for the former (though even so
its value is doubtful) but if it is carelessly used
as evidence for the latter, it leads to the unfortunate
conclusion that they are causally indistinguishable
from proconscious or conscious events.
(227) The existence of this confusion is confirmed if
we consider whether Freud does ever in fact give an
example of two similar actions of which one is caused
by a conscious (or of course preconscious) process and
the other by an unconscious one. Perhaps the examples
• .nicii are most nearly of to. a kind are oarao of the -
mistakes /
____________ _________ _____________
But this doos get him into real difficulties over
the argument from discovered causes: see paragraph
239 et seq#
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mistakes in speech or action which are described in
PPEL. In most of those the mistaken action or locution
which is attributed to an unconscious thought or
intention is very different from the sort of thing
which we should expect to result from a conscious une.
But there is at least one example in which, at first
sight at least, this is not so. On pp. 62-3 of PPEL,
Freud tells the story of the lady \7ho said "Yes, a
woman must be pretty if she is to please the men, A
man is much better off. As long as he has five
straight limbs, he needs no more." Of this, Freud
says "The woman's saying, following its wording,
could just as well be an excellent witticism as a
jocose speech-blunder. It is simply a question
whether she uttered these words with conscious or
unconscious intention ••«•••" Even here, however,
the real point is not that she could conceivably have
3aid "five" as the result of a conscious thought,
but that if her unconscious thought had been conscious
instead, she would no doubt have said "four". In
other words, the conscious thought that might have
caused her to say "five" would have been a different
one from the thought that, being unconscious, caused
her to say it in this instance.
(223) /
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(288) Apparent exceptions such as this underline the
fact that what Freud was seeking to exixLain was not the
similarity of one group of actions to another, hut the
dissimilarity of a small group from all the rest.
This group cmisisted of such tilings as unjustified
fears, unreasonable actions, apparently causeless
mistakes, physical symptoms without detectable physical
origins, and so forth. The nature of Freud * s
explanation is discussed in other chapters, my
present purpose is merely to show that his "argument
from other minds" was neither based on the evidence
which it requires nor leads to the conclusions which
Freud requires,
(889) It is interesting to compare Freud's argument
ith Professor Macmurray's "account of the theoretical
origin of the notion of the unconscious in psycho¬
analytic theory" (BS, 1939, pp. 1G9-172). Professor
iiacmurray concludes -
"What I call the consciousness of another person
is simply the thoughts, impulses, desires and
intentions which I must assume to he operative
behind the behaviour that I observe. Ho
doubt I am convinced that he is aware of them,
but I con not, and in the nature of things can
never be. The "unconscious" of the psycho¬
analyst involves the hypothesis that what is
always true of my consciousness of another
person's /
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person's consciousness is true also in respect
of a part of my own consciousness. It merely
insists that I can observe in my own behaviour
as well as that of other people elements of
activity which can only be accounted for on
the assumption that they have a raotivo and to
which I can assign 110 motive. If this is so,
then I must have motives which I am not aware
of. A motive of mine which I am not aware of
is quite properly described as an unconscious
motive, and the collection or system of such
motives in myself is not too badly described
by the phrase "my unconscious"•
The argument is almost identical with i'reud's, but with
one important difference. I11 Professor Macmurray's
hands it is a psychological explanation of the origin
of the theory of the unconscious, and not an attempt at
a logical justification of it. It therefore contains
no logical fallacy, and is merely true or untrue,
probably the former.
THE iUACftflMT FKOII blJOOViucED thutiaS.
(<330) Levinc's statement of this argument is so brief
that it can be quoted in oxtonso
"If it be stil.:. maintained that the conception
of unconscious mental processes is invalid,
what can be made of the mass of facts which it
has been the special task of Psycho-analysis
to bring to light? Is pathology a myth? Are
errors and mistakes just an "accident"? Are
dreams mere meaningless froth or rubbisn? iuid
what of the facts of post-hypnotic suggestion,
which even beiore the time of Psycho-analysis




(351) This seems to correspond to items (a), (b),
(c) and (f) in SMP:-
"(a) the post-hypnotic carrying out of
suggestions held in the unconscious;
(h) the evidence found through discovering
the latent meaning of dreams;
(c) the discoverable bases for common slips
or errors of speech, memory, action;
(f) the fact that through psychoanalytic
technique various mental and physical
symptoms are found to have their
foundations in hidden mental life, and
in general, that "analyticyinvestigation
reveals scone of these latent processes
as having characteristics and peculiar¬
ities that seem alien to us, or evon
incredible, and running directly counter
to the well-known attributes of
consciousness".
(232) It is not easy to sec exactly what the argument
is. It seems however to consist of a claim to have
discovered certain things ("meaning" of dreams,
"bases" of errors, or "foundations" of symptoms)
that account for certain otherwise unaccountable
phenomena. Hence the nickname I have given to the
argument•
(235) The first question to be considered is "What
does the procesqjdf discovery coneist of?" Undoubtedly,
—in any of the examples that Freud gives, the meaning
of /
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f a dream or the basis of a slip of the tongue is an
assumption, and it is this that gives the argument its
appearance of begging the question which has irritated
critics such as Wohlgemuth (CEP, 1925, pp. 54-8 et
alibi). These, however, are merely applications of
the theory, whose plausibility or far-fetchedness
certainly contribute to its acceptance or rejection,
but are not strictly relevant to the argument we arc
considering,
(254) To bo fair, I do not think that Trend would have
regarded the meaning of a dream or the cause of a
parapraxia as "discovered" unless it had been made
conscious. It is true,of course, that he did not
always distinguish clearly between his patient's
consciousness of something and his own perception of
that something as being present in his patient: we
have seen a similar confusion between introspection
and self-description (see paragraphs 55 ot seq.),
and there is undoubtedly a close connection between
the two, although they can of course occur independ-
lently, A good example of what I shall call the
confusion between the conscious and the diagnosed is




(235) But if we leave eases of "diagnosis" out of
account, it becanes painfully obvious that "discovery"
by "making conscious" is suspect. hot only is a
"conscious idea" very different from an unconscious
one on Bread's own theory - as is clear, for example,
frora their different effects - but the process by which
the unconscious is made conscious is not what would
ordinarily be called discovery. It is of course
often stigmatised as being the effect of suggestion by
the analyst: and some analysts, such as Berenczi end
Sohmideberg, support this,although most would prefer
to see it called "interpretation" (which is what
Bte >hen Potter would call an "O.K. word" while
"suggestion" is not). Even if true, however, this
criticism does not explain why it is possible to
induce a patient to admit to one unconscious desire
and not to another; and it does not prove that there
is not something there to be discovered: the most
that it could show is that the proces^bf psychoanalys¬
ing someone is not the discovery.
(236) What can be said with certainty is that it is
much more plausible to give the name "discovery" to
the /
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the process of aalcin<j conscious what is preconscious
than to the talcing conscious of what is "dynamically
unconscious". It is interesting to see how many of
the examples of unconscious ideas or desires given in
Freud*s early works are really preconscious. Very
few,for example, of the causeqbf parapraxes and so
forth which he ;..,ives in PPEL (1904) would have heen
regarded hy him in later life as anything hut pro¬
teonscious.
(237) This is a very relevant consideration when the
value of caseqof post-hypnotic suggestion as evidence
is in question. I have not found any account of
experiments designed to show whether the subject of
post-hypnotic suggestion is preconsciously aware of
his instructions.
(238) The next question is the way in which the
"discovered" ideas, desires or emotions "account" for
the phenomena which Freud use3 them to account for.
Let us accept for the moment the assumption that they
have been discovered in a way which does not alter
their nature. The argument implies, I think, that
they account for certain effects in the same way as
normally ^
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normally conscious ideas, desires or emotions account
for certain effects# These effects may he either other
ideas, desires etc., or bodily actions. In either
case, the unsophisticated man regards the relationship
of "accounting for" as the relationship between a
cause and an effect both of which are events. A fit
of anger is regarded as the event that causes both
the sudden flush and the murderous thought. The
cause is regarded as occurring before the effect,
although it may of course overlap with it temporally.
(I am not of course discussing the way in which an
idea or emotion is sometimes regarded as a "slice"
out of a longer series: that belongs to the "argument
from continuity"). The cause may last longer than
its ef.ect, or, more usually, vice versa.
(259) But this cannot be the relationship between an
unconscious idea, emotion or desire and its effect#
Tor they are "timeless" (zeitlos): they do not
"occur", but are "there" all the time# Their effects,
on the other hand, are transient, whether they are
bodily actions or thoughts. This is fairly obvious
in the cases of bodily actions, but tends to be
obscured in the case of mental effects by Freud's
(24-0) /
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(240) This does not of course mean that there can be no
causal relationship betv/een Freud's unconscious entities
and what he regarded as their effects. People
frequently account for an event by adducing as "cause"
something that is not an event. If I aslc why a
jack-in-the-box springs out when I unfasten the catch,
I may be told that the cause is the compressed state
of the spring within.
(241) We must of course consider the possibility that
this relationship (which, for want of a better name,I
shall call that of "subsistent cause" to its effect)
was regarded by Freud as the relationship which con-
inected not only unconscious but also conscious mental
entities to their effects: in other words, that
conscious mental entities were "subsistent causes"
and not "occasions"4.
(242) This possibility is not disposed of by the
apparently transitory natur§6f conscious mental states.
For one thing, we shall see, when we come to examine
the "argument from continuity", that these were re-
igarded by Fhreud as merely the conscious sections of
permanent /
^T'liis distinction between "subsistent causes" mid
"occasions" is not suite the same as the Thomists'
distinction between "material" and "efficient" causes.
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permanent (or comparatively permanent) entities. nut
even if this were not so, it is possible for a
comparatively transitory state to be regarded as a
"subsistent cause". In the case of an explosion in
the cylinder of an internal combustion engine, the
electric spark is regarded as the "occasion" and the
presence of a certain mixture of oxygen and petrol
vapour as the "subsistent cause": both, however, are
transitory, and it may be that we merely regard the
more transitory as the "occasion", and the less
transitory as the "subsistent cause".
(243) There is of course no explicit statement by
Freud of such a view of conscious or preconscious
mental processes. At times, when he is being
Pavlovian and describes the ego as something which
merely reacts to stimuli, it is possible to road this
view into his words (see, for example, OP, 1940,
pp. 15-16): in such passages, "stimulus" corresponds
to "occasion", and the subsistent cause is the state
of the ego, though it is precisely this aspect of
psychic causation that is left vague.
(244) But even in these passages, e find that the
^stimuli /
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stimuli which act upon tlie ego come from within as well
as from without• There are thus mental as well as
physical "occasions". iuid whatever the relationship
between the ego and conscious mental events it would
be very difficult for Sreud to maintain that the latter
were never "occasions". He would, for example, have
had great difficulty in explaining why a man, sitting
quietly in a room and subject to no external stimuli
which would explain his action will go to a bookcase
and look up a page in a book, or will wind the clock,
or suddenly begin to write a letter. To us, conscious
mental events seem more like occasions than subsistent
causes.
(245) The argument from "discovered causes" thus seems
to me to require us to overlook two important tilings.
The first is that the process of psychoanalysing
someone is not what we should normally call "discovery",
and the second is that if anything is "discovered" it
does not belong to the kind of "cause" to which wtc
should normally assign conscious mental entities.
THE illiUllEiiT j'ROI-l COIITIlilllTY.
(246) Lovine states this argument as follows
nTt its found by experience that the data of
consciousness are "very incomplete". Both
among normal people and abnormal, psychic
activities occur which do not contain their
aim explanation. They presuppose other
psychic /
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psychic activity, of which consciousness, however,
reveals nothing.
-'What is meant is not simply the activity in
dreams, errors, obsessions. In everyday
experience we meet ith 'ideas whose origin we
uo not know, and thought products the
elaboration of which remains a mystery to us*.
The significant fact is that, as Freud writes,
'all these conscious activities remain disconnected
and unintelligible, if we persist in the claim
that everything psychic in uo must bo consciously
experienced; whereas they fit into a demon¬
strable, coherent system, if we introduce the
unconscious activities that are revealed behind."'
(247) This corresponds, 1 think, to arguments (d) and
(e) in SMP
"(d) the fact that ideas suddenly appear in the
mind from somewhere outside consciousness
or even that problems are solved without
awareness;
(e) the small amount in consciousness at any
one time in comparison to the latent
content of the mind."
(248) Both these statements are open to the criticism
that they do not clearly distinguish between the
"argument from discovered causes" and the argument they
are trying to state. But both Levine and the authors
of SLIP are right in attributing to Freud an argument
that is quite distinct from the one I have just
discussed. One of Freud's clearest uses of this
third argument is in a passage whicijhad not been
written /
SO4
■written at the datgfof SMP or Levine* s book : -
"Every science is based upon observations « • •
we make our observations . • • precisely by
the help of the breaks in the series of
L conscious_7"5 mental events, since we fill
in the omissions by plausible inferences
and translate them into conscious material.
In this way we construct as it were a series
of conscious events complementary to the
unconscious mental processes". (OP, 1940,
pp. 56-7}
(249) As always, the first thing is to make sure
whether Freud is really thinking of the unconscious or
only of the preoonscious when he uses this argument.
SMPfs reference to "the fact ... that problems are
solved without awareness" is an excellent example of
the failure to ask this question, since Freud had
long since abandoned the notion that the unconscious
proper could do anything of the sort.
(250) The very passage I have quoted from OP makes it
doubtful whether Freud was really thinking of the
unconscious proper. The paragraph which follows my
quotation, and hich is unfortunately too long to
ro produce liere, goes oil to explain the difference
between the preconscious and the unconscious proper,
treating /
° Inserted by translator.
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treating it (as we have found Freud doing before - see
paragraphs 58 and 59) as a matter of degree, and not
of kind. As I have already suggested, Freud my have
been guilty of using an argument that proves (or
purports to prove) only thgbccurrenee of preconsciouo
processes and extending it to unconscious ones by
later describing the latter as if they were merely
preeonseious processes that are particularly hard to
introspect,G
(251) The argument from continuity is probably the
best illustration of the way in which Freud treats
mental phenomena as if they were material things. For
the argument amounts really to this:-
a) from 2 p,m. until 2,01 p.m. ± thought about
the frosty Caucasus.
b) from 2.01 p.m. until 2,03 p.m. I thought
about lay dinner.
c) from 2.03 p.m. until 2,04 p.m. X thought
about the frosty Caucasus.
d) what happened to my thought about the frosty •
Caucasus during the two minutes for which I
thought about my dinner?
e) / —
His use of words in the passage in OP tends to
support this suggestion. What the translator
renders as "unconscious mental jroces,,est'at the end
of my quotation from OP is merely "unbewusste
Psychischen" in the original, Then, after describing
i.lm i 1 y i nt.rospar.t. i h 1 e proconscipus "Vorgang" he
turns to "andere psyehische Vorgange, "lnhalte .^_
Fur dies© reservieren wir den llarnen des eigeutlich
Unbewus;rben." It is tempting to translate this as
"other mental processes or rather contents . • for
as I have pointed out (in Chapter 3) Freud did not
really believe in dynamically unconscious mental
processes, and in the -present passage it looks very
much as if he was correcting himself*
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e) it was there all the time, 'but it was
unconscious.
This is strikingly similar to the commonsense answer
to tho question "Where is the dining-room table when
I am not looking at it?". "Still there; it is
invisible because you are in another room".
(252) If you could find a persopfeufficiently intelligent
and articulate to give you a very general description
of his experience of the outer world, but at the same
time, by a happy accident, ignorant of physics and
philosophy, he might well tell you that this experience
consisted of "things and their actions". If you asked
him where the things are when he is not experiencing
them, you would be told "either still there, or
somewhere else". But if ycu asked where their actions
were when he was not experiencing them, you would be
told "either still going on, or stopped". Like all
conversations on such subjects, this lias a rather
unlikely air. But it shows the importance of deciding
whether you are talking about a thing or an action.
(255) If Freud had regarded mental phenomena as
actions he could not have used the argument from
continuity. /
£07
continuity. To do so would have been like asking
"What has happened to the typing of Chapter 1 when
my typewriter is typing Chapter £?" In the case of
a typewriter the answer is simple - it just is not
do ing anything but typing Chapter £, In the case of
mental phenomena Freud was of course dealing with
somethiRPKfar more complicated than a typewriter.
The fact that I am thinking about my dinner does not
exclude the possibility that I am also continuing to
think about the frosty Caucasus, any more than the
fact that a printing press is printing a page of type
excludes the possibility that it is also folding
another page at the same time. But if it does not
exclude it, no more does it prove it. To prove it
you must show that what was an unfolded Page One in
the machine when it started to print Page Two has
somehow got folded while the machine was known to be
printing Page Two, This sort of thing does occur, in
Freud*s view, with preconscious processes: they can
develop while other processes are going on in conscious-
mess. But it is exactly what does not happen with
unconscious mental entities. They are timeless,
changeless; next time you look at them (if you can
manage to get a look at them) they are just the same
as the last time.
(£54 ) /
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(254) Me have nom examined three out of Freud*s four*
arguments - the ones from other mindsf from discovered
causes and iron continuity - and found them inconclusive
Before I go on to the fourth, the argument from results,
I want to £joint out one way in which these three differ
from the remaining one. They are all what I might
call "laboratory arguments'1* It is true that as Freud
states them they are based on evidence which he has
observed in everyday life or in the consulting-room,
and not on laboratory experiments. It might therefore
be more accurate to label them "arm-chair arguments".
But this is a side-issue: my point is that they
ought properly to have been based on laboratory
experiments. This point is quite independent of the
question whether the arguments tnemselves are conclusive
The argument from results, on the other hand, is not
of this nature. It appeals to the consulting-room
instead of to the laboratory. It is true that neither
Freud nor his critics have seen it in this light.
Freud uses the argument, as we shall see, as if he
were a scientist who is claiming that a crucial
experiment has verified an hypothesis, and not un-
:naturally his critics have complained that consulting-
room /
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room results are not the same as the results of
scientifically controlled experiments. But I hope to
show that i'reud was mistakenly putting in "laboratory
language" an argument which could he more cogently put
in another, less ambitious, way.
(250) This logical difference between the argument
from results and the others is interesting because of
the mixed parentage of Freud's notion of the unconscious.
In my Introduction I pointed out that while his
psychological notions were those of Herbert, his
technique developed out of that of the French hypnotists,
and it was of course the results achieved by the
technique that led him to look for and find psycho¬
logical notions, in particular that of the unconscious,
to fit these results. VJe find this origin reflected
in Freud's arguments for the unconscious. Three of
them are tnose of the academic psychologist (although
not of course based on evidence or stated in ways that
would satisfy the academic psychologists), while the
fourth is really a technician's argument. I hope
that the nature of tlio difference will become clearer




(256) Lcvine states tliis argument very briefly, and
does not discuss it at all:
"It may "bo pointed out that successful treatment
has been achieved upon the basis of a hypo¬
thetical Unconscious. The course of consclous
processes is thereby affected. This seems,
therefore," to prove that the hypothesis of an
Unconscious has real Justification". /P'fhe
italics are Levine's__/
(257) SMP merely quotes (but without any reference)
fran UCS (1915, CP IV p. 99) -
"When it appears that the assumption of the
unconscious helps us to construct a highly
successful practical method, by which we are
enabled to exert a useful influence upon the
course of conscious processes, this success
will have won us an incontrovertible proof
of the existence of that which we assumed".
(258) Freud himself seems to have regarded this argument
as no more than a reinforcement of his other proofs.
In the passage just quoted it is a sort of postscript
to his main proof (in this case a mixture of the
arguments from continuity and from discovered causes).
What is more, I cannot find any later passage in which
this argument is used.
(259) /
six
(859) I tlxins tliat tiie argument from results, as
Freud uses it, is overstated in several respects, but
that at the same tine it is the only one of his arguments
chat has any force when his unconscious is recognised as
a scientific model. I shall therefore try to remove
the overstatements,
(260) Lot us first examine the conclusion, which Freud
describes as "an incontrovertible proof of the existence
of that which we assumed". In the language of
scientific models which I have improvised in earlier
chapters, he is saying "This proves it is a correspond¬
ing model". But there is really only one way to do
this. First, you must show that the entities of your
model are the sort of things that could conceivably
correspond to something observable. When we consider-
:od Freud's ideo-motor model, we found that while he
intended its entities to be of this nature, they have
since been refined into the form of "object-relations"
which could not conceivably be corresponding. Second,
you must then discover by observation something that
corresponds to your entities. And while the entities
of the Freudian model are not ex hypothesi unobservable,
there is no means at present that would be recognised
as / ~
as observation in the way in which microscopic
examination is recognised to be observation in science
such as genetics.
(261) Freud must therefore give up the attempt to
prove by this means that his model is corresponding#
But as soon as he does so, his argument becomes one
which merely seeks to show that of all possible models
his is to be preferred. For if you can establish
that your model is a corresponding one, them it does
acquire a status that distinguishes it from other
models that have been devised to explain the same
phenomena; but if not, the most you can hope to show
is that yours is the best.
(262) At this point you must decide whether "best" is
to mean "best for all purposes" or merely "best for
your purpose". I do not think that any scientist or
philosopher since the middle ages has claimed for any
one model that it is the best for all purposes; even
those that offer the model of modern physics as a
universal model would not deny that there are fields
in which it is only theoretically usable and in which
a cruder model is of gre ter practical utility. A
dlAi.jc' 1 ;-m would, be handicapped one not helped if he
were /
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were forced to scrap the calory-vitamin model for the
model of nuclear physics. Mop, I think, would even
the most fanatical Freudian claim that his model would
"be of use in neuro-surgery. Indeed, as I have pointed
out in the Introduction, there are types of psycho-
:therapy that seem to he able to do without the concept
of the unconscious. The most that Freud could safely
claim is that his model is the best for the purpose of
a certain kind of psychotherapy.
(263) Working backwards from Freud1 s conclusion, the
next claim that wo have to consider is that his
"practical method" is "highly successful". I am, as
I have said before, not qualified to discuss evidence
for or against psychoanalysis which is offered by the
laboratory or the clinic. But I hope that I am not
disqualified altogether from commenting on this
controversy. It seems to me that in most of the
countries of Western civilisation this dispute has now
progressed beyond the stage in which the opponents of
psychoanalysis denied that it had any remedial effect.
(The exceptions appear to be the Roman Catholic
countries and Scotland). Most of its opponents now
argue that it has some effect, but that there are
other methods that are to be preferred, either because
they are quicker, or because they produce more lasting
or more marked improvements. A more extreme position,
however /
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however, is taken by Eysenck, v.ho maintains that
such evidence as can be co3.1ected about the recovery
rates o„<. neurotics who are treated by psychoanalysis
or eclectic psychotherapy, and of those who receive
no treatment whatsoever, sug ests that in both cases
about two in every three recover. He is careful to
point out, however, that a properly controlled
experiment has yet to be conducted. (UAP, 1953, Cli.10).
(264) Even if these were the results of a conti-olled
experiment, however, they are not sufficiently
precise to tell us what we want to know. Huntrip has
pointed out (TFP, 1953, p. 116) -
(i) that the argument assumes that the state
of the neurotic after natural recovery
and after psychotherapeutic recovery is
the same;
(ii) that we should ..ant to know the relapse
rates after both kinds of recovery;
(iii)na statistical summary ... takes no
account of the motives patients may have
for recovery or non-recovery . • • home
types of patient ... find extreme
difficulty in accepting psychotherapeutic
treatment at all".
The force of the third of these arguments is not at
rJLl clear to me; in so fax* as I think I understand it,
it seems to me to beg the question by assuming that if
this /
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tills type of patient did. co-operate tlie treatment would
do liim good. But tiie first two points seem to me to
bo legitimate criticisms.
(265) In the same article, Guntrip also makes an
interesting assertion which suggests that Freud himself
might have been willing, towards the end of his long
life, to modify his claim that he had constructed a
"highly successful practical method". Guntrip says -
"It is well known that as Freud grew older he
grew more cautious in his estimate of the
therapeutic value of psycho-analysis, though
he retained an undiminished regard for it
as an instrument of scientific research on
mental life".
I gather from Guntrip7 that he is founding here on aTI
(1937, CP, Vol V), and that ho regards that essay as
an admission by Freud that psychoanalysis, being unable
to abolish or diminish the real source of neurotic
disorders - namely the instincts - is unable to
achieve permanent cures. It is obviously important to
know whether this is a correct interpretation, since
it is only a matter of time before it becomes an
argument in the hands of the opponents of psychoanalysis.
(206) /
By what ps, etiological writers usually call "a
~XX3:rsona3-" communication". T hnri n talk with him.
aie
(266) I think myself that Guntrip has oversimplified
what Freud is saying in ATI. I do not thim-: it will
he a waste of time to attempt a summary of this very
important essay. It starts by referring to the
problem of the patient who, having maue a certain
amount of progress, is "becalmed" without having been
fully cured: Freud discusses certain methods of
speeding-up the analysis and bringing it to an end.
This sug, ests to him the interesting question whether,
in the theoretical sense, there is ever really an end
to an analysis. At this point Freud makes it clear
that in practice, of course, most analyses do have an
end: -
"Every analyst will have treated cases with this
gratifying outcome. He has succeeded in
clearing up the patient*s neurosis, there has
been no relapse and no other nervous uiaturb-
:ance has succeeded it ". (CP, Vol. V, p. 320)
He then goes on to discuss the exceptions - the
analyses that drag on without coming to a satisfactory
end, or that have to be renewed some years later
because the patient has relapsed. He starts this
discussion by saying that of late 3/ears he has con¬
fined himself to training - analyses (of prospective
psychoanalysts) and to the treatment of a relatively
small number of severe cases of neurosis, in neither
of /
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of which types io there any question of shortening the
analysis. broadly speaking, he then comes to these
conclusions. First, the number of "interminable
analyses" con be reduced if the analyst himself keeps
himself in good shape, as it \/ere, by undergoing
periodic analyses himself. becond, the irreducible
number of cases which he cannot then deal with will be
due either to his own irremediable shortcomings, or to
two kinds of defects in the ijatient. One of these is
the way in which some patients cannot get out of the
habit of using certain defence-mechanisms (such as
repression or regression) to deal with their conflicts,
oven when these mechanisms are recognised by them
during analysis to be harmful. The other is the fact
that instincts are sometimes too strong to be subdued
by any method; Freud ends by giving to particularly
intractable instances.
(267) I do not think that this shows any lessening of
confidence in psychoanalysis as a technique for dealing
with the majority of cases of neurosis. It is of
course always possible to find passages that will
support extreme interpretations: Freud is a writer who
thinks aloud, even when he is thinking of ways of
presenting tho case against ■linsolf. I think that
Freud /
pi nA/J.O
Freud summed up his own views on this subject in an
even later work (OP, 1940, p. 70) when he said -
"It i3 true that we do not always succeed in
winning, but at least we can usually see why
it is that we have not won. Those of us who
have been following our discussion only out
of therapeutic interest will perhaps turn
away after t.ais admission • • • But for the
moment we have nothing better at our disposal
than the technique of psychoanalysis, and for
that reason, in spite of its limitations, it
is not to be despised".
(268) If Freud had been concerned, however, to
construct as cast-iron an argument as possible, rather
than to state what he believed, he might have put
forward a more modest claim for his method. Ho
might have been content with maintaining that his
method enables the user "to exert an influence upon
the course of conscious processes". notice hovz close
this is to the words he himself used - all that has
been omitted is the assertion that the method is
"highly successful" and that the influence is "useful".
In other words, he might reduce his claim to the
as ertion that he can by his method produce in his
patient such emotions as fear, pity or horror, or rc-
:collections of events which the patient denied being
able to recollect, whether or not the productions of
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those emotions or recollections have any beneficial
effect. This watered-down claim might not be to the
taste of Freud or his followers, but it would greatly
strengthen the argument from results.
(269) The next part of the argument to be examined is
Freud*s claim that the assumption "helpfc us to
construct a • • • practical method". Again this
claim seeras slightly overstated. First, as a matter
of historical fact, the method appears to have been
constructed more by trial and error, the error being
hypnotism and the method of "free association" find
"interpretation" being the more successful and less
disreputable alternative. Certainly the fact that the
entitle,g6f the model were mental and not physiological
(that is, the model*s autophenomenomorphism) may have
suggested that an alternative to hypnotism should be
sought among "mental", that is, semantic methods: but
the model itself was suggested to Freud by his
experiments with the semantic technique of hypnotism.
But I pointed out in the Introduction that there is
more than one kind of semantic teclmique, and there is
nothing in the model itself to suggest which of them is




assert that the model helps the psychoanalyst not/the
construction hut in tho application of his technique#
(270) For I think that Freud no.a confusing two things#
One of these is the way in which a scientific hypo-
:thesis suggests an experiment that will confirm or
refute it; the other is the way in which a model is
used to help the scientist or technician in thinking
about his subject. An example may make this clearer#
It was observed that in certain parts of the world
large numbers of people developed the symptoms called
yellow fever. As we know, the general abatement that
explains this is that a person bitten by a Stegomyia
Calonus mosquito which has bitten a sufferer from the
fever will in most cases also fall a victim. So much
could be established purely by observation, if we could
think of the right observations to make. But we are
less likely to think of them if we ore not accustomed
to think in terms of the microbe model. This in
fact led first to the idea that the fever was con-
:tagions, and to the experiments that disproved this
(such as dressing healthy volunteers in the clothes of
sufferers) and nexb to the idea of an insect vector,
which suggested the famous experiment in which Lazear




(271) what is important to note here is this. .First,
the experiment proved nothing about the model. Nothing
but direct observation could do that: and it has in
fact shown that it is not a microbe but a fitter"
passing virus that is involved, Second, that thinking
in terms of the model was not the only way in which the
experiment might have been thought of, although such
thinking undoubtedly made it far more probable that
the association between the mosquito and yellow fever
would be noticed#
(272) The third t*ing to note is that experiments that
verify or refute general statements belong to sciences
and not to techniques, and that what Freud described as
his "highly successful practical method" is a technique
and not a science, though it may be based upon a
science. In the next two chapters I shall try to
separate the science from the technique, and to show the
roles which the notion of the unconscious plays in
each#
(275) I shall conclude this chapter by restating,
without Freud*s overstatements, the only one of his




In its now form it might he put as follows
"The model of the unconscious is of more help
than any other in the application of a technique
that enables us to produce in patients certain
emotions, recollections and other mental phenomena"
In this form, it seems to me that it is a good deal
harder to refute. To do this, one would have to show
either that the model is of no help at all, or else
that there are better models for the purpose. Please
note that it would not be sufficient to show that one
could manage without a model. It is, I sup ose,
possible to remember all the laws of genetics, and to
be a successful horse-breeder, without thinking in
terms of chromosomes, or even hearing of them; but
this does not discredit the model, which provides a
much easier way of working out and remembering what




Unconsciousness as a scientific principle
of inference#
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(274) In tlie chapter on Freud*3 unconscious ontitioo
I discussed the sort of a model that these constituted,
hut I did not discuss the way in which this model is
meant to he used to facilitate thinking about nuraan
behaviour. I have therefore said a good deal about the
nature of unconscious entities while saying very little
about the place of the notion of unconsciousness
itself. In order to understand this fully, we have
to appreciate several things. These are -
a. The nature of the science 011 which
psychoanalysis is based:
b. The nature of the laws of this science
when they are stated in their proper
form:
c. The role played by the notion of
unconsciousness in the formulation of
these laws:
d. The fact that, though based largely 011
one science, psychoanalysis is neither
a pure nor applied science, but a
technique:
e. The fact that the ..ay in hich this
technique uses the notion of un¬
consciousness is not unique, though
it may be rare.
(275) In his "philosophy of Science" (1952) Toulnin
gives an account of scientific explanation which is
very relevant for ray purpose. In his chapter on
"Laws /
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"Laws of nature" (p. 90) lie discusses various views
which have been held about tne logical status of such
la s, and shows how the different views result from
the kinds of scientific statement which are selected
as examples# For in Toulrain*s view there arc four
different kinds of scientific statement, find each ono
can be used to prove a different theory.
(276) His illustration is taken from geometrical optics,
which, because of its comparative simplicity and its
use of concepts which are easily grasped by the layman,
he employs to illustrate most of his arguments through-
lout his book. His four classes of scientific
statement are -
"(i) abstract, formal statements of a law or
principle - e.g. Snell*s Law, in the form
quoted above: i
(ii) historical reports about the discovered
scope of a law or principle - e.g. the
state,lent that 811611*3 Lav/ has been
found to apply to most non-crystalline
substances at normal temperatures:
(iii) applications of a principle to particular
cases - e.g. tne statement that, in a
particular prism now under examination,
the directions of the incident and
refracted beams vary in accordance with
8nell*s Lav/; or the statement that the
sunlight getting over a certain wall is
travelling to the ground behind the wall
in a straight line:
(IT) /
T?or Snell*a Law, see paragraph 388.
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(iv) conclusions of inferences drawn in
accordance with a law or principle -
e.g. the conclusion that, the angle
of incidence and refractive index being
what they are, the angle of refraction
must be 36°; or the conclusion that,
itli the sun at 30°, the shadow of a
6ft. high wall must be 10ft. Gins,
deep. "
(277) In considering how the statements of psycho¬
analysis fit into this classification, it is possible
to be misled in several ways. First, by trying to
fit in statements that do not belong to it; and
second, by failure to find satisfactory examples of
ones that do belong. Toulminfs classification
describes the statements of a completed science, and
not the statements that were made in the construction
of the science, nor again those that tell us how to
manipulate the laboratory apparatus. But it is just
this sort of statement that constitutes most of
psychoanalytic literature. Another misleading feature
is the complexity of most psychoanalytic descriptions,
compared with the relative simplicity of those of
geometric optics. This is no doubt partly because
organic behaviour _is more complex than inorganic
behaviour. But it may also be due to the fact that
psychoanalytic observables are not yet numerically
measurable, and~descidrDt±ons -ef- are thus deprived
of /
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of tiic compact notation which most of tiio sciences
cmjoy (but see paragraph 286).
(278) The pure science of psychoanalysis is thus
something which is implicit, not explicit, in the
literature, partly because this is the literature of
a science under construction, partly because the
writers are in any case concerned more with application
and technique than with the formulations of laws, and
partly because these laws would in fact be extremely
difficult things to formulate satisfactorily.
(279) Before I try to formulate a not too unsatis-
:factory example of a psychoanalytic law, there is one
more precaution to be taken, As Toulmin points out
(p. 44) there arc two kinds of science - the
"explanatory", such as physics, and the "descriptive",
ouch as natural history. The latter "hunt out
regularities in phenomena" while the former "investigate
the form of regularities whoso existence is already
recognised".
(200) tie have already come across this distinction in
Chapter 2, where I pointed out the difference between
the /
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the Freudian account of regression and the "suhotitutod
action" account that is offered "by the pure reflexologist
and where I argued that the logical relationship between
the Freudian and the reflexological explanation of
behaviour is the logical relationship that is found
between scientific statements about models and scientific
statements of the purely descriptive kind. And in
subsequent chapters vie found that by regarding Freud's
■unconscious entities as belonging to a scientific model
vie were able to make a good deal of progress with the
task of sorting out their relationships to one another
and to his raetapsychological entities, and were able to
estimate the comparative worth of his four arguments
for the unconscious.
(281) I must deal here, however, with two attacks that
may be made on my assumption that psychoanalysis is
based upon an explanatory science. First, it may bo
said that no science is wholly descriptive or wholly
explanatory. It maybe pointed out, for example, that
even natural history, hich Toulmin uses as the example,
•par excellence, of a descriptive science, sometimes
offers explanations that are not just more general
statements. The cat's possession of incisor teeth,
for example, is not dpvnt.h the exolanation that
"all /
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"all carnivores have incisor teeth"; natural history
goes on to explain that incisors are useful in masticat-
:ing uncooked meat and that the process of natural
selection therefore results in the survival of
carnivores with well-developed incisors, and in the
gradual disappearance of their less fortunate brethren;
this explanation in its turn can be expanded by
references to genes and chromosomes# Likewise, it
may be argued, the so-called explanatory sciences
cannot be purely explanatory; they must have something
to explain, and therefore must include some descriptive
statements; physics, which is Toulrain1 s example of
a purely explanatory science, must be about something,
or it would be nothing but pure mathematics,
(282) I think that there are two mistalees in this
argument. One is the assumption that when natural
historians offer explanations of the regularities they
observe, these explanations are also part of the science
of natural history. In fact, scientists themselves
distinguish such explanations from natural history
proper, by calling the former biology, or, more often,
by assigning them to some subdivision of biology such
as genetics. The converse of this mistake is to
regard the regularities which are admittedly the subject
of /
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of the explanatory sciences as being "collected" by such
sciences in the same way as specimens arc collected by
the botanist. In fact they are seldom collected in
this way, but usually have to be "manufactured". I am
not trying to suggest that the behaviour in the laboratory
of some synthetic substance such as polythene is in any
way less "real" than the behaviour of migrating geese.
But the fact that a substance that would not be encoun¬
itered if It had not been produced by the chemist himself
is nevertheless of interest to chemistry illustrates
the difference between this science and natural history
which the argument we are considering tries to obscure.
Natural history is not interested In phenomena that are
deliberately produced in the laboratory. For the
second mistake of the argument is to ignore the dif¬
ferences in the objects of the two kinds of sciences.
The object, and the value, of sciences such as natural
history, history proper, or geography is the information
they give about what Toulmin culls "regularities in
phenomena"; but the point of physics is not the
information it provides about phenomena that we shall
not encounter unless we deliberately produce them ourselves;
it is the explanations that its experiments enable it
to offer. At this stage the objection may bo raised
tliat all sciences ultimabely^tave~-a praotioal aim;—they
all /
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all assist us, though sometimes very indirectly, to do
something that we want to do - whether it is to make
life longer or shorter, more bearable or less so.
Even if this is accepted, however, - and it need not
be - there is still a valid distinction between the
sciences that serve their practical end through tho
information they provide about phenomena that occur
naturally (by which •! mean of course "outside the
laboratory") and the sciences that do so by providing
explanations that make it easier to predict or produce
phenomena,
(283) The second attack that we must meet is the
argument that even if Toulmin is right in distin¬
guishing between explanatory and descriptive sciences,
I am wrong in suggesting that psychoanalysis is based
upon an explanatory science. It is possible to
argue with some force that the real value of psycho¬
analysis lies in its observations of natural phenomena.
Perhaps the best illustrations of this -would be the
many resemblances pointed out by Freud between
infantile attitudes towards parents and adult disorders
of behaviour and emotion. Strictly speaking, it would
be sufficient for my present purpose to point out that
Freud /
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Freud clearly thought lie was dealing with, tin explanatory
science, and that this thesis is concerned with the
logical status of one of its concepts, and not with the
question whether Freud was right in his assumption.
But the argument we are considering here is so interest-
:ing, and crops up in so many forms in anti-psychoanalytic
literature, that it deserves a little more consideration.
{284} I do not think that anyone who awaits the
distinction between explanatory and descriptive sciences
would maintain that there can be no such thing as an
explanatory science concerned with human behaviour.
Nor could they deny that psychoanalysis offers what
purports to be a scientific explanation. But I think
that some of its opponents, who call it "unscientific",
must mean that it differs in some important respect
•from a genuine scientific explanation. If we think
of this assertion in terms of "models", as I have
suggested wc should do, we see that this can only mean
one of three things. It may mean that the model
used by psychoanalysis is not known, or is known not,
to be corresponding; but this could bo aaiu 01 the ray
model of light, which nobody calls "unscientific".
It may mean that there is a better model -on one
purposes /
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purposes of psychoanalysis; but nobody calls a
scientific model "unscientific" because it is improved
upon* Or it ay mean something less naive. It may
be intended to suggest that there is something peculiar
about the way in which the model is used by the
psychoanalyst. This last possibility is one that
cannot be properly considered until we have gone a
little further into the nature of psychoanalytic laws,
but I shall return to it in the next chapter, when I
discuss the implications of recognising psychoanalysis
as a technique emu not as an applied science.
(285) I hope it will now be granted that an example of
a psychoanalytic law should not be formulated in a
purely descriptive form. It should not bo of the form. -
"A man's attitude to won in a position of
authority over him usually resembles his
attitude to his father in his filth or
sixth year."
It is true that most text-books of psychology abound
in statements of this kind - particularly if they arc
trying to state the discoveries of Freud in non-Freudian
language. But such statements belong to the natural
history of human behaviour, and are not explanatory.
I am not of course suggesting that psychoanalytic laws
arc /
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are the only kind, of psychological laws that is
explanatory, or even that they are preferable to
other kinds of explanatory psychological laws. All
I am pointing out at present is that we must not
mistake a "natural history" statement for an
explanatory law,
(286) At the same time I do not want to confuse issues
or complicate ray example any more than is absolutely
necessary, as I should do if I were to attempt to give
the full-blown psychoanalytic counter-part of the
descriptive example in my last paragraph, I am not
even sure that I could do so if it were necessary. I
expect that the concept of "projection" and of
"father-image" would be used. But I do not think I
need attempt quite as much as this to show how the
psychoanalytic law is explanatory where the other is
merely descriptive. All X need do is to cast it
into the form -
"A man unconsciously regards men in a position
of aut lority over him in the same way as he
regarded his father in his fifth or sixth
year".
(I realise that the word "regards" is not altogether
satisfactory: it really embraces all sorts of reactions,
which /
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which, ought to be set out in a technical definition.
But Bnell's Law, which '^oulioin uses as an example, is
open to much the same objection. When it says that
the ratio of the sine of the angle of incidence to
the sine of the angle of refraction is a constant,
its compactness and precision are deceptive, for we
need sine-tables to make use of it).
(287) With all its shortcomings, this law has two
advantages over the descriptive form. first, it
offers a causal explanation of men's behaviour towards
their superiors. The descriptive form did not,
because we do not regard events which are separated
by an appreciable period of time as being causally
connected, unless we can show something which persists
during this period to mediate between them. But the
psychoanalytic form gives us a contemporary cause,
which is intended to stand in the s;uae relationship to
men's observable behaviour towards their superiors
as would, for example, a conscious belief that one's
superior was one's father.
(288) For much the same reason it is technically more
useful than the descriptive form. For the latter
offers /
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offers no hint of how a man's attitude to his superiors,
if abnormal and inconvenient, oan be improved: you
cannot adjust something that was happening twenty or
thirty years ago. But if you are given a contemporary
cause, you can at least speculate as to what might
alter it.
(289} This lav; fits without much difficulty into
'i'oulmin's four classes. Let us take them in reverse
order, so as to leave the more interesting to the
lost. It is easy to imagine "inferences drawn in
ccordance with this law". If asked to say what nr.
Jones' attitude to his employer might be expected to
be,the psychoanalyst would ask to be told about his
childliool relationship with his father (just as the
optician, asked for the angle of refraction, would ask
for the angle of incidence). In fact, of course, the
psychoanalyst would probably want to know something
about the employer's character as well: but this would
be in order to make a statement of type (iii) - that
is, that the case in question was governed by his
lav;, and was not merely a case in which the employer
as so intolerable that any man, whatever his childhood
story, would get on badly with him.
(290) /
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(290) From the point of view of psychoanalysis, 1'onlmin*
type (iii) is quite interesting. For a great deal of
the tncfonique of psychoanalysis, and many of the
resulting statements, are concerned to establish what
law it is that governs the particular symptom that a
patient is presenting at the moment. To identify the
lav; it may well be necessary to make use of other laws -
for example, the patient might complain of attacks of
ulcerative colitis whenever he had to stay with his
employer. The analyst might make use of a lav; that
men who do not experience feelings of anger when this
would be a normal reaction are subject to symptoms such
as ulcerative colitis, and mi ht thus guess that he had
to deal with a case of our lav;.
. He might then go on
to confirm this by indirect enquiries into the patient's
childhool attitude to his father, anu might discover
that this had been mainly one of dislike.
(291) But he would also nave to rely on statements of
type (ii) - that is, about the scope of the lav; which
was suspected to govern this aspect of his patient's
behaviour. In our example, these might say that trie
law had been found to apply to cases in which -
a) the employer's behaviour was normal,
t» /
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b) the man was past adolescence and in
normal health, and
c) he had bean a normally constituted
child.
These provisos might be criticised for their vague
references to "normality", which might even be said to
amount to the proviso "unless the law doesn't apply".
But Toulrain points out that this is inevitable if one
tries to produce a complete statement about the scope
of a law (p. 63}.
(£92) When we come to Toulmin's first group, we find
that it really consists of two different hinds of
statement - "abstract formal statements of a law or
principle - e.g. dnell's Lav; . . ." For his immediate
purpose (namely, conside ing whether laws of nature are
necessary or contingent) tiie distinction between a
law and a principle of inference does not matter. But
elsewhere he makes the difference plain. He takes
as his example of a principle, the Rectilinear
Propagation of Light, and explains -
"The distinction turns, upon something we noticed
earlier: namely, the role of the principle as
the keystone of geometrical optics. One can
well imagine a geometrical optics in which the
lav; of refraction was different. The adoption
of a different lav; in place of Onell's Law
would /
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would of course mean considerable chances - our
present notion of refractive index would be one
casualty. But geometrical optics could still
exist as a subject, and designers of optical
instruments, having learnt the new rules for
tracing the passage of rays through their
assemblies of lenses, would coon accommodate
themselves to the change. By comparison, the
principle that light travels in straight lines
seems to be almost indefeasible: certainly
it is hard to imagine physicists abandoning
completely the idea of light as something
travelling in straight lines, for to give up
this principle would involve abandoning
geometrical optics as we .mow it. If we
question the principle of rectilinear propagation,
the whole subject is at stake: that is why the
principle is not open to falsification in any
straight forward way." (p. 03)
From this and other passages it seems that the points
of difference are -
a) laws are dependent in some way upon principles,
but not vice versa.
b) laws can "be falsified by appeals to observation
in a way in which principles cannot.
c) principles of inference arc not merely more
generalised forms which combine two or more
laws •
But the question whether a particular statement is a
law or a principle is not always easy to answer
(Toulmin instances the principles of thermodynamics)•
A principle of inference appears to be (if I may step
in where Toulriin omits to tread) a general, non-
empirical statement of a rule (or convention) which
enables some non-syllogistic method of inference
to be applied to a group of
phenomena. /
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phenomena. Thus the principle of the rectilinear
propagation of light enables the method of inference
of plane geometry to be applied to the phenomena of
optics.
(293) Bo far, I have not mentioned the "principles" of
psychoanalysis. '^hey may well prove as hard to identify
as it proved hard to formulate a satisfactory law,
Something of this sort is attempted by Allers in his
chapter "The Axioms of psychoanalysis" in his book
"The Successful Error" (1941). By axioms fillers seems
to mean something like Toulmin*s principles, though he
has none of Toulmin's insight into their logical status
or relationships to trie other statements of psychoanalysis.
In what is intended to be an exhaustive list, Allers
gives six "axioms" -
a) All mental processes develop according to
the pattern of tiie reflex mechanism.
b) All mental processes are of an energetic
nature.
c) nil mental processes are strictly determined
by the law of causality.
d) Every mental phenomenon derives ultimately
from an instinct. instincts are the primary
material of mental states.
e) The principle of evolution, as stated in the
phyletic evolution of organisms, applies to
f)-f^r-voirv.v„-,ont. of -him i-mman mind in history.
(294) /> Tke cKolik. o-f ^ree cLSsociatcorv L&xds bajJc to tke.
real course <vf" rwe.rcta.t pA.en.
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(294) It is tempting to discuss each of these axioms
in detail. ouch a discussion would certainly arrive
at a clearer and more precise wording of them. It
would also determine whether each Is logically on all
fours with the rest: axiom f., for example, looks more
like a piece of technical advice, of much the same
status as a physicist's advice about the best way to
discover the source of an unexpected distortion of
light-rays (filers himself has doubts about this axiom,
although for different reasons). Again, it would be
interesting to consider whether there is not an
overlap between what Allers is trying to say in axioms
a) and b), and what he is trying to say in c) and d).
Axiom e), though it would probably be true if it were
phrased properly, is not really of much importance for
psychoanalysis, and might in fact turn out to be really
a piece of disguised natural history. another
interesting question is whether Allers' list is
exhaustive; it makes no mention, for example, of the
indestructibility of ideas, which we have seen to be
such an important assumption of Freud's.
(295) In spite of all its shortcomings, however, I
intend to use Allers• list, in preference to one drawn
up /
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up by myself, in my attempt to illustrate the function-
:ing Gf a true principle of inference in psychoanalysis.
If I drew up a list of my own 1 might be suspected of
formulating it so as to fit my own interpretation of
Freud and ray ov;n notions as to his principle of
inference. I shall imitate the conjurer, who dees
not use his own watch but borrows one from someone
else. What is more, nllers* axioms, although .erhaps
not as precise or exhaustive as he imagines them, are
by no means lacking in insight; I have not found
anyone else who has come as close to identifying the
historical and logical mainsprings of Freud's system.
(296) There is one very striking feature about his
list. It makes no mention of unconscious mental
phenomena. The omission is quite deliberate. Hot
only does Aliens regard the list as exhaustive; he
also declares openly in an earlier chapter (p. 31-2)
that he intends "to disregard this notion". His
justification is worth quoting -
"The idea of an unconscious mind is not a
peculiarity of psychoanalysis. Many authors
have made use of it, before and after Freud.
It is doubtless true that the 'unconscious'
as conceived by psychoanalysis is different
from the conception bearing the same name
in other systems. The characteristic
features. however, that the unconscious is
given in psychoanalysis result iron the
ideas /
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ideas on the nature and tlie role of the
instincts and from the general conception
of mental dynamism. Of these things
enough has been said to supply a basis
for critique. A study of the notion of
the unconscious would not reveal more of
the fundamental attitudes of psychoanalysis
than does the study of the notions of
instincts, of mental energy, of causality,
etc., all of which willfoe examined in the
following chapters. The notion of the
unconscious is secondary to the notion of
instinct, of dynamism, etc. Being an
important link in the chain of Freudian
conceptions, it implies, of course, all
the fundamental suppositions of psycho¬
analysis. But it does not imply more
or others than do those notions which will
be studied presently. To indulge in an
inevitably lengthy analysis of the notion
of the unconscious would necessitate
useless repetition ..."
(297) iillers obviously recognises that the notion of
the unconscious stands in some peculiar logical re¬
lationship to the concepts which he does propose to
discuss, end which ultimately appear in his "axioms".
But he has not troubled to be clear about this
relationship. He uses phrases like "is secondary to"
and then "implies", which are not, on the face of it,
consistent with each other, and certainly do not leave
us satisfied. The real relationship may become plainer
if we examine one or two of his axioms more closely.
(298) Let uo take the first axiom. ""*11 mental
pisses develop accorainu^o-tha .^nttem _°f the t-oflox
mechanism". /
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mechanism". In his discussion of this axiom Allers
shows how Freud was influenced by Wernicke, who
"conceived of mental reactions or of responses due to
mental operations as being identical with reflexes",
.e have already seen, when we glanced at Freud's
concept of instinct, that it was in a sense a name for
an internal stimulus which was needed to provide the
mind with its motive power. This is, Freud says,
"a stimulus of instinctual origin", and he ives as an
example "when the membrane of the oesophagus becomes
parched or when a gnawing makes itself felt in the
stomach". What Allers seems to bo pointing out (with
a great deal of insight) is that Froud sought to apply
the stimulus-response interpretation which had been
evolved from the study of simple organisms (or easily
isolated types of behaviour, such as salivation, in
animals of a higher order) to more complex kinds of
behaviour which we find in human beings outside the
laboratory. The essence of this sort of interpretation
seems to mo to consist of observing that the organism
is in a situation which can be called a stimulus, and
then of looking for the response to this stimulus, in
the belief that the same sort of stimulus always
produces the same sort of response.
(899) /
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(299) Let us, however, do what Allers ought to liave
done, and. takej| an example: let us take in fact the
one offered by Freud. Imagine a situation in which a
person has been without food for twenty-four hours.
The response that corresponds to this stimulus is
"hunger" or "hungry behaviour". Freud is more careful
than this; he eliminates cases in which the digestive
system is not working normally by 3aying that the
stimulus is the "gnawing in the stomach". Given the
stimulus, we look for the response. Usually we find
it: Freud, who was concerned with mental phenomena,
uuld have said that we found it in feelings of hunger
(the idea of food plus an affect). But in cases of
anorexia nervosa we cannot find the response (or, if
you prefer it, we find an unexpected response). At
this point Freud would not forsake the axiom which
Allera has put into words: he would get round the
difficulty by saying that the expected response may
not be observed, but that this is only because it
occurs in an unobservable form: the feeling of hunger
is there after all, but it is unconscious.^ .allers
has thus correctly formulated one of the "axioms" with
which Freud worked, but has failed to see that the
notion /
Bfe alsodo the" converse; when-given what we recognise
as a "response"', we look for the "stimulus",~Tina
we can't find it we say it is unconscious.
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notion of unconsciousness is indispensable to the
universal application of this axiom. We shall find
that the same is true of Alters* other axioms,3
(500) "All mental processes are of an energetic nature",
What Alters seems to have in mind here are the forces
which are exerted upon the Freudian "ideas" and either
propel them into consciousness, repel them from it,
or expel them if they have gained an entrance; he may
also be thinking of tho cathexis which discharges
itself into the conscious mind in the form of affect.
But we have seen that if we are to think of the ego as
exerting the constant force of repression upon certain
ideas, it is necessary to think of these ideas as
"substances" - that is, as "being there" when they are
not observable. Or again, if we are to think of an
affect, such as fear, as the dischargqbf the energy
attached to an idea (such as the idea of castration)
what are wo to do when we come across this fear without
being able to find the idea which is "discharging" it,
or when the only idea associated with it (such as a
pair of scissors) seems insufficient to account for it?
We can obey the axiom only by assuming that an idea is
"there". /
3always excepting the sixth, about which, as I have
said, Allers himself was doubtful.
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"there". It will not satisfy the axiom to point to
an idea of castration that was conscious at some time
in the past, for we are being instructed by the axiom
to apply the laws of dynamics, and this science does
not allow phenomena which are "over and done with" to
be regarded as the causegfof present effects. We must
presume that what was past is present, or that what
was never observed is there just the same.
(301) I hope that these discussions of the place of
unconsciousness in the application of Aiders* first and
second axioms has made it unnecessary for me to devote
time to a similar discussion of the other four, I
have already pointed out that axiom f) is more like a
piece of technical advice than an "axiom". Again, I
cio not think that axiom c) (namely, that "the principle
of evolution, as 3tated in the phyletic evolution of
organisms, applies to the development of the human
mind in history") is really of much importance to
psychoanalysis; Aliens himself does not devote much
time tc^S.t. Axioms c) and d) ("All mental processes
are strictly determined by the lav/ of causality": and
"Avery mental phenomenon derives ultimately from an
instinct • . .") are so closely bound up with the first
two axioms and with Freud*s argument from discovered
causes /
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causes that anyone who lias followed my discussion of
these in this and the previous chapter could work out
for himself in a few seconds the way in which they make
use of the notion of unconsciousness.
(502) What I must now try to do is to describe in more
precise logical terms the part played by the notion of
unconsciousness. Clearly, I must first be sure of the
exact status of Allere* so-called axioms. Allers
himself does not regard them as laws, for he says -
"They do not follow from the empirical statements -
which, as we know already, are indeed not
purely empirical, not the result of experience,
but very much dependent on theoretical preconceived
ideas. On the contrary they precede them and
they determine the way these statements are used
for building up the theory".
This tells us more about what they are not than about
what they are. But when we cane to read what Allers
has to say about individual axioms, he is more helpful.
The first axiom, he says "implies ... that there is
no essential difference between nervous and mental
processes". The second "implies that mental processes
are governed by the same laws as those assumed by
physics". Discussing the third, he says that "the
causality" which, according to the axiom, determines
mental processes "is conceived according to the pattern
of /
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of causality in physics". The first three axioms
then are, roughly speaking, statements that you can
make sense of mental phenomena by treating them as if
they obeyed the laws that describe the phenomena of
other sciences. And if we look closely at the fifth
axiom we find that it is mi almost explicit injunction
to apply the laws formulated by Darwin. The fourth
axiom is less obviously of this nature, until we
remember that "instinct" is for Freud a phys10logical
and not a psychological concept.
(503) It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that
Allers* "axioms" are therefore what Toulmin calls
"principles of inference". One might argue that just
as the principle of the rectilinear propagation of
light enables geometrical methods of inference to be
used for inferences from ono optical phenomenon to
another, so Allers* first axiom enables inferences of
the Pavlovian kind to be used in interpreting the more
complex kinds of human behaviour; and that similarly
his second axiom allows the inferential methods of
physics to be used also in this field. But closer
thinking shows that the to things are not on all fours.
Allers * axioms do no more than state that certain methods
of inference can (or, if you prefer it, should) be used
in /'
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in interpreting certain human behaviour# Tliey do
nothing to show how this is to be done, and as we have
seen a certain sleight of hand is needed if we are to
obey them. The Principle of the Kectilinear
Propagation of Light, 011 the other hand, is something
that helps us to apply the inferential methods of
geometry to the interpretation of optical phenomena.
What corresponds in geometrical optics to one of
Allers* axioms is the statement that the inferential
methods of geometry can or should be used. If the
person to whom you make this statement turns round
and says "But you might tell me how to apply these
methods" you can reply "By representing light as con¬
sisting of straight lines 011 a plane surface". This
enables the phenomena of refraction, for example, to
be treated as problems in geometry and trigonometry.
(504) I have already shown, I think, that if you want
to put into practice the aavice contained in one of
Allers* axioms, there is one expedient that you must
bo prepared to employ in each case; you must be
prepared to regard certain expected phenomena as being
present even when they are not observed - that is, as
being present in an unconscious form. It is thus the
notion of unconsciousness that corresponds to such
expedients /
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expedients as the presumption of the Rectilineal1
Propagation of Light. The notion of unconsciousness,
as Freud uses it, is a true principle of inference.
Just as the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of
Light enables us to interpret some optical phenomena
by drawing or thinking of geometrical diagrams, so the
notion of unconsciousness enables us to interpret
certain human behaviour by describing it as if it
exemplified the laws of other sciences,principally
dynamics.
(505) One question is bound, however, to have occurred
to anyone who has read the last few pages. Is the
notion of unconsciousness indispensable only if you
are trying to apply the inferential methods of other
sciences go the interpretation of mental phenomena?
Suppose that Jkllers were wrong, and that psycho-
:analytic laws need not be formulated in terms of
concepts borrowed from- physics or physiology? The
question is not an academic one, because I think that
-tillers* view is at most a half-truth. Freud had
created an autophenomenomorphic model - one whose parts
were meant to resemble the phenomena they were designed
to explain. But, as we have seen, the parts could
not be regarded as behaving in exactly the same way as




(i) to borrow laws from other sciences;
(ii) to invent a new set;
(iii) to mix new laws with borrowed ones.
Allers implies that Freud chose the first of these.
In fact he took the third. Some of his laws are not
borrowed - for example, the "repetition-principle"
which says that the unconscious tries to repeat
experiences that have made a strong impression on the
person, whether they were pleasant or the reverse.
(BPP, 1921, Ch. III). Another instance is perhaps
the way in which mutually contradictory ideas and
impulses were supposed to co-exist in the unconscious
(UC8, CP. IY, 1915, p. 119). The example of a
psychoanalytic law which I offered earlier in this
chapter is intended to avoid borrowing from other
sciences.
(306) I think that the question I put at the beginning
of the last paragraph boils down to the question
whether an autophenomenomorphic model is indispensable
to a psychological inferential system. This is
clearly a question which could be properly answered
only after a thorough review of modern psychological
systems, more or less in the way that F.V. Smith has
reviewed /
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reviewed one or two systems in MB (1951). If I may
offer a view that is based on a priori reasoning, it
is that a model of some sort is indispensable if the
inferential system is to be that of an explanatory
science: one without a model would consist merely of
generalisations of the "natural history" kind: and
as I shall suggest in the next chapter an explanatory
science is of more use to a technique. I shall also
suggest that there are reasons why an autophenomeno-
:morphic model is of more use than an allophenomeno-
rmorphic one to techniques such as psychoanalysis. But
for the present argument it is important to recall that
Freud at times made use of an allophenomenomorphic
model, whose parts bore no resemblance to the phenomena
they were designed to explain. These parts, therefore,
were not the sort of thing that could conceivably be
observable - that is, conscious. The notion of
unconsciousness is therefore not only not indispensable
but in fact inappropriate in the employment of alio-
:phenomenomorqhic psychological models. It is
significant that in modern psychoanalytical language,
in which the allophenomenomorphic metapsychological
model is fashionable, references to unconsciousness are
now less frequent; processes now tend to be "ego-




(307) So far, however, I have not attempt eel to put
the Freudian, principle of inference into words in the
way in which the principle of geometrical optics can
he put into words hy saying "Light moves in straight
lines"• It is true, as Toulmin points out, that as
soon as you put a principle into words in this way,
you are at once beset by the need for so many except¬
ions that you end up by saying "except when it
doesn't". (loc. cit., p,30). But it seems to me
that this difficulty is largely avoided by phrasing
the principle not as if it were a statement of
verifiable fact but as what it is - advice on a good
method for drawing inferences when dealing ith certain
phenomena: by saying, in fact, "'there are a good many
optical phenomena that can be made the subject of
geometrical methods of inference if you pretend that
light consists of straight linos on a plane surface".
It is, 1 think, a statement of this kind that we should
attempt to formulate if we want to see Freud's
principle of inference put into words#
(308) As soon as this is recognised, the task is easy#
One of the presumptions of modern science is that in
order to account for any state of affairs at any
point, of time vou need not go further back into
history than the immediately preceding state of affairs:
that /
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that state of affairs plus your laws should be
sufficient explanation. This is the temporal
counterpart of the principle of "no action at a
distance". This presumption becomes strained, of
course, as soon as you begin to be concerned with
the behaviour of living organisms; it forces you
to assume structural changes in the nervous system
of the organism in order to provide "an immediately
preceding state of affairs". When you come tq&eal
with the more complex hinds of human behaviour, the
utility of this sort of model is so obviously nothing
but theoretical that you look around for a better
one. Psychoanalysis provides this by saying "your
difficulty arises from your refusal to refer in your
explanations to any past states other than the
immediately preceding one. You would get on much
better if you would allow yourself to refer to any
previous mental states in the history of the organism
(and in some cases perhaps the history of its tribe;•
If you still insist on preserving the principle of
"no action at a distance in time" you can manage both
by treating past mental states as if they were present".
It is this presumption that past mental states are
present that creates the .Freudian unconscious.
(309) /
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(309) It may not be quite accurate, however, to regard
the Freudian unconscious as consisting entirely of past
phenomena: I think it is possible to detect in it more
than a trace of something different. I have already
referred in Chapter 1 to the "cryptoteleology" of the
Freudian models, that is, to the way in which, by using
instincts as a kind of final cause, Freud was able to
make his modelsgppear to be actuated entirely by
anterior causes. The unconscious mental representatives
of these instincts are thus the way in which the Freudian
model represents future, or more precisely hypothetical
future, events. I do not want to make too much of
this point and I certainly do not want to suggest that
this is an essential element of the notion of an
unconscious. It is largely a model for the represent-
:ation of past occurrences in the life of the
individual or his race. But in Freud's hands it
contains, probably unrecognised by him, this admixture
of futurity.
(310) It is this reflection of past and future that
accounts, I think, for that rather surprising feature
in Freud's unconscious which I pointed out in Chapter 5 -
its changeless, timeless nature. If the entities of
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his phenomenomorphic model are really past or future
phenomena, they cannot very well be otherwise than
changeless, and if they are taken out of their correct
place in time and made to serve as present causes,
"timeless" is a fairly appropriate description to
apply to them,
(311) If we recognise that the Freudian unconscious
is essentially a piece of advice for the would-be
explanatory psychologist, we are, I think, In a
position to give a short and simple answer to the question
which is so often asked in different forms - "What sort
of things can properly be called unconscious? Is it
proper to talk cf unconscious emotions, wishes,
thoughts, attitudes, purposes and so on?" The answer
to this Is "If you are constructing an inferential
system in which any of these - or any other concejjtion
denoting introspectible mental phenomena-Is treated as
a cause, then it is legitimate to talk about unconscious
as well as conscious forms of these conceptions.
Yhiatever conscious phenomenon is regarded as part of
your causal system can be talked of as unconscious#
It may not be necessary to talk of all of them in this
way; as we have seen, Freud soon gave up talking about
unconscious /
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unconscious reasoning or calculating; but it is not
logically improper •#f '
(312) 3?ouloin makes use of oil excellent analogy between
theories and maps, which will help to illustrate the
place of the unconscious in the pure science of psycho-
;analysis. (PS, Ch. IV). He refutes Mach's view
that a scientific theory is a sort of summary of the
observations on which it is founded: Tculmin points
out that the relationship would then be a deductive
one, which it is not. The relationship is very like
that between a map and the geographical statements
that can be "read off it!f. He goes on to point out
that -
"though the map and the geographical statements
are not deductively related, one need not
conclude that the map goes beyond the surveyor's
readings; since it does not present us with
additional information of a novel kind, but
represents the same information in a different
manner ... The logical relationship between,
for instance, ray-diagrams in geometrical
optics and the phenomena they can be used to
represent is a similar one. Here, too,
neither can be spoken of as being deduced from
the other: yet a ray-diagram need not be
thought of as containing more than the
phenomena. It is rather that tiie diagrams
present ell that is contained in the set of
observational statements, but do so in a
logically novel manner: the aggregate of
discrete /
~lt may of course be that for practical reasons it
is better to talk, for example, of "unconscious
object-relations" rather trian "unconscious ideas", (see para 352):
but I am concerned here merely witjt logical
considerations•
259
discrete observations is transformed into a
simple and connected, picture, much as the
collection of readings in a surveyor^
notebook is transformed into a clear and
orderly map."
(513) The role of unconscious mental phenomena might
well be represented in this cartographical analogy by
comparing them to the maps on transparent paper which
are intended to be, superimposed on other maps in order
to show features of the area which are not represented
on the ether because these features are things of the
past.^ The one-inch-to-the-mile Ordnance Survey map
of an area will serve most norraal purposes, but if you
want to understand why flint arrowheads are discovered
here and not there, and if you want to make such
discoveries yourself, a transparent "overlay"' showing
the pattern of neolithic settlements in the area is
useful.6
(314) Just as the Principle of the Rectilinear Propag¬
ation of light is essentially a recognition that you
can profitably represent light as consisting of straight
lines, so the concept of the unconscious is essentially
a recognition that you can profitably represent past
mental phenomena as contemporary mental phenomena. In
terms /
50r of the future - as with tmm devel npiriont plans,
G]?reud himself compared psychoanalytic reasoning
.ith archaeology (Prnest Jones, SiXW, 1953, p. 363).
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terms of the cartographical analogy, it is the
recognition that there is a way of representing
bygone features of an area without confusing them
with contemporary features.
CHAPTER 6.
The use of the unconscious in the
technique of psychoanalysis.
262
(£15) In the last chapter 1 discussed the principles
of the explanatory science on which psychoanalysis is
based. In this chapter I want to consider the
implications of recognising that psychoanalysis proper
is not a science but a technique, for it is only by
doing so that we shall understand fully the way in
which it makes use of the notion of unconsciousness.
I do not mean to suggest that there is anything new or
original in calling psychoanalysis a technique: but I
thin that this is often done without a clear idea of
the relationship between techniques and sciences.
This is not surprising, because I nave been unable to
find any book in which this relationship is discussed.
(31G) The statements of the sciences, as we have seen,
are either, as Toulaiin says, descriptions of
"regularities" in phenomena (in more or less general
form) or statements about explanatory models and
their uses. Techniques are systems of rules for
achieving certain classes of ends. It is necessary
to say "classes of ends" in order to distinguish
between a technique and the description of the applic¬
ation of it in a particular instance. "Operation
Overlord" had an individual end - the establishment
& h^nrq-qiPr-.ri nn t.iio homimdy oo-st - ana was til ere fore
not /
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not itself a technique but the application of one
which consisted of rules for achieving the class of
ends described as "opposed landings". 3o far there
does not seem much possibility of confusion between
a science and a technique. It is true that there have
been attempts to describe sciences as if they were
techniques of a high order, consisting of very general-
:ised rules for attaining very broad classes of ends.
These attempts confuse the motives and purposes for
which individual scientists evolved their* sciences
(assuming that they did have practical aims, which in
many cases is very doubtful) with the nature of the
system which was the result, A science does not,
like a technique, say "In order to achieve X you must
do Y and Z".-^
(317) It is when we come to applied sciences that the
possibility of confusion increases. nm applied
science /
T ——~—"—~~~ ~~
"I am not of course denying that techniques are used in
sciences - even In pure sciences. The physicist*s
experiments require a highly developed set of techniques
for making and manipulating apparatus; these are what
I call "laboratory techniques". There is also the
very interest trig logical question whether certain
statements of explanatory sciences - namely those
about models - are not really systems of rules with
the object of facilitating thinking about the phenomena
of the science in question; for example, the rule
"tn mvh -p t.n explain and predict optical phenomena,
think of them as diagrams in plane geometry" • as I
shall point out (in paragraph 322) wo even find that
some sciences are defined by reference to the kind of
model they use (for example, "geometrical optics").
But this does not reduce sciences to superior techniques,
for we must not confuse the statements of the science
with the statements about their models t Qnlv the, .latter could be regarded as a special kind ox tecnnique.
It would,tojfe a separate essay to follow this by-way to
its conclusion.
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science consists of statements selected from those of
the pure science and. set out in a v;ay which will be
useful in achieving a class of ends. But what must
be noticed is that its statements are still not of the
form "If you want to achieve X, do Y and Z". Let me
illustrate the difference from the science of optics,
which Toulmin chooses as his example because of its
comparative simplicity, What we must distinguish
are -
(i) statements of the pure science, such as
Sneli's Law ("whenever any ray of light
is incident at the surface which separates
two media, it is bent in such a way that
the ratio of the sine of the angle of
incidence to the sine of the angle of
refraction is always a constant quantity
for these t qfaedia");
(ii) Statements of the applied science, such as
tables of refractive indices 'of solids
(for example, different kinds of glass)
likely to be used in optical instruments.
Such tables are a by-product so far as
the pure science is concerned; tlioy are
of interest to it only when they reveal
some irregularity, such as anomalous
refraction, which may require a modification
of the stateiaents of the pure science;
(iii) Rules of the technique, such as instructions
for waking a telescope, which might be of
the following form "Find from the tables the
refractive index of the kind of glass you
propose to use for your louses. From this
calculate the correct curvature and relative
position for the lenses ..."
t310) /
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(318) There are two important ^joints of linguistic
usage in the case of teelini ues. My definition of a
technique as a system of rules for achieving a class
of ends is not intended as a reflection of ordinary
language. At one moment v/e may speak of poultry-
keeping as a technique, and at another v/e nay apply
the term technique to tv/o other things, such as
poultry-keeping by the battery system (as o (posed, for
example, to poultry-keeping by the deep-litter system)
or on the other hand the scxing of chicks. In the
first case v/e arc applying the term to one method of
practising the technique, v/hile in the other v/e are
•applying it to omething which is certainly defined
by its end, but whose end is nevertheless subordinate
to the main end of poultry-keeping. To avoid con-
:fusion v/e should, I think, call the former a "sub-
teciinique", and the latter an "intermediate teciinique".
This is of course an arbitrary usage, but it will help
to avoid confusion later.
(319) Explanatory sciences seem to be of more use to
techniques than do descriptive ones. A couple of
generations of genetics has done more for agriculture
than all the botany and zoology since Linnaeus. The
reason must be, I think, that a descriptive science is
less /
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less likely to suggest new ways of achieving ends.
Zoology merely reports that one "breed of cattle
survives severe winters "but yield poor meat, while
another yields good meat but has little resistonce to
bad weather: all that this suggests to the farmer is
that he should choose the latter breed and winter them
indoors. Genetics, on the other hand, suggests the
possibility of breeding a "cross" that combines
hardiness with good meat. It is true that a series
of lucky chances might allow a zoologist to make
observations that suggested this possibility; but a
geneticist would come to this conclusion by using his
explanatory model, which would enable him, for example,
to apply lessons learnt from breeding albino rats to
the breeding of the required type of cattle.
(320) This does not necessarily mean, however, that
any particular explanatory model is logically in-
:dispensable to any particular technique, although some
models may be indispensable in practice. Let us once
more take Touluiin*s example of the light-ray model,
and let us assume for the sake of argument that it and
it alone meets the needs of the technique of telescope-
smaking . This would nuke It indispensable in
practice /
^This must at one time have been the case.
267
practice to that technique. But the technique would
not cease to be that technique if one day the light-ray
model were found to be inferior for this purpose to
another - such as the light-wave model. Bach tociniique
consists of a series of operations, and it is possible
to point to the operation or operations that involve
the use of a particular model. In the case of
telescope-making it is the operations of determining
the correct positions and curvature of the lenses
that involve the use of the light-ray model. But ..Lot
us suppose that all possible combinations of curvature
and position were determined experimentally and set
out in tables; these operations would then be possible
/itliout the use of the explanatory model. my point
is that I do not believe it possible to imagine any
operation in a technique which could not, in strict
theory, be carried out even if the explanatory model
normally involved in it had never been thought of.
(321) This brings us to another important point about
the relationship between techniques and sciences.
The divisions between the former do not correspond to
the divisions between the latter. This is not simply
because there are far more techniques than sciences.
The reason is partly that sciences and techniques are
classified /
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classified in totally different ways, so that any
correspond, nco between the divisions would be a
coincidence, and partly that it is not in the nature
of a technique to .lake exclusive use of any one science,
(322) Consider first the classification of sciences.
The traditional classification is by subject-matter:
botany, says the Penguin Dictionary of Science, is
"the scientific study of plants", while zoology is
"the scientific study of animals". This serves very
well for descriptive sciences like these two examples.
But with explanatory ones it tends to raise awkward
questions. If optics is the study of optical plieno-
naenh and electrodynamics the study of electrical
phenomena, how do you tell what are optical and what
electrical phenomena? Which is the Aurora Borealis?
The only satisfactory way of classifying explanatory
sciences is by means of their explanatory models.
The Aurora is an electrical phenomenon not because we
can tell the difference between electrical and optical
phenomena as we tell the difference between plants and
. nimals, but simply because it is explained by the
science of electrodynamics, that is, by reference to
an electrical model* You can sec that this is to
some extent recognised if you consider the names of
sciences /
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sciences sucli as "atoralc physics" "quantum, theory" or
our old friend "geometrical optics"*
(523) Techniques, on the other hand, trust "be defined
and distinguished by their ends, and these are of all
kinds* A few, like carpentry or bee-keoping,could
perhaps be defined according to the material with
which they are concerned, and might thus be distinguished
in the same way as the descriptive sciences: but
this is accidental. There are techniques - such as
clock-making - in which alternative materials - wood
or metal - may be used, and there are techniques -
such as navigation - in which the material is difficult
to describe plausibly.
(524) The true position is not altogether easy to
visualise, and I think it can best be described by
having recourse once more to Toulmin,s cartographical
analogy, although what follows is an elaboration of it
for which ho is not responsible. he compares an
explanatory science with a map. But a map is a map
of a particular area, not of any port of the surface
of the earth. Even a map drawn for special purposes -
such as a map of surface geology - is a map not of any
.jui'lace g^l^gy, but, of the surface geology of a
particular /
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particular area. But tlie phenomena that are linked
up by a scientific theory are - or should be - all
the phenomena of the kind covered by the theory -
for example, all optical phenomena. It is true that
the observations from which the theory was built up,
like the observations from which the map v/as drawn,
were particular observations. But if the theory is
properly constructed there should be no phenomena of
this kind that do not, as it were, have a place on it.
If therefore we are to compare a theory with a map, it
must be ith a map that covers all the ground there is.
I am not concerned here with Toulmin's distinction
between "maps" of different scales. It is true that
an optical theory using the concept of light-rays
covers less phenomena than one based on the concept of
light-waves. My distinction, however, i! not between
different degrees of generality, but between generality
and particularity.
(325) Even so, hoi/ever, it is easy to overlook the
fact that in techniques two kinds of "map" arc used.
One is the general maps which are the analogues of the
explanatory sciences concerned. The other is what,
for want of a better term, I must call an "individual
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map". This is a "map" of the wayw in which the laws
of the sciences are working in the particular system
with which the technique is concerned each time it is
applied.
(326) An illustration from medicine raay make this
clearer. A physician's "general map" may tell him
that the administration of diphtheria antitoxin to a
person who has begun to show the symptoms of diphtheria
will have a beneficial effect. What it will not tell
him is that if he administers the antitoxin to Miss
Jones, he will cause her "pain, swelling, eruption,
feverislmess and general prostration" (Black's Medical
Dictionary, 1928, under "anaphylaxis"). Only ex¬
perience of previously administering the antitoxin to
Miss Jones, or detailed knowledge of iviiss Jones'
history,- or, in terms of our metaphor, only an
"individual map" of Miss Jones - will warn him of this.
(327) It may be argued that this is merely because the
physician's general map is too crude, ancl because I
have framed his rule of thumb about diphtheria in too
simple a form. It may be pointed out that the well-




circumstances - that Boyle's law, for example, lias to
be modified for liigh pressures and temperatures,
moreovethis argument would continue} it is possible
to formulate general laws about the circumstances in
which anaphylactic reactions of this kind occur; to
say, for example, that it occurs only in people who
have had a previous dose of the antitoxin (if this is
true) and so forth.
(328) But none of this gets over the fact that, in
order to predict (and of course cope with) Miss Jones'
reactions, it is not sufficient to know all these laws:
the physician must know something about Miss Jones.
He must either have observed this anaphylactic reaction
in her on a previous occasion, or he must know certain
facts about liex^ which lead him to expect it on this one.
There is an obvious logical difference between knowing
all the laws which are exemplified in the case of a
certain individual ,and knowing that they will be
exemplified, and in what proportion. There are
individuals who would exemplify the laws of anaphylaxis
violently, and others who would exemplify them so
slightly that the physician could afford to ignore
these laws in their case.
(329) /
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(3£9) v/e must not make the mistake of overlooking the
difference between a patient and a laboratory subject,
which is both a practical and a logical difference.
To establish the laws connecting anaphylactic reactions
to diphtheria antitoxin with other things such as
previous doses of the antitoxin would require
experiments under conditions v/hich excluded the poss-
:ibility of some other connection (for example, the
possibility that everyone who has had measles will
exhibit this reaction). The difference between a
patient and a laboratory subject is that the latter is
selected (or treated) with the object of making it an
exemplification of one particular connection3; if this
object is not achieved the experiment is vitiated before
it is begun, A patient, on the other hand, exemplifies
an enormous complexity of laws - physical, chemical,
psychological and so on. This distinction is not
removed by the fact that patients can be made the
subjects of experiments by certain expedients - for
example, by using a sufficiently large number of them
to make it highly improbably that they all share some
unguessed factor which will vitiate the experiment.
This statistical expedient is necessary even in the
laboratory /
30r, of course, of the absence of such a connect ion."
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laboratory because of the extreme difficulty of
ensuring that one individual is in perfect experimental
condition - that is, is not exemplifying some unwanted
law, as it were. Its use with actual patients is a
recognition of the fact that you cannot make human
beings into laboratory subjects as you can guinea-pigs;
and it gets over this by giving up the idea of making
the individual into a subject, and instead selecting
enough individuals in such a way that, together, they
are a laboratory subject,
(550) I shall call this fact about individuals the
"differential exemplification of laws". I should like
to make it very plain that I do not regard it as
something which is confined to living organisms. It
is this same fact which compels a xaan who is trying to
mend a clock to make for himself an "individual map"
of the causal connections which operate in tills
particular clock. He will, for example, move
different cog-wheelv one by one, observing which other
wheels move at the same time and which do not. By
moving the hands he will be able to distinguish the
train of wheels that moves them from the train that
makes the clock strike, and so on. f inally', lie may
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discover a worn or missing cog on one of the wheels#
(531) Two objections may be made to this example#
First, that there are in all probability other clocks
made to exactly the same pattern, and that therefore,
if the man who is trying to construct a "map" succeeds
in doing so, it will really be a map that applies to
all these clocks, and not an individual map at all.
But I think that this is the same as saying that a
literal map of the Isle of wight is not really a map
of the Isle of Wight but a map of all islands of
this type, on the grounds that there could conceivably
be another island whose natural features were exactly
the same. A man who had no idea that there were any
other clocks of this pattern would not for that
reason hesitate over the construction of his "map" and
say to himself "Of course, X must first look for any
other clocks of the same pattern to make sure that I
am right".
(332) It might be objected that the example is badly
chosen for another reason; that it does not really
illustrate "differential exemplification" in inorganic
objects because mecnanism like clocks owe their
existence to living organisms and would not exhibit
this /
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this differentiation if tiiey had not been constructed
with a purpose. But it is really only a matter of
degree. Differential exemplification is undoubtedly
easier to observe in systems which are comparatively
independent of their environment - that is, vmicii tend
to do whatever they usually do in spite of comparatively
marked differences in what is going on around then.
That is why human beings or clocks illustrate this
differentiation more clearly than something which is
neither organic nor designed by an organism. Even in
the example of the clock, we have lost sane (but not
all) of the variety of kinds of lav; which are
exemplified in human beings. Host of the laws which
are exemplified in the clock are laws of dynamics;
chemical laws or electro-chemicul laws are in the
background, although they are occasionally exemplified
in corrosion or in the magnetisation of certain parts.
(333) 3o that the comparative lack of isolation and
independence which is characteristic of inorganic
nature makes it hard to give a convincing example
without a very laboured exposition. Eerhaps we might
take the pot-holes of Yorkshire, where the rise and
fall of water levels is governed, for the most part,
by hydraulic laws and to a much smaller extent by the
chemical /
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chemical lav;s exemplified in the breaking down of
limestone. The behaviour of the different chains of
pot-holes has to be "mapped" (not in the literal sense
by the "pot-holers" who explore them, and the result i
a number of individual maps.
(354) But the chief lesson of all these examples is,
I think, that the need for an individual map arises
only when you are trying to do something to, or with,
the system in question; in other words when it is the
subject of the instrument of a technique. The i>ure
science must find some way of eliminating or, if it
cannot eliminate, of ignoring the way in which the
objects it studiegfexemplify laws with which it is not
concerned; for it is interested only in the general
form of its own laws. The technique, on the other
hand, must recognise, accept and make use of the
variety of laws exemplified in its subject, and not
only of this variety but also of the individual
"blend" of laws that is found in each subject,
(335) Differential exemplification is of course
extremely marked in the case of laws governing human
behaviour, and to some readers the last few paragraphs
This /
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This was, in Stern*s own words, "a science of the
essential differences of the functions and qualities
of Kind, and hence a bridge between general psychology
and psychological comprehension of individuality"
(G-.P., 1957, p. 29). But in so far as it was a
science it was really a study of two hitherto un¬
recognised ways of generalising about certain human
behaviour; it was not really a science of individuals,
for that would be a contradiction in terms. Stern
says "One feature is common to all these researches
in differential psychology; the issuance of a single
mental function. Individual differences in every
such function are either formulated as certain basic
forms called "types" (perceptual types, attentional
types, etc.) or arranged quantitatively; the most
familiar example of the latter procedure Is ranking
in intelligence ..." (ibid.) In other words, his
science enabled him to assign individuals to groups
according to the sorb of laws that were most often
exemplified in their behaviour, or to arrange tham in
an order according to the extent to which they
exhibited a certain property. It would thus be a
most useful basis for the techniques of teaching
individuals, assigning them to jobs, and so on. But
note that it is gfcili concerned with some kind of law
or /
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or property that has to he isolated from the rest of
the individual's "map" before it can be studied. It
is true that it can, in theory at least, go through
the whole catalogue of laws and properties relevant
to the behaviour of human beings, assigning each of a
group of individuals to sub-groups according to his
"type" and giving him a place in the order of
intelligence, memory, emotional stability, and. so on.
But the technique of teaching Mr, Smith, or of
choosing a job for him, or of managing him, depends
on building up a "map" of him out of his "types" and
his places in all these lists. This is where the
science ends and the tecimique begins.
(336) Vv^diave learned to distinguish a tecimique from
a pure science, but we must also learn to distinguish
it from an applied science. In practice this is fairly
easy. i'or a technique will always have to make use
of more than one science. Medicine, for example,
makes use chiefly of chemistry, biology and dynamics,
mi artificial pneumothorax deprives the tubercle
bacillus of oxygen (which biology suggests should kill
it) bj allowing air to enter the cavity between lungs
and ribs and thus preventing the inflation of the
lung - a method obviously sag ested by dynamics., Tke
multiplicity /
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multiplicity of sciences is not always so easy to
demonstrate. You might at first say that a clock-
maker uses none byt dynamics: but he chooses brass
instead of iron for his wheels because chemistry
(his crude knowledge of it) tells him that brass will
not corrode as soon. And there are of course
instances in which the technique is so simple and the
scientific knowledge on which it is based so crude
that the technique may appear to have no scientific
basis at all. But there is still a simple logical
rule for distinguishing the technique from the science,
pure or applied. The science consists of statements
(such as "iron rusts more than brass") while the
technique consists of rules or instructions ("never
use iron for this if you can get brass").
(337) I hope these illustrations show that a
technique will not necessarily have its ovm peculiar
pure or applied science. Clock-making or clock-
mending, for example, are not based on any science
that is not part of the basis of other techniques.
Some techniques, of course, make use of a particular
science to a narked extent, and of others to a minor
extent. Clock-mending is largely a matter of
dynamic#, Themes is even a close historical
association /
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association between some sciences and techniques -
for instance between geometry and surveying, as the
name of the former shows.
(333) My object in this general discussion of the
distinctions and relationships between techniques and
sciences has been two-fold. first, it will I think
help us to sort out the role of Freud's autopheno-
:menomorphic model in his technique, and secondly it
will help us to decide whether there is anything at
all unique or unusual in this role.
(339) First of all, I think it is clear that if we
are adopting the usage I advocated earlier in this
chapter we must call psychoanalysis not a technique
but a sub-technique. It is a sub-technique of the
technique of psychotherapy. Like other techniques
proper, this can be defined solely by its end, which
is the remedying of psychological disorders. As I
pointed out in the Introduction,there are two main
divisions of sub-techniques, the physiological and
the semantic, which are classified according to the
means they employ. It is of course the sonantre
techniques in which we are interested. They can bo
sub-divided /
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sub-divided into the environmental (which seek to alter
not the patient but his environment J and the personal^
(which seek to produce a change in the dispositions of
the patient himself. It is the pers o na } in
which we are interested. Tliey can be arranged in a
scale according to the extent to which they are mandatory
(that is, seek to produce the change by persuasion,
instruction, hypnosis^, suggestion and so forth) or
maieuticu (that is, seek to assist the natural
development in the patient of beneficial processes).
This last classification is a range rather than a
sub-division, since no sub-tcchnicjue is wholly mandatory
or wholly maieutic. Psychoanalysis is probably the
most maieutic, but oven so it has its mandatory
exponents like Ferenczi,
(540) / .
•Uarl iiogers distinguishes these under the names "en¬
vironmental" and "client-centered". He describes
fbrns of "counseling" which employ only "environmental"
sub-technique^, but himself favours the latter for
genuine disorders of personality. Another example of
"environmental" technique is the improvement of the
morale of industrial workers by attention to their
amenities.
^iygnosis can of course be used to assist a maieutic
sub-technique•
GI have deliberately chosen "maieutic", hich is reminiscent
of the Socratic method, because such sub-teclmiques seem to
me to rest on the uasi-hocratic assumption that the
innntdf tlio forces needed for liis own euro,
an assumption which is the psychiatric counterpart of the
Hip ocratie vis medlcatrix naturae. The term "cathartic"
is scoetimos used, but is unsuitable foryiy purpose,
partly because some "maieutic" sub-techniques are not
"cathartic", partly because this term implies too much as
to the nature of the cure; it is almost a "definition by
model"•
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(340) I spoke in the last chapter of the science on
which the technique of psychoanalysis was based.
Though it was a loose manner of speech, it did not
mislead at that stage. But i;e must now consider -
(i) whether the sub-technique uses the model
of this science and of no other;
(ii) conversely, whether this model con be
used by psychoanalysis and by no other
technique or sub-technique,
I think that the answer to the first of those questions
is an indubitable "Mo". The sub-technique uses at
least one other model or set of models, hich is that
on which the technique of medicine is based. One of
a psychoanalysts tasks is to decide, both before and
during treatment, whether his patients* somatic
symptoms are of the sort that are best treated by his
sub-technique or by medicine: this is the chief
reason why the Institute of Psychoanalysis insist that
a psychoanalyst should either be a medical practitioner
or should work under the supervision of one.
(341} The second question is not quite so easily
answered. Academic sychologists are making increasing
use of Freudian concepts, among them his autophenomeno-
imorphic model (see for example knight*s HIP, 1948,
Oh. AVI J
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Oh. XVI et seq., and other Introauct ions to Psychology) ;
and their science of psychology is used in techniques
other than psychotherapy - for example, aptitude-
testing and industrial relations# But my impression
is that the use of the Freudian model in these techniques
is the exception rather than the rule. hor does the
use of the model in anthropology prove anything; for
one thing, it is now loss fashionable to aalce this use
of it; but, more important still, anthropology is a
science and not a technique. that is more to the
point is the way in which the Freudian model has been
used in literature, drama and dramatic and literary
criticism: although even here some people might deny
that we are dealing with techniques. Again, its use
in techniques such as the education and upbringing of
children (which must surely be regarded as separate
from any therapeutic technique) is advocated and
demonstrated by Pfister. It is time that there ore
other techniques concerned with the behaviour of human
beings that do not seem to find much use for it -
politics, for example. But the people who would
deny that it has any utility at all outside psycho¬
therapy are probably those who i.ould deny its utility
for psychotherapy• Finally, I cannot see any
a priority
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a TJrlorl reason for regarding the model as unsuitable
for use in other techniques; there is nothing about
the model itself which suggests that it is a "one-
technique" model,
(548) that about the position within the technique of
psychotherapy? Is the model used by other sub-
techniques? It is tempting to suggest that it might
be the use of this model that distinguishes psycho¬
analysis from the other psychotherapeutic sub-
techniques; this would enable me to define psycho¬
analysis neatly, as "the psychotherapeutic sub-technique
that uses the autophenomenomorphic model". But X
distr st this for two reasons, f irst I should
to find the distinction between sub-techniques in a
difference of practical method, as in the examples I
gave in paragraph 518, I should be surprised to find
that the only difference between two sub-techniques
lay in their explanatory models; if I did, I should be
strongly inclined to uoubt whether there was any real
difference between the models - that is, whether they
did not consist of the same parts, or concepts, under
other names. For if the models really differed in
important respects, I should expect to find differences
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I should prefer in that case to distinguish them, as we
normally do v;ith sub-technicjues, by. those practical
methods rather than by their models. Secondly, I
think that what we actually find when we look at the
facts supports this argument. Other sub-techniques -
for example, those of June- and Adler - make use of
autophenomenoiaorphic models. They differ from the
Freudian unconscious in the entities they contain:
Jung's animus and anirna have no counterpart among the
entities xjg studied in Chapter 3.*7 But the differences
between the practical methods of the sub-techniques is
more marked; the Jungion one makes very little use of
the revival of memories, and past emotions, and more
use of attempts, sometimes less maioutic than mandatory,
to alter the patient's way of reacting to his present
environmentThere is no need to resort to
differences /
7 u — ——
'Although there are counterparts of a sort in the
internalised good and bad objects of the object-
relations theory of Fairbairn.
8Jungians are not given to precise descriptions of their
therapeutic methods. But a little can be gleaned
from Ch. 5 of Frieda Fordham's UP, 1953, where she
says, for example "To work only backwards and downwards -
i.e. looking for traumas in infancy - can have a
destructive rather than a healing effect ..." Again,
Jacob!, in a very unsatisfactory chapter on "The
practical application of Jung's theory", says "Freud
employs a reductive method, Jung a prospective one.
Freud treats the material analytically, resolving the
present into the past, Jung syrrbhetically, building
up out of the actual situation toward the future"
(PCGJ, 1942, p. 67).
887
differences between models to distinguish psychoanalysis
from other sub-techniques.
(345) One more way may be suggested in which the
relationship between the concepts and the technique of
psychoanalysis may be unusual or even unique. Roughly
speaking, it i3 this: in the exercise of the technique
it is necessary that the subject of it (i.e. the
"analysund"") as well as the practitioner (i.e. the
analyst) should think in terms of the concepts. If
this is so, it seems, at first sight at least, to dis-
itinguish this technique very sharply from techniques
practised on inanimate objects (shoos need not share tho
cobbler's notions of how to repair them) and even from
remedial techniques practised on animate objects. A
veterinary surgeon does not trouble his subjects with
theory. Even in physical medicine the same is broadly
true; the fact that sufferers from some ailments
recover more frequently or more rapidly if they share
the doctor's belief (or what they take to be his




^Having demonstrated my familiarity with this curious
word, I do not propose to use it again. It is
■i i i Agi+.-ir,mt.oT being a Latin gerundive of a Greek
verbT If anything, it should oe "cjial^u^iius".
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(544) I think: that Professor Macmurray was the first
to draw attention to this feature of psychoanalysis,
in liis chapter on "The theory and x>ractice of psycho-
jtherapy" in "The Boundaries of Science" (pp. 172-3).
He is not of course concerned, here or elsewhere in
his book, with the relationship between techniques and
their concepts. He is, I think, ioaking the point that
there is a practical as well as a theoretical
justification for making use of the concept of the
unconscious. He says -
"The proper distinction seems to be, originally,
that between acting consciously and acting
unconsciously, rather than between o. eonsclous¬
iness and an unconscious. There is, however,
a practical motive underlying the adoption of
the hypothesis of the unconscious which concerns
our purpose more nearly. The practice of
psychotherapy involves a relation between doctor
and patient in which the doctor has to diagnose
a disease which has its seat in the subjective
processes which lie behind the behaviour of the
patient. The problem for doctor and patient
alike is to understand why the patient behaves
in a way which is unsatisfactory to himself.
In other words, both doctor and patient are
under the practical necessity of trying to
understand the motivation of the patient*s
behaviour. How if the doctor is to help the
patient to discover the motivation of his
behaviour it is necessary that the patient
should adopt the same attitude to his behaviour
as the doctor does. The doctor ... is
compelled to adopt an objective attitude and to
arrive at his conclusions by inference from
what he can observe and what the patient can
tell him. The patient therefore must adopt
must consider it as if it were the behaviour




It makea no difference, of course, for Professor
Macmurray'3 purpose whether a relationship of this kind
makes psychotherapy unusual or perhaps unique among
techniques. But this question is suggested by the
passage I have quoted, and is an interesting one for
my purpose,
(345) We shall not get much further without identify¬
ing fairly precisely the part of the sub-technique of
psychoanalysis at which it is necessary that both
analyst and patient should think in terras of the
unconscious. Let us start with the naive question
"LIust the patient be thinking in terms of the unconscious
whenever his analyst is"? Obviously not. We saw
when we were considering what distinguished psycho¬
analysis from sub-techniques such as the Jungian that
the former relied very largely on the method of
inducing the patient to revive memories and other past
reactions, principally emotions. Until they are
revived, they are not phenomena, either for the patient
or for the technician; they are entities of an
autophenomenomprphic model. ^s it is the technician's
aim to bring about their revival, he must think in
terms of them. lie may not know what the memories
..mrl nr.nt.-inriH are when the analysis begins, although he
may /
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may have an idea of their nature from the nature of the
patient's disorder, and he probably begins to have a
fairly clear idea of the sort of thing that is about to
be revived some time before the patient does. But the
patient does not need to think in terras of this model
throughout the treatment. Iiis job is to toll the
analyst his dreams, attempt free association when the
analyst tells him to, and obey the analyses instruction
not to restrain or conceal any beliefs, emotions, or
other experiences. Indeed, some analysts maintain
that a patient with too much knowledge of Freudian
theory is actually handicapped.
(34-G) At what point, then, in the sub-technique is the
patient required to think in terms of the model? It
seems to me that this point is to be found in an
intermediate technique within the sub-techniquc. when
we were manufacturing a language in which to discuss
techniques (paragraph 318) we saw that within some
techniques there were others, which like techniques or
sub-techniques were definable by their ends, but whose
ends were means toward the end of a technique or
sub-technique • iin example might be the technique of
telescope—making, which includes intermediate technique
such as those—of making lonscg^r of calculating their
curvature /
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curvature and position* The latter of these inter¬
mediate techniques involves the use of the model of
geometrical optics. In the same way there are inter¬
mediate techniques in psychoanalysis. One of these
is "interpretation". Another Is what is called
"control of the transference". It is the former that
involves the use of the model both by patient and
analyst•
(347) "Interpretation" is the technical term for
telling the patient what unconscious thoughts etc. he
must revive in order to be well. In dream-interpretation
it consists of explaining to the patient - almost
always after the latter has attempted free-association -
what unconscious thoughts caused his dream. It can
however take the form of interpretation of the unconscious
entities underlying the waking emotions and other
reactions to waking experience, which the patient
relates to the analyst. It seems to be used, broadly
speaking, in two kinds of situation. The first seems
to be when the analyst judges that the patient is so
nearly able to "derepress" a memory or emotion etc.
that if the analyst describes it to him this will help
to release it. It is, apparently, necessary to time
this sort of explanation' carefull^i~sinee-ni£-it is
premature /
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premature it will merely strengthen tlie patient*s
"resistance11 to the revival of whatever it is. The
other sort of situation is that in which the patient
produces in the process of analysis emotions etc.
(such as excessive dislike or affection for the analyst)
which the analyst considers are analogous to those
which, in unconscious form, are responsible for abnormal
behaviour or emotions outside the consulting-room
(such as excessive nervousness or anxiety in the
patient*s relations with his employer or superior).
(34®) It is possible to argue that the model is also
used in "free association", but I think that this is
only plausible through a confusion. Free association
(when it works) produces in the patient a series of
conscious thoughts. During the process it is not
necessary for the analyst - and it would probably
impede the patient - to think of these thoughts (or
their causes) as being unconscious. It is after the
process of free association has been brought to a
successful conclusion that the analyst explains to the
patient that the later thoughts in the series either
are or are closely akin to thoughts that have hitherto
been repressed. But this explanation is of course
not~~frce association but interpretation.
(349) /
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{349} How does the use of the model, as a result of
interpretation, help the patient? Here I must once
again issue a warning against the "recognition"
fallacy which I desci'ibed in Chapter 2. Recognition
is not derepression. The patient who recognises the
emotion that he ought to revive is not thereby
reviving it, although a properly timed recognition,
according to the psychoanalysts, helps him to revive
it. How does it do so? The simplest answer is that
it tells the patient what to look for, as it were;
if he recognises that the emotion he is trying to
make conscious is fear, he will look out for the first
traces of this emotion and when he encounters them
will encourage them, instead of disregarding or re¬
pressing them. If this were the whole ansv/er, the
patient would be using the model in much the same way
as the analyst - that is in what I shall call the
"diagnostic" way. When used diagnostically, it tells
both analyst and patient what to look for, and what to
encourage and dwell on when they find it, just as a
tentative diagnosis of cancer from a patient*s account
of his symptoms tolls a doctor what to look for. If
this were the whole truth, tIiex'o is ciGaily notnxng
essential, from the patient*s point of view, in the
rolo of "the model-;- for wliy need the analyst- represent
to /
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to the patient that what must be revived is there "in
the unconscious"? Why should 1b not merely toll the
patient what to look out for, and leave words like
"unconscious" alone?
(350) But I should like to suggest that it is not
quite so simple as this. For the explanation I have
given - although I think it is the one that the
orthodox Freudian mi, jit approve - does not explain
how recognition helps to overcome resistance. In
other words, before recognition can work in the way I
have suggested, the force of repression must have been
sufficiently overcome to allow the patient at least
occasional faint glimpses of the emotion or memory
that he must revive. If this diagnostic way were tho
only way in which tho model helped the patient to
revive what he must revive, interpretation must be a
very unimportant end far from essential intermediate
technique.
(351) What do the Freudians themselves say about its
importance? Glover considers it import tint enough to
be tho subject of four out of the eleven chapters of
ITPA. But his summing-up is this
"Discussion /
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"Discussion emphasised this difference in
estimation of tlie value of the patient's
intellectual co-operation between the ex-
:treines of those who considered it essential
and those who regarded it as either
negligible or ineffective ... There
appeared also a moderate section. These
maintained that, in general the value of
co-operation must vary with the patient's
degree of insight, but that refusal of
co-operation might easily mean undesirable
mid unnecessary frustration". (ITPA, 1940
p. 17-18)
We must not make tho mistake of assuming that the
psychoanalysts whoso views arc summarised by Glover
have reasoned as I have been reasoning in this Chapter.
But this passage suggests to me that if some of then -
those who considered interpretation "negligible or
ineffective", were asked whether the model played
nothing but a diagnostic role in its use by both
analyst and patient, they would say "Yes": while
others - those who consider it "essential" - would
maintain that, at least in its use by the patient, it
must have another role. For if they consider inter¬
pretation essential, it must surely be because it is
of help before the proces^f derepression has begun,
since by then the battle is half-won.
(352) I myself think that they are probably right, and
it pirns novo than a diagnostic Part In the
patient's thinlcino But I am not do sure that they
would /
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would agree with my idea of the other way in which it
works. Let us take the case of a patient who knows
that what he must revive is his childhood hatred of
his brother, but who has not yet re. ched the stage at
which this emotion is dimly and very occasionally felt.
Recognition is therefore of no use to him. But ho is,
I think, helped in his efforts by thinking of the
emotion as present in himself unconsciously, in a way
in which he would not be helped if he merely thought of
it as an emotion which he had once felt and which it
would do him good to feel again. iin analogy may make
clearer what I mean. If a man is made to stand with
his eyes shut, and someone else says to him firmly
and convincingly "You are falling now", his body will
begin to sway. This is the "body-sway" test of
sug estibility. The analogy lies in this, that the
subject is hold that he _is falling now, and not merely
that he could fall or that he used to fall as a child
or that he ought to fall. (I should think that the
effect of such information would be nil). In the same
way the analyst's patient is encouraged to revive what
he must revive by having it described to him as
something already present, and not as something from
his past. I call this the "suggestive" function of
should /
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should not have both the diagnostic and the suggestive
function for the same patient, at different stages in
the revival of the same thing. Indeed, it my well
be that the model has both functions for some analysts:
in its suggestive function it may well be what gives
them the confidence that what must be revived can be
revived. However this may be, I think that for the
analyst the main function is the diagnostic one, while
for the patient it is the suggestive one,
(353) The recognition of the "suggestive" role of the
model of the unconscious helps us to understand why,
for psychoanalytic purposes, an autophenomenomorphic
model is preferable to an allophenomenomorphic one.
a model that consists of entities, such as ideas or
emotions, with which the patient is familiar from
ov ry-day introspection is much more likely to have
the suggestive effect I have described than one that
consists of libido, cathexes, ego-dystonic processes
and the other entities of the Freudian metapsychology -
or, for that matter, than the allophenomenoraorphic
models of neurologists or other psychologies. I am
not however maintaining that the Freudian autopiieno-
:menomorpliic model is the only suitable one xor
p syj choanalytic -f
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psychoanalytic purposes, or even the most suitable;
I have already mentioned the illein-Fairbairn "object-
relation model" as a formidable rival.10
(354) I have not yet dealt with an obvious question.
Put into ordinary language, this is "Heed the analyst
believe in the unconscious as well as the patient?"
It is this sort of question which I can, I think,
answer more easily as a result of my discussions of
models and techniques. for the question can now be
put more precisely in this way:-
"must a psychoanalyst who induces his patient
to revive what must be revived by means of
the Freudian model be either -
(a) one vho believes that the model is a
corresponding one; or
("b) one who does not believe this, but
believes it to be the best one that
both he and the patient could use; or
(c) one who believes neither of these
things, but considers it the best
model for the patient tqlise, but
inferior to some other for his own
use? "
(355) I think it is clear that to stand any change
of /
his~TeT "fhm "practical -aspeat of_ the logical quest ion
"What sort of thing can properly be called uneonscmms? ,
to which I suggested a purely a prior® answer m
paragraph 311.
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of success "by employing tlie Freudian model the analyst
must hold something like one of these beliefs (please
note that I am not saying that he must use the
Freudian mode-ylf he is to stcuid any chance of success).
For an analyst who held that the model was non-
corfespending and inferior to some other for use by
both patient and analyst, and who nevertheless
persisted in using it, is surely a possibility that we
need net consider. An even more academic possibility
is one who holds that it is corresponding but inferior
to some other! 80 that if the question means "Must an
analyst, to succeed, belong to one of the categories
(a), (b), or (c), the answer is surely "Yes". But if
it means "Must he belong to category (a)?" then I think
the answer is probably "No". For I believe that
to-day a good many analysts, who claim success by the
use of the Freudian model, belong to category (c).
Anyone who reads Dr. Brierleyfs TP cannot fail to
receive the impression that neo-Freudian analysts tend
to think in terms of the metapsychological model to
which I have briefly referred in earlier chapters,
but at the same time to use the autophenomenomorphic
model when they are talking to their pat lents(Jam
excluding here the illein-Fairba±rn school, whose
model I hqyr nTreacly ^QAn-rlhrid in Unapter 3 as the
descendant /
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descendant of Freud's autophenomenomorpliic one). I
get the same impression from Glover's IfPA. This
does not prove that a belief of type (c) is more
effective than a belief of type (a); but it shows
that (c) has a certain survival value, and thus that
it is not essential to belong to type (a). And If
it is possible for one who believes (c) to be a
psychoanalyst, it follows a fortiori that a believer in
(cl) can be.
(356) -ALl that this proves, however, is that if the
Freudian model of the unconscious is used in psycho-
:analysis, it is the patient who must use it, mainly
because of its suggestive function, although possibly
also for its diagnostic function. But is It
essential that it should be used in psychoanalysis?
Obviously this is the sort of question that cannot
be finally answered on a priori grounds, but requires
clinical experience and might even be the subject of
experiment. All I can do here is to suggest that if
the arguments I have put forward in this chapter come
anywhere near the truth, there is no logical reason,
why the use of the model should be essential. if X
am right in describing its functions in interpretation
301
as diagnostic and suggestive, then I do not see why
it should not he possible for analysis to be carried
on without it. For I do not see why it should not
be possible to induce a patient to revive what must
be revived without assistance either from the
suggestion or from the diagnosis it provides, I
realise that the practical difficulties may be great,
although not insuperable, if we can judge by the
number of analysts who told Glover than interpretation
was negligible or ineffective. But I think it is
most important to recognise that the role of the
unconscious in analysis is a facilitating role and
not a logically essential one; it is, as it were, not
the conjurer himself, but the conjurer's assistant,.
(357) So far in this chapter I have treated psycho-
:analysis as a remedial technique. As I pointed out,
however, at the end of Chapter IV, its opponents have
challenged its efficacy as a remedy for neurosis:
and though the statistical argument used by Eysends
is defective because of its unsatisfactory and in-
:complete data, the challenge cannot bo ignored. In
that chapter, 1 suggested that Freud would have done
well to base his argument from results upon the more
can /
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can produce in its subjects certain recollections and
emotions. What I want to point out here is that in
the present chapter I have been suggesting a view of
the part played by the concept of the unconscious in
this technique, and that this view can be held whether
you believe that the technique is a remedial one or
merely that it is one capable of fulfilling this more
modest claim,
(358) Another point which is worth making is that even
if you believe in psychoanalysis as a remedial
technique, it is still possible to hold a number of
different views on the question of how it achieves
its beneficial effects. You may believe,for example,
that it does so by temporarily turning certain rather
complicated habits or automatic responses into
deliberate, attentive responses, which can thus be
replaced by other deliberately learned responses that
have been selected, either by patient or analyst, as
more desirable; Macmurray has suggested qfrieu of this
kind in BS (1939, Ch, 5). Or you may believe that the
true remedy lies in the establishment of a satisfactory
relationship between patient and analyst, which
corrects the effects of an unsatisfactory child—parent
relationship, /
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relationship. Guntrip has suggested this view in
TIT (1953), and it may, for all I laiow, he the orthodox:
view of the "ohjest-relation" school, to which he
belongs. Glover, on the other hand, seems to regard
all repressed "processes" as constituting one or more
subsidiary egos (he calls them "ego-nuclei") which
interfere with the organisation and control of the ego
proper until they are brought within its organisation
by analysis (see Brierley, TP, 1951, p. 39, 49-5S);
this may very well amount to Macmurray1 s explanation
in different vords. And there are no doubt ether
accounts. The point I want to make is that my view
of the role of the unconscious in the technique does
not commit the holder of it to any particular explanation
of how the technique has a beneficial effect. It Is
true that it would rule out explanations that made
explorations of the patient's memories, emotions and
desires superfluous; indeed it seems to me that
Guntrip does not make it sufficiently clear why, on
his view, these should be helpful. But so far as
other explanations tire concerned, the view I have
suggested does not favour one or the other.
(359) It remains to decide whether this "diagnostic-
ouaostive" function that I have ascribed to Urn notion—
of /
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of the -unconscious in the internediate technique of
psychoanalytic interpretation is unique, or whether
it has parallels in other techniques. I think that
this is worth considering not "because of any strictly
logical conclusions that could he drawn if we decided
that the function is unique, hut simply because of the
suspicion or prestige that is apt to attach itself to
the unique. It is perhaps worth pointing out that
if we fail to find a satisfying analogy elsewhere, this
will he quite consistent with ray view that the concept
is not essential to the sub-technique of psychoanalysis.
For in that case it is quite conceivable that there are
techniques which are comparable to psychoanalysis but
which, for one reason or another, do not find it
necessary to employ a concept in the diagnostic-
suggestive role. In other words, what is inessential
in theory but may be essential in practice to psycho-
:analysis may well be inessential to another technique
both in theory and in practice. I issue this warning
in case the only analogies I can offer are considered
too thin.
(360) In my search for an analogy X must of course
mention Wisdom's "Philosophy and Psychoanalysis", in
which /
which he points to a similarity between these two
techniques (X think he would call tliem both techniques).
If I understand him, he things that there are similar- K
:ities between both their ends and their means. Both
appear at first sight to be intended to answer
questions of fact fUhat is colour?" or "what did you
see in the wood-shed at the age of five?") but in both
cases this is illusory, since they are really intended
to alter people's reactions. The reactions that
concern philosophers are verbal usages, while the
psychoanalysts are interested in producing different
or less intense emotional reactions. I think, too,
though I am not certain, that Wi&clom would also point
to analogies between the methods used by the two
techniques. Both are of course semantic; both
require the "patient" to think of himself as in certain
situations and to report on his reactions, linguistic
in one case, emotional in the other.
(301) It may well be that Wisdom's analogy, fully
worked out, would show that there is a concept, or
concepts, in philosophy that play a similar part to
that of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. But he
does not work it out, and as he does not - except by
occasional implication - let us know how he thxiiks
that /
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that psychoanalysis works, I cannot toll whether he
would agree with the "diagnostic-suggest ivo" part that
I have assigned to the unconscious. lior can I imagine
what sort of concepts the philosophical analogies
would be. And in any case, the real nature of the
ends and the neons of philosophy is itself a subject
just as controversial as that of psychoanalysis; so
that even if Wisdom or I succeeded in producing an
analogy, it would convince only those who held the same
vie, s 011 both techniques.
(362) There are of course renty of examples of non-
corresponding models used by techniques in diagnostic
roles - one is an engineer's diagram of the stresses
in a structure such as a bridge. There are also
examples of non-corresponding models used in suggestive
roles; there is the geometry-teacher's trick of
proving the impossibility of something - such as the
meeting of parallel lines of finite length - by asking
the pupil to sup ose that the impossible is the case
and then to work out the logical consequence, "which",
as the proof concludes, "is absurd". The difficulty
is not to find such examples, but to find ones that
combine the diagnostic and the suggestive roles of a
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noil-corfesponding model. The trouble is that, like
wisdom*s philosophical analogy, the nature of
important techniques is usually controversial. Take
for example the case of the Sunday-school teacher who
has among her charges a child who lies and steals.
She may diagnose his trouble as a failure to recognise
the rightness and wrongness of actions, and she may
regard these qualities as being capable of recognition
in the same way as red or green are recognisable. She
may succeed in improving the child*s behaviour by
• inducing him to share this view of ethical qualities,
although it may in fact be a non-corresponding model.
The trouble about this example is that there are people
who would not agree that tne model is non-corresponding.
(363) It is easy, however, to find non-controversial
parallels among trivial techniques. There is the
share-pusher, for example, who wants to create a demand
for his shares in order that the price shall go up.
lie knows very well that there is no demand at the
moment, and he reasons that if he can create the
belief that there is a demand, people will hasten to
buy them. He therefore spreads a rumour tlx at people
are buying his shares, and before long this mistaken
belief /
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belief has brought about a state of affairs corresp-
:onding to the rumour. Or again tnere is the
journalist or politician who wishes to start a
campaign that will provide him with news or prestige.
He selects some not too far-fetched measure - such as
the construction of a large and imposing public work -
and he begins to talk about the "widespread and almost
universal demand for it". Before long the belief that
other people are demanding this measure induces some
people to desire it, either because they fear to bo in
a minority or because they believe that what a lot
of people want is a good thing to have.
(364) It would be easy to multiply trivial examples
like these. The difficulty of finding a non-
controversial example of an important and widely used
technique to which the diagnostic-suggestive use of a
non-corresponding model is a practical necessity is
no coincidence. lor to be effective in a suggestive
role a model must not be widely recognised as non-
corresponding, or it will cease to have the intended
effect upon the subject of the technique.
(365) /
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(365) I have gone, I think, as far into the relation¬
ship between this particular principle of scientific
inference and this particular sub-techni rue as X can
go without involving myself in questions that are not
only extremely controversial but also call for
experiment rather than philosophical discussion.
"Ex cathedra" does not mean "from the armchair"•
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(3G6) I am not;, I think, in a position to review very
briefly the results of this examination of Freud*s
unconscious. In the interests of brevity I shall
omit arguments and minor conclusions, and state the
main conclusions dogmatically, without any of the
reservations that accompany them in the preceding
chapters.
IH'rHQiJUCTIQn.
(367) Freud's work consisted of three separate
things, each of which came from different sources.
iiis technique - so far as it was not his own discovery -
came from the French psychiatrists; his meta-
:psychology, which was to become thqdanguage of the
main neo-Freudian school, from the laboratory of
Bruclce: and his psychology from Herbert. The
Freudian notion of the unconscious really belongs to
his psychology, but he was led to adopt it by the
results achieved with his technique.
(368) Freud's theory of the relationship between
mind and body was a type of emergence theory. He
regarded his unconscious as helping to bridge the
apparent /
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apparent gap between physiological processes and the
phenomena of consciousness. He thought, however,
that his metapsychology came nearer than either
physiological or psychological language to describing
the real nature of mental processes. This really
implied that consciousness was epiphenomenal, which
is an odd thing for Freud to hold, but not inconsistent
with an emergence view of mental processes,
OiihPTEU I.
(369) Freud equated "consciousness" with "intro¬
spect ibility". But because he did not properly
distinguish between introspect ion and things such as
simultaneous undiscriminating awareness or self-




B. potentialities not the subject of
self-description.
He also mistook the difference between preconsclous¬




(370) The following things, according to Freud, were
















by ideas and in the





(371) Freud thought that there were things that were
always unconscious, but did not think they differed
in kind from those that were sometimes conscious and
sometimes unconscious. They consisted of "racial
memories". These were of much less importance to
Freud than to Jung. Freud did not believe in the
collective unconscious in the full Jungian sense,





(372) Repression (apart from the act of repression,
which was probably introspectible) was conceived by
Freud as a force exercised upon unconscious ideas to
keep them out of consciousness, in opposition to the
instincts, which were also forces and were trying to
push them into consciousness. If we consider the
alternatives to the notion of repression, which I call
"non-recognition" and "substituted action", we see
not
that the former does/let us give a satisfactory
account of the effects of the "repressed". The latter,
on the other hand, turns out to be, not an alternative
to the Freudian "repression", but something of a
different logical status. The Freudian explanation
and the substituted action explanation are related to
each other in the same way as scientific models are
related to purely descriptive laws.
(373) Scientific models can be classified according
to their "phenomenomorphism". Highly phenomenomorphic
models are either "autophenomenomorphic" (like the
Freudian unconscious) or "allophonomenomorphic" (like
the Freudian metapsychology)• They can also be
according to t.hethor they are "corroopondlns"
■hon-corresponding" or "unverified". 'i'he fact that the
Freud ion /
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Freudian unconscious entities are ex hyoothesi
unintrospectible does not moan that the model is
therefore unverifiable.
ClhiPTER 5,
(374) The chief entity of the Freudian model of
the unconscious is the "idea". VJhen they are driven
out of consciousness and preconsciousness, ideas are
stripped of the visual or verbal images in v/hich they
were clothed: hence their unintrospoctibility. At
the same time, they are indestructible, like the
matter of nineteenth-century physics. They might be
described as "permanent possibilities of introspection",
and are thus more like potentialities than observable
entities, that is, more like such model-entities as
isotherms than chromosomes.. Freud*s belief in their
permanence, however, was due to a confusion between
the act and the content of ideation. This explains
why he believed that ideas, which have content, can
be unconscious, while affects, which have none, cannot.
(575) In neo-Freudianism, ideas have been replaced by
two alternative notions. The "process school" have
really /
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really taken the "process" of Freud * s metapsychology
and made this into the entity of their model, to which
the term "unconscious" is quite inappropriate. The
Klein-Fairbairn school, on the other hand, have
refined the "idea-plus-affectH into the "object-relation",
which is, even more clearly than the "idea", the entity
of a "potentiality-model", and cannot be regarded as
"corresponding", although Freud would have maintained
that his model was.
(376) Freud maintained that part of the ego - the
part that exerted repression - was unconscious. His
notion of the ego began by being a simple, uncomplicated
entity, with the sole function of repressing and being
motivated by ideas under the impulsion of the instincts.
It soon became necessary, however, to attribute to it
other kinds of behaviour, and it eventually ceased to
be a cog-wheel and turned into a manikin. Freud
distinguished it from the id by saying that it consisted
of the same sort of constituents, but in an organised
form. But the "organisation-ego" really belongs to
Freud's metapsychological process-model: a different
kind of entity is needed (and is sometimes found in
occasional remarks of his) to act as a recipient for
the Tdeas of theadtophenoaenemorphxc-modeJL, The
unconsciousness /
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unconsciousness of part of the ego is inferred from
tlie mistaken assumption that repression (as distinct
from the act of repression) and. thqbrganisat ion of the
ego are the sort of things that could conceivably be
introspected.
(377) It is difficult to determine the relationship
between the so-called unconscious parts of the ego and
the super-ego. They may have been one and the same,
or the former may have been visualised as acting under
the pressure of the latter. If, as seems likely, the
two were separate, the unconscious superego may be a
complex of ideas (sometimes called the "ego-ideal")
which acts upon the ego just as other unconscious
ideas, and is in fact (thought Jfreud would not have
admitted it) a miniature and very specialised id. The
superego is really an attempt to describe certain
kinds of learning-phenomena.
(378) freud talks of "unconscious processes", and it
is important to know whether this means that his
unconscious was the sort of place in which change and
action went on. hut his ideas were processes only
in the metapsychological sense, and while he spoke of
~
"iiHi'.m imp/I oua ghaut as ion", these may only have been groups
of /
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of ideas which, could produce a phantasy if made
conscious. When he tallcs of unconscious processes
he usually means the dream-work. But the four so-
called unconscious processes of the dream-work turn
out to he relations between unconscious and conscious
(or preconscious) mental entities, and not something
involving change or development in the unconscious
itself. The conscious (and preconscious) mind is
like the action of a play, but the unconscious is a
tableau, whose characters resemble those of the play,
and are sometimes removed to take part in it or
added to by players expelled from it, but otherwise
stand for ever in frozen immobility,
CHhPTBR 4,
(379) Of Freud's four arguments for the unconscious,
three are logically unsound - the arguments from other
minds, from discovered causes and from continuity.
These three are "laboratory arguments", whereas the
fourth, the argument from results, is a "consulting-
room argument". Only the fourth has any force. But
it was overstated by ITeud, who claimed that his
assumption helped him to construct a successful
therapout ic method, It. wo lei have been more prudent
to /
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to claim only that -
"The model of the unconscious is of more help
than tiny other in the application of a technique
that enables us to produce in patients certain
emotions, recollections and other mental pheno¬
mena."
CHaPTER 5.
(380) The pure science of psychoanalysis is
explanatory, not descriptive, although it is responsible
for many acute observations about human behaviour.
It is possible to formulate psychoanalytic laws so that
they, and statements about them, fit into Toulmin*s
classification of scientific law-like statements.
But Toulmin also points out that in addition to lows
explanatory sciences use "principles of inference".
Allers* "axioms of psychoanalysis" are not principles
of inference, but are statements that you can make
sense of mental phenomena by treating than as if they
obeyed the laws of other sciences, such as physics.
But in order to adopt this advice it Is necessary
to regard cert; In expected phenomena as present when
they are not observable - that is, as being in the
unconscious. Unconsciousness is thus a scientific
principle of inference. It i-q nn expedient uhich is
needed /
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needed to apply to the explanation of complex kinds
of human behaviour the principle of "no action at a
distance in time", and it does this by treating past
states as if they were present. If we also take
account of the Freudian instincts and their crypto-
:teleology, the unconscious also to a certain extent
represents hypothetical future events as present.
This explains its "timelessness",
CitAfTKK 6,
(381) The role of the unconscious in psychoanalysis
will be fully understood only by recognising that the
latter is a technique and by clearing up the nature
of the relationship between techniques and sciences.
Techniques are systems of rules for achieving classes
of ends, Sciences are either descriptions of
regularities in phenomena or these plus statements
about explanatory models and their uses. Techniques
can have "sub-techniques", which make use of alternative
way3 of achieving the object of the technique, and
also "intermediate techniques", which achieve ends
that are means toward the main end, Explanatory
sciences, which almost always make use of models, are
of trr* t" t^nhn* qnon thpr ri^o-i ptave sciences,
and /
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and explanatory sciences are sometimes distinguished
or sub-divided according to the model they use. But
no technique, sub-technique or intermediate technique
need be defined in this way (with the possible
exception of statements about models, which may prove
to be a highly specialised kind of technique). The
subject-matters of techniques do not divide up along
the same lines of division as the subject-roatters of
sciences. Each technique makes use of more than one
science, and this is one of the ways in which
techniques can be distinguished from applied sciences.
Techniques do not have their own peculiar sciences.
(382) It is not difficult to fit psychoanalysis into
this pattern. It is a sub-technique of the technique
of psychotherapy. This lias as its end the remedying
of psychological disorders. Its sub-techniques can
be classified first into the physiological and the
semantic. The latter can be divided Into the
environmental and the personal. - The latter can
be arranged in a scale according to the extent to which
they are mandatory or raaieutic. Psychoanalysis is
probably the most maieutic. Like other techniques xt
is based on more than one explanatory science, and
^hor^fT'-3 mnvft tban one model. It is uistinguiohed
from /
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from other sub-techniques not by its use of the
Freudian autophenomenomorphic model, but by its
practical method, which lays emphasis on the revival
of past memories and emotions. There is no logical
reason why the use of the Freudian model should be
confined to this technique, and it can in fact be
argued that other techniques can or do use it.
(333) So far the relationship between psychoanalysis
and the model follows the normal pattern. But it is
not evory technique in which it is considered necessary
for the subject as well as the technician to think in
terms of the model. This takes place not in the sub-
teclmique of psychoanalysis as a whole but in the
intermediate technique called "interpretation". This
is-the technical terra for telling the patient what
.memories, emotions etc. he must revive in order to
be well. In the '• interpreter's" thinking the model
plays a "diagnostic" role. In the patient's thinking
it can play a diagnostic role, but this would not
justify the great importance which some analysts attach
to this sub-technique, and I suggest that its most
important role is a "suggestive" one. This explains
why an autophenomenomorphic model is prexerable xor
psychoanalytic /
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psychoanalytic purposes to other hinds. It is not
essential for tno psychoanalyst to "believe that it is
a corresponding model; he need only believe that it
is the best model for the patient to regard as
corresponding. It may in practice be difficult to do
without a ode! of this sort for psychoanalytic
purposes, but there is no logical reason why inter¬
pretation should not be carried out without it, and
sorae analysts do not even consider interpretation a
very important intermediate technique. This view
of the role of the unconscious is consistent with the
modified form which I have suggested for Freud*s
argument from results, and also with different theories
• s to how psychoanalysis achieves its beneficial
results (if it is held that it has beneficial results).
It is also possible to find other non-corresponding
models that play analogous roles in other techniques
although these analogies are either controversial or
trivial, for the very good reason that, if the
technique were an important one, the model could not
be generally accepted as non-corresponding without




(384) The Freudian unconscious has suffered from an
excess of both scepticism and mysticism. The
sceptics have accused it of being unscientific and
of corresponding to nothing in reality. The mystics
have exalted it into something which is not merely as
real as the things of the familiar mind but oven
represents the true reality, of which the mental
things we knov; are only shadows. Both attitudes
arise from the same failure to appreciate its logical
status. If this is seen to be the same as the status
of some of the conceptions used in other sciences, the
question at issue ceases to bo "Is there any such thing?"
and is replaced by two new questions. The first is -
"Does it help the psychoanalyst more than any
other conception to visualise the remedy for
the disorder which he is "trying to alleviate?"
and the second is -
"Does it help the patient more than any other
conception to experience the experiences that
will alleviate his disorder?"
These are questions which I have not tried to answer,
since it is only in the consulting-room that they can
be answered. I have in passing suggested reasons,
historical and logical, why the conception took this
particular /
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particular form. I have also pointed to some
respects in which it has "been improved, or mightyhave
been; no doubt there are many more. An important
question to which I have only made brief references
is -
"From the technical - that is, the therapeutic -
point of view, what are the entities which it
is most effective to refer to as "unconscious"-
should they be emotions, purposes, object-
relations or what?"
This too is the sort of question that is better
answered from the consult ins-room. iron the armchair,
all that I can do is to point out what sort of a
thing it is that the sceptic is trying to put into a
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FREUDIAN TERMS FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO IN THE
TEST Willi TiDiiIR POLISH EQUIVALENTS.
Condensation Yerdichtung
Conscious Bevnisste
Defence Abwehr
Discharge Abfuhr
Displacement Yerschiebung
Dramatisation Darstellung
Ego Ich
Ego-ideal Idealich
Emotions Gofulile
Feeling Eiipfinaung
Id Es
Instinct Trieb
Memory-traces Erinnerungsspuren
Mental representative
«« rtt-
Poychischer ReprasentatA
Organisation Organisation
Perception Uahrnemung
Preconscious Vorbenvusste
Primary process Priiaarvorgang
Process Vorgang
Reflex arc Reflexschema
Repression Yerdrangung
Resistance /
Freudian Terms (Cont&»)
Resistance
Stimulus
Superego
Symbol
Widerstand.
Reiz
Bberich.
Symbol
